Representing archaeological uncertainty in cultural informatics by Sifniotis, Maria
   
 
A University of Sussex DPhil thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
REPRESENTING ARCHAEOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY
IN
CULTURAL INFORMATICS
by
Maria Sifniotis
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the
University of Sussex
July 2012
Declaration
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in
whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.
Signature:
Maria Sifniotis
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX
MARIA SIFNIOTIS
Representing Archaeological Uncertainty in Cultural Informatics
This thesis sets out to explore, describe, quantify, and visualise uncertainty in a
cultural informatics context, with a focus on archaeological reconstructions. For quite
some time, archaeologists and heritage experts have been criticising the often too-
realistic appearance of three-dimensional reconstructions. They have been highlight-
ing one of the unique features of archaeology: the information we have on our herit-
age will always be incomplete. This incompleteness should be reflected in digitised
reconstructions of the past.
This criticism is the driving force behind this thesis. The research examines ar-
chaeological theory and inferential process and provides insight into computer visu-
alisation. It describes how these two areas, of archaeology and computer graphics,
have formed a useful, but often tumultuous, relationship through the years.
By examining the uncertainty background of disciplines such as GIS, medicine,
and law, the thesis postulates that archaeological visualisation, in order to mature,
must move towards archaeological knowledge visualisation. Three sequential areas
are proposed through this thesis for the initial exploration of archaeological uncer-
tainty: identification, quantification and modelling. The main contributions of the
thesis lie in those three areas.
Firstly, through the innovative design, distribution, and analysis of a question-
naire, the thesis identifies the importance of uncertainty in archaeological interpreta-
tion and discovers potential preferences among different evidence types.
Secondly, the thesis uniquely analyses and evaluates, in relation to archaeological
uncertainty, three different belief quantification models. The varying ways that these
mathematical models work, are also evaluated through simulated experiments. Com-
parison of results indicates significant convergence between the models.
Thirdly, a novel approach to archaeological uncertainty and evidence conflict visu-
alisation is presented, influenced by information visualisation schemes. Lastly, sug-
gestions for future semantic extensions to this research are presented through the
design and development of new plugins to a search engine.
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"Where shall I begin, please your
Majesty?" he asked. "Begin at the
beginning," the King said
gravely, "and go on till you come
to the end: then stop."
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Cultural informatics is a broad research area which describes the application of in-
formation technology to the heritage sector. The area has been increasingly active
during the last twenty years due to the lowering costs of technology as well as the
lower barrier of entry. More particularly, the archaeological community has witnessed
a sharp increase in Three-Dimensional (3D) reconstructions of ancient structures. As-
sisted by both advances in technology and lower technical costs, museums, archival
institutions and heritage attractions have been using 3D reconstructions more and
more often.
However, archaeologists and computer scientists have urged caution [1] in the
abundant use of virtual reconstructions because of the possibility of misleading the
public. Existing literature highlights the need for visualisations indicating where ar-
chaeological finds end and reconstruction begins.
Archaeology is both an uncertain discipline and a destructive process. An archae-
ological site can never be excavated and interpreted to its exact ancient dimensions.
This is a one-off process, since once the site is dug and its evidence removed and pro-
cessed, the excavation cannot be repeated. Consequently, archaeological hypotheses
and interpretations also contain the element of uncertainty.
The archaeological community has stressed the need to acknowledge the availab-
ility of other possible hypotheses as well as the difference between what was found
and how it is interpreted. As a result, new approaches have come forward that take
these alternatives under consideration, and attempt to include them in a virtual re-
construction.
1
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This thesis makes contributions in the area of cultural informatics and specifically
in the use of 3D reconstructions as a hypothesis evaluation tool.
The main question of the thesis is:
How can an archaeologist’s belief in a reconstruction be quantified, and how this
belief can be visualised alongside the 3D reconstruction itself?
Before an answer to the question itself can be explored, a number of key concepts
pertaining to the question have to be explained. Firstly, one has to consider, what is
archaeology? How do archaeologists interpret their evidence? What are computer
graphics? What is the relationship that archaeology has with computer graphics?
Section 1.1 serves as an introduction to archaeology, its changing role through the
last century and covers the basics of archaeological theory and inference. Section
1.2 offers a short primer in computer graphics principles such as what makes up a
3D model and the ways that it can be created. Section 1.3 explores the relationship
between the discipline of archaeology and computer graphics; how graphics have
been used as a tool for various archaeological purposes. The criticisms and sugges-
tions that arose from the uses of computer graphics in archaeology are summarised
in Section 1.4. Lastly, Section 1.5 revisits the main question of the thesis and expands
on the different contributions the thesis makes.
1.1 Archaeology
Archaeology is the scientific study of human cultures through the excavation, col-
lection and interpretation of cultural and environmental remains [2]. The width and
breadth of archaeological study is wide, encompassing areas such as cultural history,
human evolution, cultural and individual behaviour, and ecology. This wide expan-
sion of research areas has had two effects: firstly, a difficulty to pinpoint exactly what
the aims of the discipline are; secondly, the inclusion and collaboration with a variety
of other disciplines such as anthropology, palaeobotany, history, geology, mathemat-
ics, computer science, psychology, medicine etc. Even though scientific methods are
used, as mentioned above, archaeology forms the study of human cultures; thus this
makes the discipline also humanistic-oriented in nature.
The most common conception of the first archaeologists brings to mind antiquar-
ians of the 18th—19th century. In reality, archaeology has existed for thousands of
years. Early examples include Flavio Biondo in Europe (15th century), Shen Kuo in
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the East (1088 AD), and in Islamic Egypt Ibn Wahshiyya (9th century AD). However,
until the 19th century, archaeology was mostly expressed as antiquarianism and the
hoarding of strange and ancient objects for personal collections. The first systematic
scientific approach to archaeology by means of empirical examination and develop-
ment of theories, was formulated by J. Winckelmann (early 19th century)–he was the
one who first distinguished between Greek, Greco-Roman and Roman art. Pitt Rivers
(mid 19th century) was one of the first to develop a typology, a method of classify-
ing artefacts according to their characteristics. William Petrie and Mortimer Wheeler
(early and mid 20th century) were two of the most noted British archaeologists due to
their meticulous approach to excavation, detailed record keeping and the dissemina-
tion of archaeology to the public. They developed the methods of seriation (a relative
dating system based on assemblage of artefacts) and the grid system excavation, re-
spectively.
One of the most important technological developments for archaeology in the 20th
century is considered to be radiocarbon dating (Libby, 1949). It brought a revolution
in archaeological dating, allowing archaeologists to reasonably date organic material
and reassess past discoveries. Also about that time, a diversity of ideas emerged, re-
garding what archaeology is, and how it should be applied. This gave rise to the term
archaeological theory. In essence, the term encompasses all the intellectual frameworks
through which archaeologists interpret discovered material remains.
1.1.1 Archaeological theory
The major schools of archaeological thought over the last two centuries are Culture
History, Processualism and post-Processualism:
Culture History (19th—mid 20th century)
Culture History involves the grouping of archaeological sites into distinct cultures,
the determination of geographical spreads of population as well as any interaction
between different cultures [3]. Each culture in essence describes human behaviour
and changes in behaviour could be explained by social and economic exchanges
between cultures.
Processualism (1960s—1970s)
Processualism, or New Archaeology was proposed by Lewis Binford in the 1960s
[4]. It advocated a more scientific view of archaeology where culture was a set of
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behavioural processes. Influenced by other scientific disciplines, the Processualists
advocated the use of hypotheses, scientific method and testing against evidence. To
them, the view of Cultural History put too much importance on culture over the
people themselves.
Post-Processualism (1980s—1990s)
This school of thought, formulated in the 1980s by Hodder, Shanks, Tilley and Miller,
rose as a debate to Processualism [5]. Since theories on cultural change can not be in-
dependently or experimentally verified, then what is considered true is simply what
seems the most reasonable to archaeologists as a whole [6, 7]. Additionally, there
are many cases where the same pattern, or data set, could be interpreted in differ-
ent ways. Hodder, who highlighted this issue based on discoveries on his gathered
data, termed it equifinality. Lastly, post-Processualism stated that since archaeologists
are not perfectly objective, the conclusions they reach will always be influenced by
personal biases [8].
Different though they may be, Processualism and post-Processualism do share
some similarities. They both try to understand whether the knowledge obtained
through study of the past represents the actual past or a possible reconstruction of
the past. For this reason, they both promote the idea that interpretation of the past
always carry biases which have to be acknowledged and ideally, removed [9]. This
element of subjectivity that arises from archaeological inference is quite important
and deserves to be analysed further.
1.1.2 Archaeological inference & subjectivity
Consider the position an average archaeologist is in: she1 has to discover, observe,
catalogue, and analyse present material remains (or, the archaeological record) belong-
ing to ages long past. The remains, as found today, might be strikingly different than
when actually used. The archaeologist has to assign a place, a time, and a recovery
context [10] to those remains in order for them to have some sort of meaning. This
results in the archaeologist gathering data from the remains–the remains are now a
source of data. While place and time can (most of times) be measured quite object-
ively, by for example, stratigraphy or radiocarbon dating, the context is a different
matter. She is asked to interpret those remains, and reconstruct the habits and mean-
ings of past societies, but she has never met them and can not observe them. She can
1She equally means he.
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only make deductions in the here and now of the present. This tentative link, con-
tinuously looping, between material remains, their data, and their use as evidence for
a conclusion, sums up the archaeological inferential process [11].
Thompson [12] suggests that archaeologists use two stages of inference. The
first stage occurs when the material evidence is collected; its significance has to be
weighted. Is this piece of evidence important? Does it carry indicative [12, :327] qual-
ity? One can immediately see that this depends on the individual. What one archae-
ologist might deem as important, perhaps a less experienced one, will not. This is the
first element of subjectivity.
The second level of inference is probative analogy [13]. Much like its legal counter-
part, in the archaeological context it suggests a relationship, a correlation, between
some material evidence and a behaviour or event. However, unlike law, where cur-
rent human behaviour can be correlated with current statistics and data, the archae-
ologist deducts a past behaviour based on present observations. Thus, the archaeolo-
gist has firstly to identify something to correlate her evidence to, and secondly has to
prove that the correlation is strong. This is the second element of subjectivity.
The process of archaeological inference is a process that involves subjectivity; it
is directly related to the individual, their level of knowledge and expertise, as well
as personal biases. This is acknowledged in the archaeological literature while the
various theoretical frameworks, despite their different approaches, agree on the sub-
jectivity involved in interpretation.
Around the time of the post-Processualism development, computers began to be
used in various areas of archaeology such as quantitative analysis, database manage-
ment of archaeological data, Geographical Information Systems (GIS), on-site record-
ing methods, computer learning and 3D representation. As a discipline, archaeology
focuses a lot on illustration as a medium of presenting results, approaches and deduc-
tions. Computer graphics, and the capability for 3D representation mostly excited the
imagination, since there was an opportunity to visualise what until now only existed
as photographs of ruins, or at best an artist’s interpretation. The next section intro-
duces computer graphics principles.
1.2 Computer graphics principles
This section explains notions such as modelling, lighting, texturing and rendering. It
also explores the most common ways to create a 3D model. This provides the set-
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ting for the subsequent analysis of archaeological projects that make use of computer
graphics.
1.2.1 From two to three dimensions
The lowest unit of a two-dimensional picture is a pixel; it represents a single draw-
ing point. It consists of three sub-regions each corresponding to the basic colours:
red, green and blue (RGB), such as in Figure 1.1. Thus, a graphics image is made of
a rectangular grid of independent pixels. This type of display mode is also known
as a raster image. In the late 1970s, Smith and Catmull [14] proposed that the opa-
city/transparency of a pixel is as important as its colour. They extended the RGB
representation by adding the alpha-channel value which represents transparency, thus
resulting to the RGBA pixel.
(a) A pixel with the basic col-
ours
(b) A pixel with an alpha level.
Figure 1.1: Pixels with RGB and RGBA values
Another 2D display method is vector graphical representation where the image
is modelled as a set of commands. While no solids can be drawn with this method,
one can draw graphs, wireframe images, etc. Vector graphics store the image as a
set of commands, rather than pixels. Nowadays, most vector graphics systems ac-
tually run on pixel based hardware. As a result, lines are approximated with pixels.
Nonetheless, numerous vector systems are able to draw text, curves, and fill regions.
A step further is polygon modelling. This display mode is most commonly used
to represent three-dimensional shapes, by constructing a set of connecting polygons
to represent an object. The most basic operation of polygonal modelling is the cre-
ation of a triangle. Interconnecting polygons representing an object are known as
meshes. Three-dimensional modelling is not restricted to polygonal representation,
albeit being the simplest, but not always memory efficient, technique. Others include
parametric cubic curves and subdivision modelling.
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Polygon modelling offers linear approximation to surfaces. As a result, modelling
a curve would require storing a large number of coordinates in order to achieve some
degree of accuracy. Parametric cubic curves (or splines) use higher degree functions
that approximate the shape by using only a few points, thus utilising less storage
and being easier to alter. Common used techniques in computer graphics are Bézier
curves, B-spline curves, and Non Uniform Rational B-Splines (NURBS). However,
parametric forms are unable to represent some simple curves such as circles. Bézier
curves and B-splines can only represent what polynomial parametric forms can.
By introducing homogeneous coordinates they are generalized to rational Bézier
curves and NURBS. Thus, rational Bézier curves and NURBS are more powerful
than Bézier curves since the former can represent circles and ellipses. Consecutively,
NURBS are more powerful than B-splines.
Bézier curves are defined by control points. Two points represent the start/end
of the curve, while the rest specify the curve’s direction (Figure 1.2). Bézier curves
can be combined, subdivided and be made more complex. Consecutively, Bézier sur-
face patches arise from combining curves in two dimensions instead of one, like in
Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.2: A degree three Bézier curve. The dots indicate the control points
B-splines are a generalization of the Bézier curves, and offer advantages over
them. They handle an increased number of control points (or knots), complicated
curves, sharp bend and corners. Like in Bézier curves, the interior knots define the
shape of the curve-however each knot has an active range of influence. As a result,
the curves can be manipulated with greater accuracy. Uniform B-splines have their
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Figure 1.3: A Bézier surface patch. The black dots indicate the control points
knots equally spaced out, while non-uniform do not. NURBS extend the non-uniform
B-splines in that they are rational. Homogeneous co-ordinates allow the element
of weight to the control point, represented as a factor of w. As with Bézier curves,
NURBS and B-splines can be combined to create respective surfaces
Lastly, subdivision surfaces algorithms are used to create smooth surfaces out of
arbitrary meshes. This includes meshes composed of triangles, rectangles, and other
polygons. There are numerous refinement approaches, among the first proposed be-
ing these of Catmull-Clark [15] and Doo-Sabin [16]. Refining a mesh involves insert-
ing new points in between existing ones, therefore increasing the detail and complex-
ity of the object (Figure 1.4).
Figure 1.4: Subdivision algorithm (Image from [17])
Introduction 9
The aforementioned techniques are commonly referred to as surface modelling, be-
cause they try to describe an object by its surface properties. An object modelled in
such a way does not necessarily contain information about its volume or is a closed
volume at all. However, there are circumstances when the object’s volume has to be
known, so that its geometry and interaction with its environment can be better un-
derstood. Properties such as the outside, inside and centre of mass might be required.
Solid, or volumetric, modelling is an approach to this case. A solid object should have
certain properties [18] to ensure that no invalid representation is created. Well-formed
solid objects can be combined together to form new solids by a set of Boolean opera-
tions, such as union, intersection and difference [19]. Figure 1.5 serves as an example.
This technique is also known as Constructive Solid Geometry (CSG).
Figure 1.5: Boolean expressions
Having analysed the ways a three-dimensional object can be described, it is ne-
cessary to examine the context in which it will be displayed: its orientation in space,
shading/texture features, and illumination.
1.2.2 Space orientation
When drawing, either in two or three dimensions, the position of the shape is de-
termined by its coordinates. By specifying the vertices, or connecting points, of i.e. a
triangle, we can model it in two or three dimensions.
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In a two-dimensional plane, <2, a position is specified by its x and y coordinates.
Consecutively, a position in a three-dimensional plane <3 includes the z coordinate.
However, the positioning of the three-dimensional plane’s axes is different between
computer graphics and the usual mathematical one. As illustrated in Figure 1.6 in
computer graphics, the z-axis gives the illusion of depth; it points towards the viewer.
Figure 1.6: Coordinates at <3; z-axis points towards the viewer
1.2.3 Texturing
Once a three-dimensional object is created, it undergoes a surfacing procedure. This
involves anything affecting its appearance in rendering, and it is composed of texture
and material. Texturing is the procedure of adding an image to an object in order to
simulate greater realism without the cost in processing power. A representative of
this approach, is bump mapping[20]; as illustrated in Figure 1.7 the coarseness of an
orange is represented by a bitmap. There are many methods to achieve this; including
advanced texturing that involves combining different textures for one area.
The material properties affect the diffuse colour, specularity, ambience, transpar-
ency, reflectivity (and other properties) of an object. Diffuse colour is the colour re-
flected by an object when light falls on it. Specularity defines the glossiness of an
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Figure 1.7: Demonstration of basic texturing principles
object. Diffusion and specularity can be thought of as matte and glossy properties. A
material’s ambience reflects an inner glow emitted by the object. Transparency refers
to the object’s opacity values, while reflectivity defines how the surrounding world is
reflected onto the object.
1.2.4 Lighting
Lighting is an important aspect that adds to the overall visual quality of the 3D graph-
ics scene by enhancing it with shadows and illumination. It is divided into two broad
categories: local and global.
Local lighting considers only sources of light shining directly on a surface and
then reflected on the viewpoint. A very popular model is the Phong[21] lighting and
shading model. It is very flexible and can be efficiently implemented both in hard-
ware and software. It works only with point lights and deals with the ways a light
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reflects off surfaces. A particular point on a surface is being illuminated by a light
source and is viewed from a viewpoint, as demonstrated in Figure 1.8. Having a
point light with intensity IIn, the model calculates the amount of light that reaches
the eye through surface reflection.
Figure 1.8: The Phong lighting model: n represents the surface normal, l the direction
towards the point light source, v the direction towards the viewpoint (after [22]:70)
Thus, it offers two types of reflection: Diffuse and Specular. Diffuse reflection
occurs when the light is reflected evenly in all directions, away from the surface and
is mostly used on matte (Lambertian) surfaces. Specular reflects the light in mirror-
style, according to the shininess of the material. Light is reflected primarily in the
direction with the angle of incidence equal to the angle of reflection. The further one
rotates away from this direction, the lower the specularity. Figure 1.9 illustrates the
two concepts.
Other models for local lighting exist, such as the Cook - Torrance [23], and Schlick
[24].
While they are efficient and fast, local lighting models do not consider secondary
reflections, for example when light bumps on several surfaces before reaching the
viewpoint. Additionally, the shadows they cast are not representative of actual light-
casting shadows. Global lighting overcomes some of these limitations by offering two
major approaches: ray tracing and radiosity.
Ray tracing [25], attempts to track the specular movement of light. In other words,
it follows each individual ray received by the viewer as it reflects off surfaces (or
moves through transparent areas [26]) and calculates the reflection direction. This
is repeated until the ray reaches the source. Radiosity aims to analyse the balance
of lighting in a scene [27] by taking under account the light energy transfer between
two surfaces. While ray tracing performs extremely well with specular effects, radi-
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(a) Diffused reflection: The light is reflec-
ted equally in all directions. The dotted
line indicates the incoming light while the
arrows the diffused light
(b) Specular reflection: The dotted line
indicates the incoming light. The arrows
show the outgoing light; the longer the
arrow, the more intense the reflection to-
wards this direction
Figure 1.9: Phong diffusion and reflection
osity excels at calculating diffusion, and these two perform very well in combination.
However the computation cost is extremely heavy, often taking hours for proper ra-
diosity/ray tracing calculations.
Until now the aspects considered how a scene is populated with objects and how
these objects are displayed on the screen. The last major property of a scene is its
viewpoint. The viewpoint represents what the observer sees and is often likened to a
camera view, with a direction, position and Field Of View (FOV). It determines what
parts of the 3D objects will be visible in the final image, in what order and which will
be clipped from view.
1.2.5 3D content creation
There is an abundance of software that can be used to create 3D models. Despite this
variety, however, the software broadly falls under two categories:
Programming & Procedural
In order to draw a 3D model on the screen, the user has to actually enter the mathem-
atical equivalents of each vertex or other information (e.g. colour) of which the object
is comprised. Special manoeuvres including translation/rotation/scaling of an ob-
ject must also be represented mathematically. As the scene becomes more complex,
the programming difficulty increases. Essentially, it is a set of functions that aid a
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programmer into creating 3D scenes from simple primitives. Well-known represent-
atives of this category are OpenGL and Direct X. For example, the following lines in
OpenGL create a polygon and assign a green colour to it:
glBegin (GL_POLYGON) ; /∗ Begin i s s u i n g a po lygon ∗ /
glColor3 f ( 0 , 1 , 0 ) ; /∗ S e t t h e c u r r e n t c o l o r t o g r e e n ∗ /
g l V e r t e x 3 f (−1 , −1, 0 ) ; /∗ I s s u e a v e r t e x ∗ /
g l V e r t e x 3 f (−1 , 1 , 0 ) ; /∗ I s s u e a v e r t e x ∗ /
g l V e r t e x 3 f ( 1 , 1 , 0 ) ; /∗ I s s u e a v e r t e x ∗ /
g l V e r t e x 3 f ( 1 , −1, 0 ) ; /∗ I s s u e a v e r t e x ∗ /
glEnd ( ) ;
An extension of this is procedural modelling. It is a technique that uses algorithms
and rules to produce textures and complex models. An example of this is the genera-
tion of terrain from a greyscale heightmap. Procedural modelling allows textures and
models to be created in the run-time of an application. These rules and algorithms
describe the properties of the model. For example, an algorithm for a procedurally-
generated house may define a range for the height of its walls, number of windows,
entrances, etc. This technique is often used in computer games to generate random
content and introduce variety at a much lower cost.
Modeling Software
In this category, modelling is achieved mainly by using specialised software and
rarely any hard-coded programming. Creation is achieved by using artistic tech-
niques in combination with an in-depth knowledge of the software package. Users
can add, subtract, stretch and otherwise change the object as desired. Models can
be viewed from a variety of angles, usually simultaneously. An example modeller is
3ds Max by Autodesk. Modelling capabilities include polygon, mesh, NURBS, CSG
and others. It also features lighting, texturing and rendering techniques. Figure 1.10
shows the working area of the software. Other popular options include Autodesk
Maya and Blender.
Scanning
To create a 3D model with scanning, specialised equipment, such as a laser scanner
has to be used. The scanners work with a real-world object, gather its surface data
and with customised software, extrapolate the 3D shape of the object. The use of 3D
scanners has found widespread appeal from manufacturing, to medicine and cultural
heritage.
Introduction 15
Figure 1.10: 3ds Max modelling environment; the four panels show different views of
the object simultaneously
Stereophotogrammetry
Specialised software can perform 3D data acquisition by using photographs from ac-
curately placed cameras, or video sequences. This technique is known as stereopho-
togrammetry.
1.3 Computer graphics & archaeology
The previous section presented the main elements that make up a 3D model, as well
as the ways it can be created. This one examines the uses that computer graphics has
found in archaeology. The section looks at the what, how, and why. More specifically:
• What projects and research paths have developed that blend computer graphics
with archaeology?
• How are the project being created? Which are the main technologies that have
been used?
• Why are computer graphics useful for archaeology? What did the archaeolo-
gists think about it?
1.3.1 Projects
Projects relating to archaeology and computer graphics can be categorised into four
broad areas: Preservation and collection; site enhancement and promotion; education
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and learning; hypotheses and evaluations. These areas are not mutually exclusive, in
fact, numerous projects can be considered to belong in two or three concurrently. To
illustrate the breadth of the research, a number of representative projects of each area
are presented.
Preservation and collection
Many reconstructions deal with digital preservation of the ancient site. In such cases,
a reconstruction is made in order to keep a digital archive of the site/object and bring
together elements that may be dispersed in various locations (i.e. different museums).
For example, in [28] the authors use CSG to preserve a Japanese temple along with
several unique items. In [29] the authors created digital models from the Parthenon’s
sculptures scattered around the world, and assembled them together in a digital en-
vironment.
Digital collections also exist from archaeological excavations. When an area is
excavated, the data is meticulously catalogued and often incorporated in GISs and
databases. Examples can be found in the excavations at Petra, Jordan ([30], [31]) and
Çatalhöyük, Turkey [32].
ARCO (Augmented Representation of Cultural Objects) [33, 34], was a European
project which provided a tool chain for museums to digitise and catalogue their col-
lections. Through the tools the museums were able to create virtual exhibitions with
an online presence. explorable through 3D representations and augmented reality.
Site enhancement and promotion
Projects that enhance a visitor’s experience to the site fall under this category, as well
as those dealing with heritage promotion and dissemination. At least two European
projects, Archeoguide [35] and LifePlus [36] have developed mobile systems for en-
hancing a visitor’s experience of an archaeological site. In the first case, the visitors
personalise their tour and explore the site aided by information provided through
a Head Mounted Display (HMD), which includes superimposed reconstructions on
top of actual remains. In contrast, LifePlus, transmits information to a customised
PDA. In [37] the authors introduce an immersive, mobile, Augmented Reality (AR)
environment, where visitors to Pompeii are able to witness through a HMD virtual
flora and fauna of the Roman period within the context of the real buildings.
Turning to site promotion, UNESCO, the United Nations organisation protecting
and disseminating the world’s heritage, offers virtual tours around the word’s pro-
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tected monuments available on the Web [38]. Additional examples can be found in
[39] which promotes a virtual set of ancient Olympia including an informative web
site.
Education and learning
Educational projects and those that promote learning of heritage material belong in
this category. The Foundation of the Hellenic World, a non-profit cultural institu-
tion located in Greece, aims to educate and project learning on Greek history and
culture. The institution deals with 3D reconstructions [40], immersive Virtual Real-
ity (VR) and table top interactive environments [41]. Its strongest educational me-
dium is considered to be Kivotos, a fully immersive 3x3x3 Cave Automatic Virtual
Environment (CAVE) in which users navigate with the use of a wand.
The Ename Centre for Public Archaeology fostered the Ename 974 project. Ename
974 focused on educating and understanding of Flanders history and culture [42]
through VR and multimedia techniques. This was achieved by an on-site VR system
located at the ruins of the Benedictine abbey church at Ename. The first prototype,
functioning as a kiosk outside the church, allows visitors to view a superimposed
three-dimensional model of the church over the actual remains. The second prototype
was installed outside a standing monument–an early Romanesque church closed to
the public for restoration. The visitors were able to follow the excavations and restor-
ation procedures of the monument as well as virtually visit the closed space.
Hypotheses and evaluation
This category is the one most relevant to the topic of this thesis. Under this category
belong projects examining archaeological questions and providing specific tools to
aid archaeological research. A very useful tool for examining ritual spaces is Photorealistic
Rendering (PR). By introducing elements of accurate lighting and shadows in a space,
researchers are able to witness the visibility of the area. One of the first projects was
INSITE [43] which examined Bronze Age ritual complexes in Malta and tested two
hypotheses for the organisation of ritual performance based on the visibility between
priests and audience. A further prospective of PR is the simulation of ancient light
sources. In [44], the authors simulated the lighting of various candle types by meas-
uring the actual spectral data and incorporating them to illuminate the preserved
frescoes of House Vetii in Pompeii.
Another example can be found in the modelling of the Roman theatre in Can-
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terbury. The computer model revised and highlighted faults in earlier popular il-
lustrations and drawings of the theatre, specifically, the seating area was wrongly
proportioned [45].
In [46] the authors developed STRAT, a tool to aid archaeologists recording actual
stratigraphic data and part of the 3D Murale European Project. STRAT allows archae-
ologists to record the stratigraphic data layer by layer (including any artefacts) as the
excavation occurs, and visualise the data both in two and three dimensions.
1.3.2 Technologies
A little while after new technologies are introduced, there are to be found in virtual ar-
chaeology projects. This section looks at some of the most common technologies that
have been used, by focusing on those that feature a higher level of interaction. Highly
interactive projects include those that might utilise some sort of avatar, or sense of be-
ing there to the user. The 3D environment is navigable and changes might occur due
to user input. The ones featuring a low level of interaction might include specially-
created websites, digital repositories, hosting static, rendered images, or videos of 3D
renders and are not examined here.
The early years
Some of the first examples can be found in the reconstructions of the temple pre-
cinct from Roman Bath [47] and the Roman bath houses at Caerleon [48]. Both were
created by using CSG, and used as case studies to test the features of ray-casting al-
gorithms. In a research project by IBM, solid modelling was used to reconstruct the
Saxon Old Minster of Winchester [49], while similar techniques were employed in the
reconstruction of Furness Abbey [50].
While the previous examples constructed the model using area plans and elev-
ations, the reconstructions of the Dresden Fraüenkirche [51] and the Visir Tomb in
Saqqara, [52], utilized photographs of existing buildings and items as basis for textur-
ing.
VRML
The Virtual Reality Modeling Language (VRML) is an ISO-standardised, nonpropriet-
ary, text markup language that describes interactive 3D scenes. Originally developed
in the 90s, it had its first version out in 1995 [53] and its second, standardised version
(VRML 2.0 [54]) in 1997.
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The structure of a VRML scene consists of nodes that describe what is in the scene.
For example, the following code snippet constructs a 3D shape (a sphere) and applies
material properties (RGB colour and transparency). It can be thought of as a higher
level of programmable modelling, where the user can both include custom 3D models
or create complicated models from primitive solids. Scenes created with VRML can
be interacted with through special viewers and can be accessed both through the web
and off-line.
#VRML V2.0 utf8
# A Sphere
Shape {
appearance Appearance{
material Material {
diffuseColor 0.8 0.8 0.8
transparency 0.9
}
}
geometry Radius {
radius 1.5
}
}
VRML, around the time of its standardisation, started attracting a number of ar-
chaeological research projects that were being active on the Internet [55]. VRML’s
most appealing features were its ability to run on the web, its interactivity and low
cost of implementation. Amongst the first applications were cases studies using ar-
chaeological data in VRML [56], the reconstruction of Canterbury theatre [57], and
the English Heritage/Superscape’s reconstruction of Stonehenge. The next 10 years
that followed saw a plethora of VRML reconstructions, some of them being the tomb
of Sen-nedjem [58], the Appian Way [59] and the Avebury project[60]. VRML was
also used as a means of navigating virtual collections of online museums, examples
can be found in the ARCO project [61]. With the release of X3D, the new 3D standard
based on XML, the focus slowly shifted.
X3D
X3D [62] is a specification and description language for 3D objects based on XML.
First introduced in 1999 and standardised by ISO in 2004, it also describes 3D objects
and scenes. X3D was created to be a replacement of VRML, fixing a number of issues
and bringing numerous extensions (such as animations and NURBS) to the format. It
Introduction 20
has a well-defined XML syntax but one can also use the VRML 97 syntax if so desired.
An example X3D document of a sphere is presented.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
<!DOCTYPE X3D PUBLIC "ISO//Web3D//DTD X3D 3.2// EN" "http://www.web3d.org
/specifications/x3d -3.2. dtd">
<X3D profile="Interchange" version="3.2" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org
/2001/ XMLSchema -instance" xsd:noNamespaceSchemaLocation=" http://www
.web3d.org/specifications/x3d -3.2. xsd ">
<Scene >
<!-- A Sphere -->
<Shape >
<Sphere radius='1.5'/>
<Appearance >
<Material diffuseColor='0.8 0.8 0.8' transparency='0.9'
/>
</Appearance >
</Shape >
</Scene >
</X3D>
The strong relationship of X3D with XML and other open source standards like
DOM/XPath made it much easier than before for users to create importers and ex-
porters between their preferred 3D modelling software and X3D. It also enabled them
to create custom attributes and nodes that could accompany 3D models. Archaeolo-
gists soon saw benefits in this new format. Nicolluci [63] proposed that X3D, because
of its capacity to include custom nodes, would be an excellent candidate for describ-
ing archaeological models. Hetherington [64] applies XML and X3D technology to a
3D model of Stonehenge. The application allows the user to choose and navigate in
real-time through different temporal phases of the model. By choosing to visualise
buildings of Sao Polo with X3D, Cabral [65] suggested that the design and validation
process was much more efficient. It also allowed for rapidly prototyping candidate
models and offer them to the expert historians and archaeologists for validation.
Game Engines2
The use of game engines as a medium for 3D representations has been a relatively new
direction for archaeology, but not for other disciplines. Their application in scientific
modelling [67], simulations and education ([68], [69], [70]) has been well documented.
2This section is a very condensed summary of an invited technology report written by the author
[66]. It offers an introduction to the workings of a game engine and an extensive description of archae-
ological projects using them.
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Jacobson [71] created a set of modifications for the Unreal engine and extended it
for use in a customised CAVE environment. He then applied it on a visualisation of
an Egyptian tomb [72]. The Notre Dame Cathedral project, based on the Unreal 2.0
engine, was the first to show how a complex historical architectural structure could
be imported into a game engine [73]. Erik Champion explored how a virtual cultural
heritage scenario can evoke a sense of belonging to its users, by focusing on an ancient
Mayan site at Palenque, Mexico [74, 75, 76].
In the AERIA project [77] the Quake 2 game engine was used to reconstruct a Bav-
arian Roman fortress and a classical Athenian farmhouse. Additionally, the Half Life
and Morrorwind engines were used to reconstruct the palace of Nestor in Pylos and the
throne of Apollo, respectively. The authors postulated that game engines can actually
serve as a low cost but powerful tool for heritage visualisation.
This sentiment is followed by Anderson [78] who suggested that as the game in-
dustry keeps investing in its own technology, it will also keep it updated for heritage
use. He used the Quake 3 engine to recreate a Pompeian house from archaeological
plans. The same engine was also used by researchers from the University of Aizu,
Japan [79].
The Rome Reborn 2.0 project has used the City Engine [80] to reconstruct an-
cient Rome with about 7000 buildings[81]. By using a blend of manually-created and
procedurally-generated buildings [82] it has been one of the longest in duration and
biggest in scope heritage projects featuring a game engine.
1.4 Criticisms & suggestions
The previous sections demonstrated the wealth and breadth of projects and techno-
logies used in virtual heritage. If one looks at the history, along with advances in
the world of IT, the archaeological community has been exploring the benefits of 3D
modelling since the 1980s.
In 1990, P. Reilly firstly proposed the concept of virtual archaeology [83], referring to
3D models of archaeological formation. The word virtual was to represent a replica,
a surrogate that would efficiently describe the original formation. Reconstructions
were made in effect to describe the original artefact as closely as possible, by putting
more and more effort in realistic representations and detail.
Ambitious though they were, these first attempts were soon met with criticisms
from the archaeological community; the archaeologists feeling that the reconstruc-
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tions promoted advances in computer technology rather than archaeological inform-
ation. While visualisation could offer much in research areas of such a visual discip-
line as archaeology, until that time it was used to present already existing knowledge
to the public, offering little insight to archaeological questions. These criticisms were
effectively summarised in a well-known publication by Miller and Richards in 1995
[1].
Furthermore, due to the high cost, time and effort in producing 3D graphics con-
tent at that time, most of the projects were undertaken by IT specialists; the archae-
ologists had no direct control over the models created. There was concern that the
past was presented as a known reality, especially when the models looked extremely
realistic [84]. If a rigid and very realistic model of the past is given, two major draw-
backs are faced: one politically correct view of the past is projected (thus dismissing
alternate realities) and the public is restricted in its ability to criticise and evaluate the
interpretation. When compared to hand drawn illustrations, reconstructions carried
a greater degree of authority, thus leading to singular views of the past. However,
efforts to represent alternative models, or difficulties in interpretation were minimal
[85].
Now, a bit less than twenty years after the criticisms by Miller and Richards were
drawn, the stage is not yet clear. The rapid technological development has made
tools of the 3D trade more common and low-cost than before and brought advanced
graphics hardware to the masses. As a result, there has been a wide spread increase
in projects dealing with virtual archaeology.
Some conferences and journals are particularly dedicated to the area (VAST, CAA,
Internet Archaeology), while others (VSMM, EG, IEEE Computer Graphics) actively
receive input from virtual heritage research. Since the 5th framework onwards, the
European Community fosters a wider interest for cultural heritage and has actively
funded projects that cross between heritage and informatics.
Gillings [86] draws attention to the usual development pattern of archaeological
visualisation:
“Sophisticated VR models are created largely because we can, and are always
generated as finished and freestanding, in effect, end products” ([86, 18])
He suggests that archaeological VR3 (Virtual Reality) in archaeology should not be
3His use of the term virtual reality is not just restricted to the definition of VR that involves a strong
amount of user presence and the use of head-mounted display or stereoscopic glasses. It is a blanket
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seen as eye candy, an expensive and marginalised technology displaying only visual
expectations. Rather, he proposes a change of focus towards explorative and flex-
ible environments. Archaeological VR should encompass imitation, representation as
well as involvement and creativity.
In the same fashion, Goodrick, Earl, and Wheatley [60, 87] caution against the
reluctance of the archaeologists to facilitate the use of visualisation technologies as
standard techniques in their work. They define three misconceptions: virtual archae-
ology is costly; there is a lack of readily available information for archaeologists to
create VR projects; virtual archaeology techniques require great technical skills. On
the contrary, they suggest that tools, hardware and software has evolved to a point
where it can be available to archaeologists.
It is also encouraging that numerous bodies have come forward with propositions
for a more rigorous and documented representation of 3D objects. Some of these in-
clude: the AHDS Guides to Good Practice for CAD (2002) and Virtual Reality (2002),
Virtual Archaeology Special Interest Group (VASIG) and the Cultural Virtual Reality
Organisation (CVRO). What all of the above share is a belief that 3D visualization
methods should be applied only where needed, with a scholarly rigour and distinc-
tions should be made between evidence and hypothesis.
In 2005, The London Charter (TLC) was created. It is a document that establishes
a set of “principles for the use of three-dimensional visualisation by researchers, educators
and cultural heritage organizations”. These principles are briefly summarised here:
1. Subject Communities: Aims and objectives of TLC are valid across domains in
which 3D visualisation can be applied to cultural heritage.
2. Aims and Methods: A 3D visualisation method should normally only be used
to address an aim when it is the most appropriate available method for that
purpose. Evaluation of methods is required to determine suitability.
3. Sources: Relevant sources pertaining to a 3D visualisation should be identified
and evaluated in a structured way. Sources are defined as all information, di-
gital and non-digital, considered during, or directly influencing, the creation of
the 3D visualisation outcomes.
term, analogous to Reilly’s Virtual Archaeology. The term archaeological VR encapsulates all realistic-
looking archaeological reconstructions–from simple video to areas navigable by keyboard/mouse as
well as those that require extensive use of HMD.
Introduction 24
4. Transparency requirements: Information should be provided to allow 3D visu-
alisation methods and outcomes to be understood and evaluated appropriately
in relation to the contexts in which they are used and disseminated.
5. Documentation: Process and outcomes of 3D visualisation creation should be
sufficiently documented to enable the creation of accurate transparency records,
potential reuse of the research conducted and its outcomes in new contexts.
6. Standards: Appropriate standards and ontologies should be identified, at sub-
ject community level, systematically to document 3d visualisation methods and
outcomes to be documented, to enable optimum inter- and intra-subject and
domain interoperability and comparability.
7. Sustainability: Ensure long-term sustainability and preservation of 3D repres-
entations by digital archiving or other means.
8. Access: Ways in which the outcomes of a 3D visualisation could contribute to
the wider study, understanding, interpretation and management of cultural her-
itage assets.
While a number of positive opinions have been expressed, only a few offer insight
on practical applications of TLC. Nevertheless, TLC has brought to the limelight the
need to accurately document and justify the sources and choices used when creating
3D representations of cultural spaces and objects.
In summary, the archaeologists’ critique is that in their majority of virtual her-
itage applications, computer graphics have been used recklessly and mostly for the
purposes of just using a cutting edge technology. This technology, however, has great
potential to be used as a research and documentation tool, that will be transparent
and make use of best practices. Three-dimensional models should be created to solve
actual archaeological problems and they should make their construction process clear
[88]. Archaeological theory, too often forgotten about, should be inherently related to
uses of computer science in archaeological problems.
This thesis takes those concerns and suggestions under consideration and makes
contributions in this area. To reinstate the thesis question:
How can an archaeologist’s belief in a reconstruction be quantified, and how this
belief can be visualised alongside the 3D reconstruction itself?
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The inferential process, the ambiguity, that are involved in archaeological interpreta-
tions, how can they be included, encapsulated, in 3D reconstructions? How can one
quantify their own belief? The next section examines the thesis contributions analyt-
ically.
1.5 Thesis contributions
The contributions belong to the area of cultural informatics and specifically the uses
of digital reconstructions as a research tool for archaeology. As discussed in previous
sections, archaeologists piece together available information derived from evidence
into a speculative view of the past. This view becomes more certain as evidence in-
creases.
The thesis researches methods to quantify and visualise the archaeological ex-
pert’s uncertainty in the reconstructed interpretation. This approach offers visual-
isations based on an archaeologist’s knowledge and evidence on reconstructed parts.
The major and minor contributions are presented in Tables 1.1 and 1.2.
Contribution The design, development and distribution of a novel questionnaire
that examines archaeological uncertainty in interpretation during
excavations of structures.
Importance There had been no previous work relating to perception of, and
evidence related to, archaeological uncertainty, even though it had
been identified as a matter of importance to archaeologists.
(Published in [89])
Contribution Archaeologists across different disciplines are equally concerned
about uncertainty in interpretations and reconstructions.
Importance This indicates that uncertainty is an important issue that cuts
through different areas of archaeological training. (Published in
[89])
Contribution Archaeologists indicate preference among different categories of
evidence.
Importance This indicates that an element of bias can exist towards certain
evidence and should be made transparent in reconstructions.
(Published in [89])
Contribution Application, for the first time, of three mathematical uncertainty
models to archaeological uncertainty/belief representation for the
purposes of reasoning visualisation.
Importance Previous approaches to visualisation of uncertainty in 3D
reconstructions offered no justification to the values, or meanings of
uncertainty. (Parts published in [90, 91])
Contribution Innovative visualisation of belief and conflict elements on 3D
archaeological reconstructions by using information visualisation
schemes.
Importance For the first time, a way is provided with which experts can
represent belief in the reconstruction as well as conflict that weak or
contradicting evidence brings to an interpretation. A number of
information visualisation schemes are applied and evaluated to
both an archaeological case study and experimental models. (Parts
published in [90, 91, 92])
Contribution Design and development of new extension to a search engine for
searching for archaeological image and text data.
Importance The extensions to the engine allowed for the aggregation and
indexing of images which was unavailable before. Further
extensions allow for the integration of semantic information that
will be useful in visualisations of uncertainty. (Published in [93, 94])
Table 1.1: Thesis major contributions
Contribution A previous approach to archaeological reliability representation
through fuzzy logic is not conceptually valid.
Importance Different kinds of uncertainty exist. It is very crucial to choose the
right model for the right uncertainty. Fuzzy logic is well suited for
other purposes, but not subjective belief reasoning.
Contribution Suggestions that a probabilistic approach is not capable of
representing archaeological uncertainty are unsustainable. It can be
done through a Bayesian approach.
Importance The Bayesian representation of subjective belief is used through a
wide number of disciplines. The previous approach examined
conditional probability but without Bayes’ rule which updates with
evidence.
Contribution Explanation and illustration of the quantification models through
novel archaeological paradigms.
Importance Relevant archaeological examples were crucial for placing
uncertainty quantification in the right context.
Table 1.2: Thesis minor contributions
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1.6 Thesis structure
The thesis contains eight chapters. This Chapter offered a general introduction to the
area, pinpointed the thesis’s area of interest, and analysed the contributions. Chapter
2 focuses on the representation of uncertainty in archaeology and other disciplines.
It looks at previous approaches to the visualisation of archaeological uncertainty in
reconstructions. Other disciplines, such as law, GIS and medicine are also examined
for their approaches towards representing belief. Lastly, the chapter examines the
visualisation methods used to represent uncertainty, such as information visualisa-
tion schemes.
Chapter 3 includes the structured evaluation of archaeological uncertainty based
on a questionnaire, the evidence factors, interviews conducted with archaeologists,
questionnaire design and derived results. It concludes with a discussion and defini-
tion of archaeological uncertainty related to reconstructions.
Chapter 4 presents a mathematical method for quantifying uncertainty based on
Subjective Probability. The model is then applied to an archaeological scenario. Chapter
5 presents two further mathematical methods of quantifying uncertainty, based on
Evidence Theory and Possibility theory. It then proceeds on applying both of them to
archaeological examples.
Chapter 6 begins by explaining why previous approaches based on fuzzy logic
are not adequate to handle uncertainty and why probability theory is one way of do-
ing so. The Chapter also contains a series of experiments conducted on possibilistic,
probabilistic, and belief results in order to determine if a relationship exists between
them. Lastly, it presents and analyses a series of uncertainty visualisations based on
the three uncertainty quantification models.
Chapter 7 presents research results on the design and development of a search
engine with a focus on identifying ancient coinage. Discussion of results includes
a connection between semantic annotation of uncertainty information and semantic
descriptions in search engines.
The last Chapter presents the thesis conclusions and discusses future work.
1.7 Published Work
Parts of this thesis have been published or presented in:
• Sifniotis, M., Jackson B., Mania, K., Vlassis, N., Watten, P. L., White, M.: 3D
Introduction 29
visualization of archaeological uncertainty. APGV 2010: 162
• Felicetti, A., Sifniotis, M. Numismatic Web Search Tool. COINS Project deliv-
erable D9. September 2008
• Sifniotis, M., Felicetti, A. Needle in the Haystack: finding, indexing and se-
mantically querying image collections of ancient coins. In M. Ioannides, A. Ad-
dison, A. Georgopoulos, L. Kalisperis (Editors). Full Paper Proceedings of the
14th International Conference on Virtual Systems and Multimedia (VSMM), pp.
165—171, October 2008, Limassol, Cyprus.
• Sifniotis, M. The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: The Wild West of On-line Coin
Sales. CHIRON workshop, VSMM 2008, Limassol, Cyprus
• Sifniotis, M. COINS: The Search Engine. Workshop presentation (COINS work-
shop). EVA Florence, 18 April 2008
• Sifniotis, M.; Watten, P.; Mania, K. & White, M. (2007), Influencing Factors on
the Visualisation of Archaeological Uncertainty, in D. Arnold; F. Niccolucci & A.
Chalmers, ed.,’VAST07: The 8th International Symposium on Virtual Reality,
Archaeology and Intelligent Cultural Heritage’, pp. 79—85.
• Sifniotis, M. An Overview of 3D Visualisation Using Game Platforms. 3dVisA
bulletin September 2007 issue. (JISC 3D Visualisation in the Arts Network)
• White, M.; Sifniotis, M.; Petridis, P. & Suciu, C. (2007), ’Virtual reality applic-
ations for digital heritage: from multimodal interfaces to interactive environments.’
Computer Applications and Quantitative Methods in Archaeology, CAA UK
2007, Chapter Meeting.
• Sifniotis, M.; Mania, K.; Watten, P. & White, M. (2006), Presenting uncertainty
in archaeological reconstructions using possibility theory and information visualisa-
tion schemes, in M. Ioannides; D. Arnold; F. Niccolucci & K. Mania, ed.,’VAST
2006 7th International Symposium on Virtual Reality, Archaeology and Cultural
Heritage-Short papers.’, pp. 198—203.
• Sifniotis, M.; Jackson, B.; White, M.; Mania, K. & Watten, P. (2006), Visualising
uncertainty in archaeological reconstructions: a possibilistic approach, in ’SIGGRAPH
’06: ACM SIGGRAPH 2006 Sketches’, ACM, New York, NY, USA, pp. 160.
Knowing ignorance is strength.
Ignoring knowledge is sickness.
Lao Tzu,Tao Te Ching,Ch.71
CHAPTER 2
Uncertainty Literature
2.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, the literature background of uncertainty is examined. Firstly, a back-
ground to the research of archaeological uncertainty visualisation is provided, and
the lack of uncertainty representation models is highlighted. Then, the concept of
uncertainty as well as its forms of expressing it are examined from a philosophical
and cognitive point of view. Following, advances in information visualisation are
presented with relation to uncertainty. Lastly, a number of different visualisation and
quantification approaches to uncertainty by a variety of disciplines such as law, medi-
cine and GIS, are presented.
2.2 Uncertainty and archaeological reconstructions
Chapter 1 introduced the concerns raised by archaeologists with regards to three-
dimensional reconstructions of archaeological structures. This section expands on
these issues by looking at previous approaches to alternative reconstructions and the
topic of uncertainty.
In [57], the authors create an interactive model of the Roman Canterbury theatre
using VRML. Not only is the user able to change views and navigate in the model,
but also to interact and manipulate objects in the world. In this way, alternative in-
terpretations of the theatre are embedded in an interactive model. By manipulating
side sliders, the user is able to change the theatre’s height, the seat height, and the
seat depth.
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(a) The walls follow a uniform texture (b) A white line differentiates between remains
and reconstruction
Figure 2.1: The Acropolis Propylaion reconstruction [96]
H. Eiteljorg ([95],[96]), was amongst the first researchers who demonstrated con-
cern on the level of detail of heritage virtual worlds. He suggests that photorealistic
visualisations impose their descriptions to the viewer and pass as a certain view of
the past. Together with G. Tressel they stress the need to build accurate models which
distinguish between the real and the hypothetical. His work on visualising parts of
the Acropolis Propylaion demonstrates this concept, where renderings show the dif-
ference between the actual remains and the virtual parts (as shown in Figure 2.1).
Roussou [97] expands on the differences between PR and Non - Photorealistic
Rendering (NPR) for archaeological reconstructions. It is suggested that both ap-
proaches if used sensibly can greatly aid heritage visualisation. The choice of visu-
alisation techniques usually depends on the targeted audience: archaeologists and
researchers or the general public. The former usually require a set of tools to evaluate
hypotheses and aid interpretation, and as such the use of NPR techniques perhaps
would aid more than PR ones. In the latter case, it is suggested that photorealism
is a necessary part to transmit the information into engaging presentations destined
for the public. As part of the ARCHEOS European project, an interactive VR setting
from the Argos Agora has been developed. Specifically, the Tholos monument is dis-
played through which the users are able to alter between two different hypotheses.
Additionally, the users are able to interactively manipulate archaeological fragments
found around the area and snap them in their appropriate positions, as illustrated in
Figure 2.2.
Kensek [98] presents a series of thoughts on ambiguity and uncertainty in 3D re-
constructions. She stresses the importance of distinguishing between the real and
the hypothetical and proposes a number of ways to achieve this through visualisa-
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Figure 2.2: The Tholos monument: At the top two images, the remains on the ground
differ from the reconstructed columns. At the bottom the two different hypotheses
available to the user are shown [97]
tion. Drawing from non-digital techniques she suggests the use of different colours,
transparency and rendering as various ways of representing ambiguity, as shown in
Figure 2.3. Additionally, a project is demonstrated where the user is able to construct
and evaluate different versions of Egyptian columns by combining various shafts,
bases and capitals. The system shows both the certainty of the construction as well as
prevents the user from making wrong combinations.
In [99] the reconstructed portions are displayed as sketch-lines and transparent
overlays. Methods to present uncertainty are introduced in [98] where the use of
colours, transparency and rendering are suggested as ways of representing ambiguity.
Another approach is given in [100] which deals with temporal uncertainty in ar-
chaeology. The research compares a variety of information visualisation schemes and
uses visual cues (such as transparency and wireframe) to separate uncertain from
recovered areas.
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Figure 2.3: Four representations of uncertainty: Colour: red indicates less confidence
while green more; Transparency: more transparent is less confident; Hybrid: colour
and transparency; Rendering type: wireframe is less confident, shaded more).
In [101] fuzzy logic is introduced as a basis for quantifying reliability in virtual
reconstructions. A reliability number is assigned, ranging from 0.0 (low reliability) to
1.0 (highest reliability), for each reconstructed part of the structure. By combining the
values using a fuzzy logic union, an overall reliability index of the reconstruction is
calculated. This approach is further analysed in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2.
The majority of those approaches clearly distinguish between parts of the build-
ing that the expert knows about, and parts that they are partially (or fully) ignorant.
However, there has been no attempt to explore, or formalise, the reasoning process
which results in that uncertainty visualisation. For example, why would a column be
50% transparent? Why, in Figure 2.3, the lower end of the column is greener than its
upper? How are those numbers decided? What evidence supports this visualisation?
This thesis suggests that the area of archaeological 3D reconstructions does not
have sufficient research on which to build upon with regards to uncertainty. As a
result, a top-down approach is taken to examine uncertainty, represented in Figure
2.4.
The concepts of ignorance and uncertainty are analysed and a number of defin-
itions are presented. This is followed by different quantification and visualisation
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Figure 2.4: Top-down approach for analysis of uncertainty. Numbers refer to sections
in the thesis.
methods. Lastly, other research fields are also examined. These fields use inferen-
tial reasoning and incomplete evidence to formally express beliefs in order to reach
judgement or evaluate a hypothesis. Examples are spatial modelling, law, medicine,
and geology. Some to a greater, and others to a lesser, extent they have explored the
notions of mathematically and visually expressing beliefs and judgement under un-
certainty. Their approaches and the mathematical models used are also introduced.
2.3 What is uncertainty?
As archaeologists have warned about the possible misuses of 3D reconstructions, ar-
tificial intelligence theorists and researchers in automated reasoning have warned
about the misuse of reasoning/uncertainty representation models [102, 103, 104]. Not
all models are appropriate for all cases.
In order to express a form of ignorance about a proposition, a hypothesis, it is
useful to understand the category of ignorance that is dealt with. Unfortunately, a
fixed definition of uncertainty does not exist. Numerous definitions do exist amongst
the research literature, some less generic than others. This section presents a num-
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ber of definitions and sub-categorisations of uncertainty along with examples where
appropriate.
Bonissone and Tong [105] identify three general categories for expressing ignor-
ance.
1. Incompleteness: refers to cases where the value of a variable is missing
2. Imprecision: refers to situations where the value of a variable is given, but not
with the required precision
3. Uncertainty: covers cases where an agent can construct a personal subjective
opinion on a proposition that is not definitely established for him [102].
The following archaeological examples illustrate the differences between the three
forms suggested by Bonissone:
Incompleteness: Consider a database of Roman coin measurements. Information
includes the coin’s diameter and weight. Suppose for one coin that the information
for the diameter is available (e.g. 18.66mm) but not the weight. In this case, the
information is incomplete in terms of weight but precise and certain in terms of the
diameter.
Imprecision: Consider the value of the weight of the aforementioned coin to be 2.9
g.–3.8 g. In this case, the information is complete in terms of data available for both
variables, but it is imprecise, since it cannot be said without ambiguity which is the
actual weight of the coin.
Uncertainty: Suppose that entries of measurements were done by an unskilled
and unknowledgeable agent. Data for the aforementioned coin is 18.66 mm. for dia-
meter and 2.9g. for weight. However, even though the data is precise and complete,
it may be wrong.
A major difference between these forms of ignorance is the participation of an
agent and, in consequence, whether an objective or subjective component is involved.
Incompleteness and imprecision form objective expressions of ignorance. They are
solely related to the data, the context, forming properties of it, and exist independ-
ently of an observer. On the other hand, uncertainty, forms a subjective type of ignor-
ance, since the observer is taken under consideration. Uncertainty appears when an
observer is not certain about the information available, and as a result, reflects partial
knowledge, or belief.
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Smets [106] suggests that imperfection permeates all information and data. It is
quite idealistic to presume that perfect, complete information will exist for a sys-
tem/hypothesis/suggestion. As a result, this imperfection must be taken into account
when modelling a system.
He identifies three aspects of imperfect data that can co-exist:
1. Imprecise
2. Inconsistent
3. Uncertain
Imprecision and inconsistency relate directly to the information, the data. Imprecision
can indicate that more than one world may be compatible with the given information.
For example consider the statement:“The Olympian gods were at most twelve”. This
gives as possible answers any number between 1 and 12 and thus the information is
imprecise. Imprecision can also manifest in erroneous data, as for example in: “The
Olympian gods were 13”. Compared to the model suggested by Bonissone, imprecision
includes incompleteness. Imprecision in data is the biggest cause of uncertainty in an
agent.
Inconsistency, on the other hand, suggests that none of the worlds currently known
are compatible. It usually results from conflicting information; for example: “My flight
arrives from London at 20:00.” and “There are no flights arriving from London after 15:00”.
Uncertainty is also defined as objective (aleatory) and subjective (epistemic). Ob-
jective uncertainty relates to randomness, variability, the chance that an event is likely
to occur, for example during a repeatable experiment. Subjective uncertainty is dir-
ectly related to an agent’s opinion about the reliability of the data depending on said
agent’s state of knowledge. If the agent has all the information required, there is no
subjective uncertainty involved (but there may well be objective!). Objective uncer-
tainty is well represented by statistical, frequentist, probabilistic methods. For the
case of this thesis, objective uncertainty is not relevant and has been excluded.
Klir [107] also relates uncertainty to information deficiency. Different informa-
tion deficiencies (i.e. incompleteness, vagueness,imprecision) will result to different
uncertainty types. He identifies:
1. Nonspecificity: There are a variety of choices, the data may be imprecise.
2. Fuzziness: The data is vague with no clear boundaries.
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3. Discord: There is conflict among choosing between alternatives. The data may
have discrepancies.
Klir’s categorisation is analogous to the imprecise and inconsistent data of Smets. The
imprecise erroneous category is similar to the imprecision of Klir, while the non-erroneous
is akin to the vague & fuzzy one.
Gershon [108] follows a similar approach to Klir. He relates uncertainty to de-
ficiency, or imperfection, in information. The information could be incomplete, too
complex, corrupt, or inconsistent.
1. Corrupt: Analogous to errors in physics and engineering.
2. Incomplete: Data is missing.
3. Inconsistent:Different types of data are conflicting with each other.
4. Incomprehensible: Difficult to understand, confusing, complicated.
5. Uncertain: Data exists, but user/expert is unsure about the quality/existence.
In 1995, the ISO standards board released the Guide to the Expression of Uncertainty
in Measurement [109]. Solely focusing on measurements of well-defined quantities, it
provided guidelines on how to measure and report uncertainty in results. Two types
of uncertainty are identified:‘
1. Random effect uncertainty: due to random erroneous results
2. Systematic effect uncertainty: continuous error affecting the measuring process.
Pang [110] divides uncertainty in three categories:
1. Statistical: Due to some random process. Covers probabilistic and confidence
methods.
2. Error: Covers the differences between an estimate an an actual value. Impreci-
sion.
3. Range: Covers an interval of possible values.
Longley [111, 128] defines uncertainty as an umbrella term which depicts the dif-
ference between the perceived, incomplete, state of the world (by an agent) and the
actual state of the world. Increasing uncertainty lowers the quality of a representative
system (Langley’s specialisation is in GIS). Uncertainty manifests in different ways:
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1. Error
2. Inacurracy
3. Ambiguity
4. Vagueness
As it can be seen, there is no single definition of uncertainty. Research areas, such as
GIS, offer their own interpretations on uncertainty based on works from Klir, Pang,
Bonissone and others, depending on what fits their field. Section 2.4 introduces math-
ematical models of quantifying uncertainty while Section 2.6 examines approaches to
uncertainty from different disciplines.
2.4 Quantifying uncertainty
Until well into the late 19th century, scientific uncertainty was completely undesir-
able. Proper scientific endeavours were considered unscientific if permeated with
uncertainty [112]. The development of statistical methods and its acceptance as a
valid scientific tool, had two major consequences. Firstly, uncertainty was starting to
be something quite normal and expected for scientific enquiry, and no longer negat-
ive. Secondly, because of the direct relationship between probability and statistics,
probability was the only way of dealing with uncertainty. Probability has had more
than 300 years of extensive research through contributions from scientists such as
Bernoulli, Bayes, Gauss, Laplace, Poisson, De Finetti, Kolmogorov and Savage.
The monopoly of probability as a mathematical method of representing aleatory
and epistemic uncertainty, lasted until the second half of the 20th century, when non-
probabilistic methods begun to emerge. These methods identified a number of uncer-
tainty paradigms where probability was not able to give sufficient answers1. The last
50 years have seen the emergence of a number of non-probabilistic theories. Three of
those are the most established and with the most amount of research literature behind
them, given the short amount of time involved. The probabilistic model of subjective
Bayesian probability is also included for completeness.
1The major difference between bi-valent and multi-valent logic is extensively analysed in Chapter
4.2 where also the mathematical foundations for the theories are examined.
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2.4.1 Static, dynamic, decision
What all of the following theories have in common is three components: static, dy-
namic, and decision.
• Static: pool of rules, previous knowledge, anything that can be considered as
background information to the current problem. There could be cases where
this is empty, reflecting total ignorance.
• Dynamic: New information arrives, in the form of evidence, data, etc., that
updates the knowledge.
• Decision: Given all accumulated knowledge, this aids in selecting one of the
possible hypotheses.
The differences arise in how each of those components is implemented.
2.4.2 Subjective Probability (1763)
Based on Bayes’ Rule [113], this form of probability is equated to a quantification of
subjective belief. The belief is calculated by combining what one already knows about
the data, and the support (or non-support) of the available evidence.
Bayes’ Rule works fine with singular variables, in other words it is capable of
assigning belief on one hypothesis but not a combination of two hypotheses. For
example, consider the following statement: The column was most likely Ionic, I would
value my certainty at 90%. This can be represented with subjective probability. Now
consider the following: The column was most likely Ionic or Corinthian, I am 90% sure
of that. This can not be represented in a holistic way; the rules of probability declare
that between those two the probability must be shared. The equivalent would be: I
am sure 45% that it was Ionic and 45% that it was Corinthian. A second requirement of
Bayes’ Rule is a priori information, knowledge available to the expert or system that
will be used as a basis for updating.
2.4.3 Evidence Theory (1976)
Evidence theory is best recognised through the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence
(DST). Shafer [114], who built his theory on Dempster’s research [115], suggested
the use of degrees of belief to represent uncertainty in a quantified manner. One
of the main features of evidence theory is that a belief can be assigned to a set of
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hypotheses rather than a singular one. A second feature is that it does not require a
priori knowledge and it is more flexible in scenarios of total ignorance. Lastly, DST
can contain Bayes Rule as a special case [116].
A number of different probabilistic formalisms arose that tackled some of the
shortcomings of DST, such as the hints formalism by Kohlas [117, 118], and random
sets [119]. The non-probabilistic ones include Shafer’s original work on belief func-
tions and Smet’s [120] Transferable Belief Model. For a further analysis of the different
formalisms the reader is referred to [121].
2.4.4 Fuzzy Sets & Possibility Theory (1965, 1978)
In 1965 Zadeh [122] introduced a theory of sets where the boundaries are not crisp,
but fuzzy. An object could belong to more than one sets, according to its degree. This
allowed for the representation of vague terms, whereas before it was impossible to
do in an intuitive way. Consider the expression “It is sunny outside.” If the amount
of clouds covering the view is less than a certain percentage, then it is sunny. How
much is less? Is it, 30%? If the clouds cover 31%, is it immediately cloudy? Fuzzy
set theory introduced this needed vagueness by having a gradual transition between
terms such as sunny, cloudy, little, a lot, etc.
Possibility theory [123] is a theory for uncertainty quantification based on fuzzy
sets. It is non-probabilistic as it does not follow certain rules of probability. It does
not require a priori knowledge.
2.4.5 Expressing uncertainty
The mathematical models that quantify uncertainty and used in decision theory all
rely on a normative framework. They describe how a rational agent should act.
For a long time, humans expressing confidence judgements when updating their
beliefs, were perceived to follow the rules and structure of subjective probability the-
ory. However, it has been shown that in various situations, humans did not behave
as rationally as probability theory would predict [124]. The conjunction fallacy is of-
ten commited by humans; people often assign a probability of conjunction to their
reasoning that is, in some cases, greater than one or even both of the two premises.
Research results indicate that when people are asked to express their confidence,
they do not actually produce a probability [125]. Under-confidence is often expressed
when issues to be assessed are easy, and over-confidence is expressed when issues
to be assessed are difficult. Research by Griffin and Tvsersky [126] explain over-
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and under-confidence on the hypothesis that people rely heavily on the strength of
the evidence with little regard to its weight. Example of overconfidence arise also
in the field of medicine [127], where clinicians evaluating a positive mammogram
result gave a probability of patient sickness at 70% where the calculated Bayesian
probability was 8%. Further research [128] confirm findings by Griffin and Tvsersky
and identify patterns where weight, quality and strength of evidence can be over- or
under-weighted.
Researchers have also criticised the application of the probabilistic framework
when single events are assessed [129], e.g. the plausibility that a diagnosis for a
patient is correct. They showcase that the probabilistic framework should be ap-
plied to the understanding of confidence assessments expressed over a long period
of time and for multiple events. Alternative normative frameworks such as possibil-
istic measures have not been applied to uncertain situations except in a few cases of
empirical evaluation of human radiological diagnosis [130].
The theories are examined more analytically in Chapters 4 and 5. The next section
introduces methods for visualising uncertainty.
2.5 Visualising uncertainty
Information visualisation techniques [131]encompass a wide range of approaches de-
veloped to help people visually interpret data. However, when uncertainty is in-
volved, particularly in scientific data, there is a need to visualise that precise lack
of information. The significance of visualising the uncertainty in a body of data has
been acknowledged in different fields such as flow data [132], positional uncertainty
in molecular structure [133], astrophysical data [134], terrain modelling [135] and an-
isotropic rock property models [136]. Reznik and Pham [137, 138] have evaluated the
information uncertainty of fuzzy models and its visualization.
A systematic classification for uncertainty visualisation techniques has been sur-
veyed by Pang [110], classifying the techniques into adding glyphs and modifying
geometry, attributes, animation and sound. Pang suggests using different visual cues
according to the type of data, such as scalar, vector or range. Methods that can be
directly applied to a 3D model are presented [139]:
Free graphical variables: Affects the hue, texture, lighting, shading, crispness and
opacity/transparency values of a visualised object. Also includes pseudocolouring, a
technique for representing scalar, interval, or ordered data values by using a sequence
Uncertainty Literature 42
of colours. A well-known example would be geographical maps.
Side by side: compares two, or more, different visualisations of data i.e. simu-
lated and actual.
Animation: Helpful for representing changes in uncertainty dynamically this
might include blinking areas, and motion blur.
Integration of objects: This approach represents uncertainty with externally at-
tached objects. These can include glyphs, error bars, text labels.
Research on the visualisation of uncertainty has been slow to catch up, being occa-
sional and sporadic compared to the visualisation of information. The majority of the
research deals with the uncertainty in a body of crisp, measurable data. Much less
research has been conducted in visualisation of uncertainty involved in reasoning,
thought process, and subjective belief about information [140]. However, researchers
highlight the need [141] for the creation of formal error and visualization frameworks
and also formally evaluate through user studies simulated and experimental 2D/3D
data with uncertainty information.
2.6 Uncertainty in other fields
2.6.1 GIS
The GIS community was one of the first disciplines to acknowledge the existence
of uncertainty and take efforts to visualise it. Veregin [142] identified 5 goals for
managing and reducing uncertainty within a GIS system. He stressed that sources
and cause of uncertainty should be understood first in order to manage its occurrence
or propagation through a GIS system..
Fisher [143], by expanding on Klir’s definition and categorisation of uncertainty,
provides a taxonomy of GIS uncertainty as the result of error, ambiguity, vagueness or
lack of information of data. In further research he [144] suggested that a large part of
geographical phenomena are vague in nature and a formal recognition of vagueness
should be included in geographical systems. He proposes that a way to represent
vague concepts would be through fuzzy sets.
In [145] the authors use Evidence Theory to integrate subjective beliefs and spa-
tial geographical information regarding land suitability analysis. Ferrier [146] uses
a Knowledge-Based System (KBS) utilising a comparison of approximate reasoning
techniques such as DST, Bayesian probability and possibility theory. The KBS is used
together with a GIS to analyse sedimentary basins. When eliciting the experts’ know-
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ledge for use in the KBS, it became apparent that two factors had to be addressed: the
vagueness and imprecision of data and the reliability of a hypothesis.
Couclelis [147] suggests that representation of uncertainty within a GIS should
move away from a strict spatial data perspective. She argues that the limitation in
the experts’ knowledge should also be acknowledged. There are cases where the ac-
tual truth may be unknown (i.e. due to incomplete information). She proceeds by
analysing how approaches from the AI community, logic, philosophy and mathem-
atical quantifications of epistemic uncertainty (such as fuzziness, belief or Bayesian
estimate) can help the GIS community to formally map out the uncertainty in spatial
knowledge.
In specific archaeological applications of GIS, there have been some extensive dis-
cussions on the uncertainty involved in regards to the accuracy of DEM [148, 149].
Wheatley [150], influenced by Fisher’s uncertainty work on fuzzy viewshed analysis
[151], suggested that uncertainty be acknowledged in cumulative viewshed analysis
and proposed that viewshed and visibility analysis should be enriched with includ-
ing their uncertainty. In the area of predictive modelling, Canning [152] has used DST
to represent the expert knowledge and a body of data for predicting Aboriginal sites
at Victoria, Australia. Comber [153] uses DST and Bayesian analysis to predict the
existence of bog habitats.
There have been a number of uncertainty visualisations in spatial applications. In
[135] animations are used to represent different exploratory data visualizations. Jiang
has shown how paleness, or whiteness, gives the perception of carrying more uncer-
tainty than a more solid colour and applies it on geographic fuzzy spatial datasets.
Hengl [154] applies this colour-model scheme based on Hue - Saturation - Intens-
ity (HSI) to represent spatial data uncertainty in soil thickness and a fuzzy classifica-
tion of landforms. For a further in-depth analysis of GIS visualization of uncertainty
the reader is refereed to [155].
2.6.2 Law
Lawyers must continually assess the weight and strength of evidence as well as be
able to combine various types of evidence in order to present a strong case to the
court. On the other hand, the judge and jury have to evaluate this evidence and lend
support to the guilt or innocence of the accused. They also have to accept or discard
evidence according to its weight. There is a large element of ignorance and ambi-
guity involved in law cases; evidence might be incomplete, inconclusive, conflicting,
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witnesses might be unreliable, forensic tests might have a percentage of error.
The need to assign credibility and weight has been recognised by the discipline for
at least two centuries. Most commonly referred to as Evidence Law, it is quite well
represented in the following quote by Sir G. Gilbert one of the founders of modern
law:
“There are several degrees from perfect Certainty and Demonstration quite
down to Improbability and Unlikeness...and there are several Acts of Mind
proportioned to those Degrees of Evidence...from full Assurance and Con-
fidence, quite down to Conjecture, Doubt, Distrust and Disbelief.
Now what to be done...is to range all Matters in the Scale of Probability so
as to lay Weight where the Cause ought to be prepondate.”[156]
There are no ground rules of weight, covered by law, for grading evidence, al-
though it has been proposed [157]. However, there are certain categories of evidence,
like eyewitness accounts, where the judge is obliged to warn the jury about potential
unreliability [158]. In some legislation areas, such as Scotland, at least two witnesses
are required to bring a person to court.
One of the greatest contributors of Evidence Law was J. Wigmore. Apart from
major influences in Anglo-American jurisdictions, he developed the Wigmore Chart
[159]. The chart aimed to represent the justification of conclusion of facts made by the
jury/judge in a trial. It was a graphical method to represent the reasoning process,
evidence involved as well as its strength and direction.
The indisputable existence of uncertainty was there, and it was not long before
that probabilistic and non-probabilistic methods were evaluated as a means of rep-
resenting belief about evidence. Since the early 80s, books have been devoted to the
use of probability [160, 161, 162] in the legal process. Bayes’ rule and its application
to evaluating evidence and reaching decisions has been explored by Dawid [163, 164,
165]. Schum [166, 167] has explored the relationships between knowledge, probab-
ility and credibility and developed MACE (Marshalling Competence and Credibility
Evidence). MACE uses subjective Bayesian Probability and a chain of questions about
the witness that assists the law enforcer in evaluating the witness. While the majority
of research has focused on probabilistic representations, in more recent years there
has been an increase in the use of evidence theory and fuzzy systems. Dragoni et
al. [168] use the Dempster-Shafer Theory to represent belief revision in deliberations
of jury, including the issue of credibility. Jösang [169] uses DST belief model as an
example of subjective logic involved in the courtroom. Yablon [170] suggests that
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fuzzy sets could be used to determine the concept of fairness in a litigation. Chavkin
suggests [171] that fuzzy sets could be used in law to represent vague concepts.
There has been limited actual practical application of probabilistic and non-probabilistic
inference in court decision making. In an infamous (in lawyer circles) case of Regina
v. Adams [172] the jury was instructed to use Bayesian reasoning to combine certain
evidence. The ruling was so critical of the use of Bayes’ theorem in the courtroom that
it has not been used since. Despite the mistrust by law courts, researchers in evidence
law continued advocating the need for a framework to represent evidence and belief
in legal contexts. Schum, Twining, Dawid and others [173, 158, 174] have sugges-
ted that evidence and knowledge representation is an important multi-disciplinary
subject and should be researched further.
2.6.3 Medicine
Health practitioners are also experts who have to face uncertainty on a daily basis
by evaluating evidence (symptoms) in order to make a diagnosis. Similar to law
and archaeology, evidence might be inconclusive, vague, conflicting. The knowledge
available is rarely comprehensive or complete. Additionally, the doctor’s expertise
plays an important role in evaluating evidence and making decisions.
Uncertainty in medicine has been long recognised and accepted by its practition-
ers. Medical students are trained [175] in identifying and handling the existence of
uncertainty. Fox, and later Light, [176, 175] identify three elements of medical uncer-
tainty:
1. Incomplete mastery of knowledge (the knowledge of the professional.
2. Limitations of current literature (the knowledge of the profession).
3. Difficulties in distinguishing between the above.
Soon after, an influential paper by Ledley and Lusted suggested that medical reas-
oning could be quantified by using Bayesian probability [177, 178]. Developments in
computer science and AI led to research in Clinical Decision Support Systems (CDSS).
The role of these systems is to assist practitioners in reaching a diagnosis, in prevent-
ive care, and treatment [179].
The majority of the systems use a pool of knowledge that assists in decisions [180].
Medical experts contribute to this pool by adding their knowledge about symptoms,
diseases, and results from clinical trials. Depending on the CDSS used, the knowledge
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is expressed by rules (MYCIN [181]), subjective probabilities (de Dombal [182, 183],
Internist-1/QMR [184]), fuzzy sets/logic (CLINAID [185]) and evidence theory [186].
2.7 Conclusion
This Chapter has examined the concept of uncertainty; how it is handled in differ-
ent fields, its different definitions and visualisation approaches. It is quite clear that
cultural informatics, and archaeological 3D reconstructions involving visualisation of
uncertainty have a long, long, way to go compared to other disciplines. This thesis
suggests that 3D reconstructions could be so much more than pretty pictures. They
have the potential to be what GIS has become for geography, archaeology, and medi-
cine: a way to represent and visualise the extent of knowledge. Examination of other
disciplines has shown that they use a plethora of mathematical models, all within
the three categories identified in Section 2.4, namely Bayesian subjective probability,
Fuzzy Sets and Evidence Theory.
For the purposes of this thesis, three mathematical models of representing uncer-
tainty, each belonging to one of the different categories, are evaluated and applied in
the area of cultural informatics and archaeological 3D reconstruction. Bayesian Sub-
jective Probability is included, firstly for being the oldest and most researched model
and secondly for having been used extensively throughout other disciplines for the
purposes of quantifying uncertainty. From the non-probabilistic category of Fuzzy
Sets, Possibility Theory is also included, as an established alternative mathematical
model of representing subjective uncertainty. It is a relatively new area, with active
research, but fewer applied cases than Bayesian Probability. Its use of two meas-
urements (Neccessity and Possibility) offers a range of capabilities not supported by
Subjective Probability.
Bayesian Subjective Probability and Possibility Theory are two of the most pop-
ural models in their respective categories (probabilistic and non-probabilistic/fuzzy).
However, the most known representative of Evidence Theory, the Dempster-Shafer
Theory, has not been applied in this thesis. Rather, a non-probabilistic interpretation
of it, the Transferable Belief Model [187], is evaluated and applied. There are three
main reasons to choosing a less popular model:
Firstly, the implicit rejection of Probability Theory (on which DST is based) allows
the TBM to represent conflict. Conflict can arise between two (or more) contrasting
pieces of evidence. The capability to quantify conflict would be of great use in a field
such as archaeology where often evidence may be encountered that is ambiguous,
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conflicting, or untrustworthy.
Secondly, the TBM allows for the mathematical representation of an ’open world’.
In other words, while evaluations of evidence are being made, the expert is allowed
to enter new hypotheses in the list of possible interpretations. This feature is not
supported by either Subjective Probability or Possibility Theory.
Thirdly, the TBM is a very new model, developed in the beginning of the 1990s
with limited research and almost no applied case studies. Its evaluation and applic-
ation in this thesis is the first application of the model in the context of Cultural In-
formatics.
Before those models can be applied and evaluated, uncertainty must be identi-
fied and defined in its archaeological context. The following Chapter identifies un-
certainty in a cultural informatics context, and presents research on archaeologists’
attitude towards uncertainty and evidence.
Knowledge is of two kinds. We
know a subject ourselves, or we
know where we can find
information on it."
Samuel Johnson
CHAPTER 3
Identifying Uncertainty
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 evaluated how other disciplines approach uncertainty, presented different
definitions and classifications and higlighted the lack of similar approaches in the
area of cultural informatics. Cultural heritage uncertainty representation is a novel
research area and this thesis explores foundation questions. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
case. Stage A is where the thesis makes contributions in, while Stages B and C are
envisioned future interest areas within archaeological uncertainty research.
In order to represent archaeological uncertainty in 3D reconstructions, the first
step is identifcation: Firstly, does it exist? To what end? Is uncertainty something
important, or not? How does it affect archaeologists? How can it be defined, in
relation to reconstructions?
Research conducted as part of this thesis involved the creation and distribution
of a questionnaire focused on expert archaeologists. The questionnaire explored the
perception of uncertainty among expert archaeologists, queried on different types of
evidence that might influence uncertainty and examined possible differences between
different archaeological groups. This Chapter presents the questionnaire design, de-
velopment, and research results. Finally, by discussing research results and evaluat-
ing previous work on uncertainty it gives a definition of archaeological uncertainty
in 3D reconstructions.
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Figure 3.1: Stages of uncertainty research
3.2 Questionnaire on Archaeological Uncertainty and
Evidence
There is no set list of evidence types that turns up in every excavation. Additionally,
every historical period may show an abundance of a specific type of evidence but a
complete lack of another. Of particular interest to this thesis are types of evidence that
influence the interpretation of structures.
In order to identify evidence types, the first step was to conduct open structured
interviews with expert archaeologists. Discussions were done on an individual basis
and the panel consisted of five archaeologists. The discussion focused solely on the
interpretation of structures. Three of the archaeologists were Romano-British spe-
cialists, one focused on Eastern Europe and Byzantium, and the last on Anglo-Saxon
England. All of them have in excess of 10 years experience in their fields. Three were
interviewed personally, one by phone, and one by email. From these discussions a list
of evidence factors that can influence uncertainty was created. The factors identified
are:
1. Features: all elements of man-made structures; these can range from ditches to
wall remains, to post-holes of wooden structures.
2. Artefacts: any object made, affected, used, or modified in some way by human
beings; this usually includes pottery, glass, lithic, etc.
3. Biofacts: Biofacts (or ecofacts) constitute of human, animal and plant remains
which are not changed by human interaction.
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4. Textual evidence: ancient texts and documents which may provide information
on architecture, decoration, lifestyle etc. of a specific culture.
5. Absolute comparisons: a structure is compared to a structure of similar propor-
tions.
6. Contextual comparisons: a structure and its context is compared to similar
structures with similar contexts.
7. Topography: natural features of the landscape in which the building is located;
elevation of the area, characteristics of the region and landform data in general.
8. Peer review: the interviews indicated that interpretation is heavily based on
discussions and re-discussions with other archaeologists and architecture spe-
cialists were considered important.
The next step involved the creation of a questionnaire with an aim to gather more
information on how archaeologists perceive uncertainty as well as the evidence.. The
aim of the questionnaire was to determine if:
• There is any difference between the results obtained by archaeologists with dif-
ferent expertise. The initial hypothesis was that a difference should be evident.
• There is any perceived preference among these different factors.
3.2.1 Design
There is an abundant bibliography on the design of questionnaires for factors in-
volving perception, immersion [188], and computer interfaces evaluation [189]. How-
ever, in the case of this thesis, there is no similar work conducted relating to questions
and factors on archaeological uncertainty. As a result, the questions were designed
progressively with consultation by the archaeologist panel described above and by
consultation of questionnaire design textbooks [190, 191]. The questionnaire was
designed in three steps: Questionnaire type selection, response scale selection, and
question wording.
Questionnaire type
There are a number of questionnaire types suitable for human factors testing and
evaluation. These include multiple choice, rating scales, semantic differential and
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open ended questions and are illustrated in Table 3.1. The most commonly used is
a rating scale. The chosen questionnaire type should be based on the way the data
would be eventually analysed as well as the appropriateness of the area in question.
For example, do multiple choice answers reflect the area or not.
Usually, for exploratory purposes, open ended questions or structured interviews
are used. Through these questions, the participants offer written responses with no
restrictions. This allows the researcher to retrieve opinions on a topic and is a useful
precursor for data gathering for descriptive or exploratory purposes. An issue with
open ended questions is that they are difficult to quantify and are prone to subjectivity
on the researcher’s part; she must decide whether an open-ended answer signals an
agreement or disagreement with a topic.
For descriptive purposes, multiple choice questions and rating scales are mostly
used. Since those can be quantified at the interval scale, they provide access to a wider
range of statistical options than the open-ended nominal ones.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, structured interviews/open ended questions were
used with the archaeological panel to determine the factor list. For the purposes of the
questionnaire, since it focuses on attitude measurement towards different factors, a
multiple choice option was considered to be restrictive. As a result, a rating scale was
used through most of the questions. Multiple choice options appear in the personal
information pages.
Response scale
The response scale simply represents the distribution of the responses by providing
firstly the number and secondly the type of allowable answers to a question. There
are various issues to consider, such as the balance, the polarity and the number of
values. Like the example in Table 3.1, a scale that has an equal number of positive
and negative alternatives is known as balanced. Such balanced scales are commonly
chosen because they tend to produce nearly normal distributions. On the contrary,
unbalanced scales are used when it is expected that responses will be selected from
the scale’s extremes.
Another point to consider is the presence or absence of a scale midpoint. Denying
the ability of neutrality will probably increase the variability towards one extreme or
the other. Additionally, it is sometimes considered impolite to bereft respondents of
the choice to be neutral and force them to select a choice.
Lastly, the number of response alternatives tends to be based on the degree of
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Ice cream is good for breakfast
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Strongly agree
Table 3.2: Typical Likert scale statement and possible answers
discrimination required. For example, by increasing the number of alternatives, it is
possible to decrease the uncertain responses (neutral). However, this also increases
the questionnaire administration time because the respondent has to examine all al-
ternatives. Research suggests [192] that up to seven alternatives aids discrimination
between the answers– more than that and increased variability and small discrimin-
ation is faced between answers. Most evaluation questionnaires utilise a balanced,
bipolar scale with 5 to 7 points.
For the purposes of this questionnaire, in parts where a rating scale is used, a
balanced, bipolar scale with seven points was chosen. The aim was to offer the most
conveniently possible range of answers, in a balanced way and with the inclusion of a
neutral standpoint–an issue that was considered extremely important by the archae-
ological advisory panel.
A Likert [193] likelihood scale is a rating scale used for attitude measurement. In
place of a numerical scale, answers to a statement are given on a scale ranging from
complete agreement on one side to complete disagreement on the other side. The
original version of the scale uses five points of agreement or disagreement, as shown
in Table3.2:
Sometimes a four-point scale is used; this is a forced choice method since the
middle option of “Neither agree nor disagree” is not available. This is often con-
sidered as forcing the choice of the reader one way or another. Likert scales may be
subject to distortion from several causes. Respondents may avoid using extreme re-
sponse categories (central tendency bias); agree with statements as presented (acqui-
escence bias); or try to portray themselves or their organization in a more favourable
light (social desirability bias).
Question creation and wording
The third step in constructing a questionnaire involves the wording of questions. At-
tention must be paid to:
1. Vocabulary: It must be clear and precise, avoiding jargon and confusing terms.
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2. Negatives: Negative phrases such as "Indicate how often you do not eat breakfast
during a week" may appear confusing and misunderstood by the reader–the neg-
ative word should usually be left out.
3. Double-barrelled questions: These are questions involving two questions at the
same time i.e. “Do you like watching cartoons or eating ice cream”. The respond-
ent may like cartoons but not ice-cream or vice versa and is thus confusing to
answer one way or another.
4. Leading questions: These presuppose an event e.g. The statement “Indicate the
sourness of the ice-cream” presumes that the ice cream is de facto sour.
3.2.2 Prototype
A total of 35 related questions were created. The archaeologists were asked to care-
fully read through questions and make suggestions on their validity, appropriateness,
easiness of understanding, and order, as well as the types of answers available. The
resulting questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.
The questionnaire is divided in nine parts. The first part deals with perceptions
of uncertainty in the discipline and how alternative hypotheses are handled. Parts
two to six contain questions on the different identified factors. Part seven provides
combinations of factors (for example features and artefacts, or artefacts and biofacts)
and queries the expert as to how strong she considers this combination of evidence
to be. In the eighth part, the list of factors is provided and the expert is requested
to assign an order of importance for each. Finally, in the last part, the expert enters
his/her personal data such as their specialisation field, time spent on excavations etc.
Most importantly she is asked to give an opinion on the completeness of the factor
list.
The answers to parts 1—6 are chosen from a seven point ordered response Likert
scale. While prototyping the questionnaire, the first decision was to use a likelihood
Likert scale, which would indicate the agreement or disagreement with a statement.
However, feedback received from archaeologists showed that a frequency scale was
better understood in accordance to the specific questions. As a result, a frequency
scale was used.
Values include never, almost never, sometimes, often, very often, and always. The
expert is asked as to how often she encounters each statement when making inter-
pretations and reconstructions of a structure. Table 3.3 illustrates the concept:
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I consider two or more valid interpretations.
Never Almost never Seldom Sometimes Often Very often Always
Table 3.3: Question example
The participants were aware under which group each question belonged since
each part is clearly marked out as belonging to uncertainty, or a specific factor.
In part 7 the expert is asked to rate a list of factor combinations from 1 (weak) to 9
(strong). Lastly, part 8 follows a ranking system where the expert must rank the eight
factors according to how important she believes they are in an interpretation. This is
done by using numbers from 1 to 8 only once and assigning them to the factors.
Once the questions and scaling were completed, it was again tested by five ar-
chaeologists and five non-archaeologists for its coherence, layout and structure. The
questionnaire was distributed in two versions, printed and electronic.
Both versions, printed and electronic, had the same content and in the same order.
The printed version was personally distributed to archaeologists and collected after
completion. The electronic version was created with a simple design using XHTML
and PHP technology, while also being assistive and interactive. Features include error
handling, data retention and real-time data collection. Before the actual distribution
of the electronic questionnaire to any experts, fifteen people were asked to evaluate it
in terms of: understanding of the instructions, text length readability, font size, ques-
tionnaire flow and error handling. They were also asked to identify their computer
expertise, browser choice and screen resolution. 73.3% were male and 26.7% female.
26.7% were less than 25 years old, 53.3% were between 25–33 and 20% were above
33. 33.3% considered themselves to be adequate or knowledgeable with IT while the
rest were identified as experts or professionals. While 100% considered the length of
text and instructions easy to read, 33.3% faced issues with the error handling and 20%
with the default font size. About 73% of them were navigating with Mozilla Firefox
and the rest with Internet Explorer. 60% had a resolution of 1024x768 and 40% had
1280x1024 or more.
Following their suggestions, more robust error handling was implemented, which
introduced the ability to change the text size, gave instructions for all popular browsers,
and ensured full conformance with W3C XHTML/CSS specifications.
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Figure 3.2: Electronic questionnaire page
3.2.3 Participants
Participants were recruited across the archaeological discipline. Because the case
study is based on a Romano-British structure, half of the participants were Roman
archaeology experts. A requirement for inclusion was the participation in archaeolo-
gical excavation and interpretation of structures. Twenty experts participated, 50%
specialising in Roman archaeology and the other half in different fields. As far as
experience is concerned, 50% of the archaeologists had been working for 10 years or
more on their particular field while 30% had also been excavating for more than 10
years. 60% of the archaeologists involved were between 26-33 years old, 15% between
34-41 and the rest above 41. 50% of the participants were male and 50% female.
3.2.4 Procedure
Before answering the questionnaire, the participants had to read an information page
that explained the format of the questionnaire and how to answer questions. In the
case of the printed questionnaire, this was also verbally explained. In the electronic
version this was ensured by having to specifically tick a box in order to accept that
they fully understood the instructions. At the end of the questionnaire participants
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answer questions about the questionnaire itself such as if they considered the factor
list complete, or if the questionnaire was difficult to fill in.
3.2.5 Results
The data was examined in three parts. The first part was related to the Likert-style
questions (parts 1—6), the second part with the evidence combinations (part 7) and
the last one with the ordering (part 8).
In order to establish the appropriate tests for the data, it was tested for parametric
conformance assumptions. These assumptions presume that data: is normally dis-
tributed; has same variance through it; is measurable at least at the interval scale; is
independent (results from one participant are independent from another). While the
last two statements hold true, the first two were tested by normality and homogen-
eity tests respectively. Kolmogorov-Smirnov analysis indicated (sig. <0.05) that the
data is not normal, while Levene’s test (sig. >0.05) indicated homogeneity between
the Roman and non-Roman groups. The violation of one assumption leads us to use
non-parametric tests. The parts will be now described more analytically.
Parts 1—6
Thirty-five questions belong to these parts. Usually, one-way ANOVA is used to
check for differences between independent groups (such as the case here); however
ANOVA requires parametric data. A non-parametric alternative to ANOVA is the
Mann-Whitney approach. This test examines whether there are differences between
the results of groups. The data was tested with exact significance values, an op-
tion which gives more accurate results in small samples like ours. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov-Z (KGZ) test was chosen, which behaves similarly to the Mann-Whitney test
but is much more appropriate for smaller samples. It appears that answers were not
different between the Roman and the non-Roman group (Sig>0.05).
The following step involved averaging the answers for each factor and examining
the results. Terms that have a reverse phrasing were examined. For example, in the
questions measuring the attitude towards uncertainty, the statement “There is only one
true interpretation of a site” is a reverse-phrased one: if the attitude towards uncertainty
is positive, the answer to this question should be negative. However, this would
give a less weight in the scale, and vice versa. For this reason, six negative-phrased
questions had their scores reversed before they were averaged. As a result, out of the
35 variables, 8 resulted (Table 3.4).
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Resulting variable # Resulting variable #
Uncertainty 7 Ancient texts 3
Features 7 Biofacts 3
Topography 3 Peer support 5
Artefacts 4
Total 35
Table 3.4: Aggregated variables
This data was again tested for parametric properties, and it was found to be ho-
mogeneous but non-parametric; Biofacts and Ancient texts failed the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov parametric test (Table 3.5). Table 3.6 shows the results for the homogeneity
test.
A KGZ test was conducted to test for any difference between the two groups. The
results, demonstrated in Table 3.7 show that no difference was observed. The above
results suggest that no difference can be observed between answers given from the
Roman and non-Roman groups.
Looking at the means of the different factors (Table 3.8 and Figure 3.3) it can be
seen that archaeologists primarily place importance on the suggestions of their peers
(Peer support). Then, evidence from existing sites (Comparisons) and Features score
quite strongly, followed by Artefacts and Topography, Biofacts and Ancient texts.
Part 7
Twenty-two options belong to this Part. Having established in the beginning of Sec-
tion 3.2.5 that the data is non-parametric, a KGZ test was conducted to test for any
differences between the two groups. The results, included in the appendix, show no
significant difference between groups and allow us to examine the means as a whole
group. Table 3.9 shows the results from the combinations of Part 7. It is interesting
to note that combinations involving features, artefacts, contextual and absolute com-
parisons and topography score more strongly than other combinations. Additionally,
combinations involving texts and biofacts score the least in the table.
Roman experience? Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a)
Statistic df Sig.
Uncertainty yes .255 10 .064
no .242 10 .099
Features yes .174 10 .200(*)
no .200 10 .200(*)
Artefacts yes .202 10 .200(*)
no .158 10 .200(*)
Biofacts yes .285 10 .021
no .184 10 .200(*)
Topography yes .185 10 .200(*)
no .214 10 .200(*)
Comparisons yes .138 10 .200(*)
no .178 10 .200(*)
Ancient Texts yes .302 10 .010
no .303 10 .010
Peer Support yes .202 10 .200(*)
no .139 10 .200(*)
Table 3.5: Normality test for Parts 1—6
Levene Statistic Sig.
Uncertainty .491 .492
Features .658 .428
Artefacts 1.590 .223
Biofacts .179 .677
Topography 1.097 .309
Comparisons 1.300 .269
Ancient Texts 2.353 .142
Peer Support .275 .606
Table 3.6: Homogeneity test for Parts 1—6
Kolmogorov
Smirnov Z
Exact Sig.
(2-tailed)
Most Extreme
Diff.
Uncertainty 0.447 0.958 0.2
Features 0.671 0.708 0.3
Artefacts 0.894 0.332 0.4
Biofacts 0.671 0.526 0.3
Topography 0.224 1 0.1
Comparisons 0.894 0.181 0.4
Ancient Texts 0.894 0.288 0.4
Peer Support 0.447 0.981 0.2
Table 3.7: KGZ test for Parts 1—6
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Peer Support 5.25 0.75359 4 6.6
Comparisons 5 0.71737 3.67 6.67
Features 4.9625 0.47659 4.25 6
Uncertainty 4.8429 0.52006 4.29 6
Artefacts 4.7625 0.66627 3.75 6.25
Topography 4.15 0.73727 2.67 5.67
Biofacts 3.9 0.72628 2.67 5.33
Ancient Texts 3.6333 0.7327 2.33 5
Table 3.8: Means for Parts 1—6
Sum Mean Std. Deviation Variance
Features & artefacts. 155 7.75 1.02 1.039
Features & contextual comparison. 138 6.9 1.071 1.147
Features & peer input. 138 6.9 0.852 0.726
Features & absolute comparisons. 137 6.85 1.424 2.029
Features & topography. 131 6.55 1.638 2.682
Artefacts & contextual comparison. 130 6.5 1.821 3.316
Features & biofacts. 129 6.45 1.638 2.682
Artefacts & absolute comparisons. 128 6.4 1.635 2.674
Artefacts & biofacts. 127 6.35 2.033 4.134
Artefacts & peer input. 124 6.2 1.508 2.274
Topography & absolute comparisons. 124 6.2 2.093 4.379
Topography & contextual comparison. 121 6.05 1.791 3.208
Artefacts & topography. 121 6.05 2.038 4.155
Topography & peer input. 118 5.9 1.586 2.516
Features & textual evidence. 115 5.75 1.97 3.882
Topography & textual evidence. 111 5.55 2.481 6.155
Biofacts & peer input. 111 5.55 1.504 2.261
Artefacts & textual evidence. 111 5.55 2.114 4.471
Biofacts & contextual comparison. 109 5.45 2.328 5.418
Biofacts & absolute comparisons. 106 5.3 2.319 5.379
Biofacts & topography. 98 4.9 2.469 6.095
Biofacts & textual evidence. 98 4.9 1.997 3.989
Table 3.9: Means for Part 7
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Figure 3.3: Means of averaged variables
Part 8
The last part involves eight (8) variables, each accounting for a specific identified
factor. The KGZ test (Table 3.10) indicated that there was no difference between the
two groups (sig>0.05).
The next step was to examine the group means. Table 3.11 and Figure 3.4 show the
means calculations. Features and artefacts indicate higher scores for their means (6.85
and 5.70 out of 8 respectively) while the comparisons and peer input are between 4.50
and 4.90. Lastly, the biofacts and textual evidence are located at the lower end of the
scale.
Factor Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z Exact Sig. (2-tailed) Most Extreme diff
Features 0.671 0.498 0.3
Artefacts 0.447 902 0.2
Biofacts 0.447 0.953 0.2
Topography 0.224 1 0.1
Contextual comparisons 0.447 0.783 0.2
Absolute comparisons 0.447 0.969 0.2
Textual evidence 0.224 1 0.1
Peer input 0.447 0.978 0.2
Table 3.10: KGZ test for Part 8
Factors Sum Mean Std.
Devi-
ation
Variance
Features 137 6.85 2.059 4.239
Artefacts 114 5.7 2.055 4.221
Absolute comparisons 98 4.9 2.1 4.411
Contextual comparisons 90 4.5 1.539 2.368
Peer input/outside support 88 4.4 2.479 6.147
Topography 78 3.9 1.553 2.411
Biofacts 63 3.15 1.843 3.397
Textual evidence 52 2.6 1.847 3.411
Table 3.11: Means of influencing factors from Part 8
Figure 3.4: Graphs of means for Part 8
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3.2.6 Discussion
The questionnaire examined the attitude of archaeologists towards uncertainty and
whether there is any difference between Roman archaeologists and those of other
backgrounds when interpreting archaeological structures. Additionally, it examined
whether there is any preferential order between the identified factors.
Evidence
Throughout the three parts, results indicate that there is no significant difference
between the two groups. Furthermore, the archaeologists seem to place more im-
portance on peer feedback and evidence like features and artefacts. Accordingly, less
importance seems to be placed to textual evidence and biofacts.
Feedback received from the evidence combination parts equally suggests that
combinations of the above strong factors are considered more favourably when mak-
ing interpretations. The results obtained show that there can be preference amongst
different evidence which may be influential in visualisations of uncertainty.
Going back to the discussion in Section 2.6.2 regarding the weight and strength of
evidence in law, perhaps this preference amongst archaeologists is something similar.
It would be interesting to explore whether any overconfidence or under-confidence
(such as mentioned in 2.4.5) occurs when making judgement with different kinds of
evidence.
Uncertainty
Figure 3.5 shows the results on questions archaeologists were asked about uncer-
tainty. A large majority considers two or more equally possible interpretations, when
interpreting structural remains. They also acknowledge that other interpretations
could be equally viable to the ones they make themselves. Furthermore, they tend
to agree that they maybe more than one interpretation of a site while they are con-
cerned about the prevalence of uncertainty in archaeology. Lastly, even if just more
than half of them feel sure about their interpretations given the evidence they have
collected, 70% of them end up with one interpretation.
These results strengthen the importance uncertainty has on the archaeological dis-
cipline. It is interesting to note that even though uncertainty is prevalent in their
opinions, most of them end up with one interpretation more often than not. This is
to be expected as a decision-making procedure; the available evidence gives weight
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towards one hypothesis rather than another, and is subsequently supported. The
concept of equally valid interpretations is also understandable; given that the evid-
ence is never complete, archaeologists accept the fact that other experts may interpret
the data differently.
Lastly, this gives the impression that archaeologists may consider hypotheses in
an open world state of mind. Consider an archaeologist who excavates a site and ac-
cepts as valid scenarios A,B, or C. Due to evidence her judged interpretation is C.
However, new recovered evidence points to A,B,C and also D. Provided that the
new evidence is strong and credible enough to account for this, the expert has to
re-evaluate the given evidence and consider a new hypothesis.
3.3 Conclusion
The questionnaire results highlighted some important issues. Firstly, archaeologists
are concerned about uncertainty. Secondly, even after they evaluate all evidence and
provide interpretations, the confidence in said interpretation is not 100%. Thirdly,
there are indications that more credibility may be placed in some types of evidence;
as in being more indicative to provide the correct interpretation. All these should be
taken under consideration in the modelling of archaeological uncertainty.
In Sec. 2.3 different definitions and categorisations of uncertainty and ignorance
were presented. It is clear that there is no fixed definition that can be given. However,
the definitions have something in common. There is a dividing line between what
is known, measured, vague, fuzzy or missing in regards to the data, and what is
believed about the data. Smet’s [106] model represents this concept well. Figure 3.6
indicates the relationships and differences between the aspects of imperfect data as
identified by Smets.
Consider the concept of archaeological uncertainty involved in a 3D reconstruc-
tion. A reconstruction reflects the belief of the expert in how the building might have
looked like, given existing knowledge and her interpretation of evidence at hand.
There is no knowing for certain, rather a quantity of belief, based on accumulated evidence,
that the reconstruction is a representation of the past. If new evidence/facts/inform-
ation arrives (i.e. missing data is found), then the belief can change. In other words,
the archaeologist/expert is expressing belief about a statement (the reconstruction)
based on a body of knowledge that might include precise, imprecise, incomplete,
vague and/or conflicting data.
(a) Archaeology is fraught with uncer-
tainty; you cannot be too sure about any-
thing.
(b) Other alternatives to my interpretation
could be equally viable.
(c) I consider two, or more, valid inter-
pretations.
(d) I feel sure about my interpretation
given the available evidence.
(e) There is only one true interpretation of
a site.
(f) I end up with one interpretation and
no alternatives.
Figure 3.5: Questions on Uncertainty
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Figure 3.6: Representing imperfect knowledge (based on [106])
An example is given to illustrate the concept, in Figure 3.7. A plain column shaft
has been discovered in an ancient Greek site. Consider Sally, a fresh archaeology
graduate. Based on the data available, and her background knowledge, to suggest an
interpretation, she would not be able to choose between Ionic and Corinthian orders.
Despite the measurement of data being precise and complete, the uncertainty is re-
flected on her interpretation. A more experienced archaeologist, John, suggests that
Corinthian columns were less common than Ionic ones–his accumulated knowledge
includes a related fact that Sally was not aware of. As a result, he favours that this
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was possibly an Ionic column.
Figure 3.7: Representing uncertainty on a state of knowledge
While both are using the same recovered data, each has different accumulated
knowledge and they use both to express their belief. Both of their suggestions will be
valid until new evidence is found that would support Corinthian or Ionic.
Great care must be taken to distinguish precision and certainty from truth. The
expert/observer can be precise and certain about an event P even though in actuality
she may be wrong. For example, consider the following proposition P: “I am certain
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the Olympian gods were thirteen in number”. While the statement is precise and certain,
it is false since the gods are twelve and the data fed to the statement is erroneous.
The certainty in a proposition can be reflected as saying “I believe that P” but not as “I
know that P”. To believe in P does not necessarily make P true.
This is the fundamental difference between the concept of belief and knowledge;
saying “I know that P” means that not only there is a belief in P but P is also true.
Conclusively, subjective uncertainty deals directly with beliefs about the knowledge.
During the course of this thesis the terms belief and degrees of belief are used in-
terchangeably. As a result, the following phrase defines the approach of this thesis
towards archaeological uncertainty:
Archaeological uncertainty can be defined as the degree of belief of the expert in the
interpretation/reconstruction of an archaeological structure or object. The degree
of belief depends on the expert’s state of knowledge at the given moment.
The following two Chapters apply mathematical methods of quantifying an expert’s
belief based on knowledge, to archaeological scenarios. Subjective probability, fuzzy
sets and possibility theory as well as evidence theory are explained and applied to
simulated archaeological cases.
Lastly, attention must also be placed in the state of knowledge. The extent, and qual-
ity, of relevant knowledge is what reduces uncertainty and results in better-supported
hypotheses. As discussed in Chapter1, a large part of the archaeological inferential
process is making analogies with similar discoveries. This is also evident with the ab-
solute and contextual comparison categories identified by the archaeologists in this
Chapter.
Consider the following scenario: During an excavation, Sally, the archaeology
graduate, unearths a piece of pottery but has troubles identifying it. She uploads
a picture of it to a database of archaeological information, and compares her find
with other pottery shards that are perhaps better identified by expert archaeologists.
Having completed her inferential process, her uncertainty is now at a reduced state.
The concepts of searchable knowledge states, and describable evidence are further
explored in Chapter 7.
It is a truth very certain that
when it is not in our power to
determine what is true, we ought
to follow what is most probable.
R. Descartes
CHAPTER 4
Quantifying Uncertainty:
Probability Approach
One of the contributions of this thesis is the application of subjective probability as a
means of quantifying archaeological uncertainty. The mathematical foundations are
set by discussing classical logic, mathematical axioms of probability theory, and the
derived Bayes’ Theorem. Then, the application to archaeological scenarios is demon-
strated. This is followed by a discussion evaluating potential benefits and drawbacks
of using subjective probability.
4.1 Introduction
The word probability in the Oxford English Dictionary has three definitions [194]:
1. The property or fact of being probable, esp. of being uncertain but more likely than not;
the extent to which something is likely to happen or be the case; the appearance of truth,
or likelihood of being realized, which a statement or event bears in the light of present
evidence.
2. An instance of the property or fact of being probable; a probable event or circumstance;
a thing judged likely to be true, to exist, or to happen.
3. As a measurable quantity: the extent to which a particular event is likely to occur, or a
particular situation be the case, as measured by the relative frequency of occurrence of
events of the same kind in the whole course of experience, and expressed by a number
between 0 and 1. An event that cannot happen has probability 0; one that is certain to
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happen has probability 1. Probability is commonly estimated by the ratio of the number
of successful cases to the total number of possible cases, derived mathematically using
known properties of the distribution of events, or estimated logically by inferential or
inductive reasoning (when mathematical concepts may be inapplicable or insufficient).
As the above quotation shows, to give a definition of probability one must con-
sider the expected values, or outcomes, of probability. Will the values measure a
tendency of something to occur, or are they a measure of how strongly one believes it
will occur? These three examples demonstrate which probability might be used when
faced with uncertainty:
1. Roll a dice, toss a coin.
2. Predict the weather, the team that will win the FA Cup.
3. Debate whether there is life on other planets, or the existence of a gold deposit
in an area.
The first scenario is what people mostly associate with probability–games of chance,
dice, roulette, the flip of a coin. Otherwise known as objective, physical, or frequent-
ist, for the purposes of this thesis, the term Frequentist Probability (FP) will be used
to refer to this approach. In such scenarios, an event such as “The coin will land on
heads” occurs at a persistent rate in a long run of trials. Thus, FP makes sense only
when dealing with well-defined, random, and repeatable experiments.
The second scenario implies that data must be used in order to assign probabil-
ities. Taking the weather scenario under consideration, if it has been observed that
with current weather conditions the day is sunny 10% of the days, the probability of
the sun coming out today will be 10%. This value will, of course, change, as more
weather data is gathered. Probability in this kind of scenario is termed Statistical
Probability (SP).
The third scenario can be assigned to any kind of statement, even when no random
process is involved. The difference from the previous two scenarios is that there is
already an outcome, there is no awareness, however, what it is. A gold deposit may
exist or it may not. An expert’s opinion, could indicate a 60% certainty–this does not
mean that the deposit is there 60% of the time and the others moves away, rather it
reflects the expert’s opinion that the chances are a bit better than half. In other words,
it reflects the degree to which the statement is supported by the available evidence.
In this form, subjective (also referred to as evidential, or epistemic) probability can be
Quantifying Uncertainty: Subjective Possibility 73
expressed as degrees of belief –how likely one would be to gamble against certain odds.
Bayesian Probability is a form of subjective probability.
Regardless of the different philosophical aspects of probability, there exist math-
ematical foundations which are followed in all scenarios. The following sections
present an introduction in classical logic, probability laws, conditional probability
and Bayes’ theorem.
4.2 Principles of classical logic
Classical logic sets a number of formal rules for the handling of logic both in a math-
ematical and a philosophical manner. It is not in the purpose of this thesis to expand
on the evolution of classical logic from the philosophical years of Aristotle to the lay-
ing down of the mathematical foundations in the 20th century–relevant information
can be found in [195]. Three are the major laws of Classical logic, the law of bivalence,
contradiction, and excluded middle.
The law of bivalence states that any proposition P must either be true or false.
The law of contradiction judges as false any proposition P asserting that both
proposition P and its denial, proposition ¬P, are true at the same time and in the
same respect. In the words of Aristotle, “One cannot say of something that it is and that
it is not in the same respect and at the same time”[196]. For any proposition P, it cannot
be both the case that P and −P (not P) is true. Symbolically, this is expressed as:
¬(P∧¬P) (4.1)
For example, if P is Tim is bald, then the inclusive conjunction Tim is bald, and Tim
is not bald is false.
The law of excluded middle states that for any proposition P, it is true that either
P, or its denial ¬P is true at the same time and in the same respect. Symbolically:
P∨¬P (4.2)
For example, if P is Tim is bald, then the inclusive disjunction Tim is bald, or Tim is
not bald is true. This is not quite the same as the principle of bivalence, which states
that P must be either true or false. It also differs from the law of non-contradiction,
which states that ¬(P∧¬P is true. The law of excluded middle only says that the total
(P∧¬P) is true, but does not comment on what truth values P itself may take.
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In any case, the semantics of any bivalent (or two-valued logics, such as classical)
logic will assign opposite truth values to P and ¬P (i.e., if P is true, then ¬P is false),
so the law of excluded middle will be equivalent to the principle of bivalence in a
bivalent logic. Classical logic and the derived Boolean relationships are very relevant
to probability theory.
However, the same cannot be said about non-bivalent logics, or many-valued lo-
gics. These logic systems may have either different or analogous laws, or reject the
law of excluded middle in its entirety. Fuzzy sets, and the derived fuzzy logic, reject
the law of bivalence and consequently, the law of excluded middle. This is further
analysed in Chapter 5, however the following simple example illustrates the logical
differences between the two.
Consider the statement P The glass is full of water. With classical logic, the glass
could either be full or totally empty. A half-full glass, however, counts as both full
and empty at the same time. This particular multi-valent logic, assigns a matter of
degree to each proposition instead of complete truth or falsity.
4.3 Probability calculus
It is worth briefly expanding on important properties of set theory as it defines the
rules and conventions of how to handle probability events. This aids in the further
discussions of probability and the consequent differences between classical sets and
fuzzy sets.
Classical set theory
A set is a collection of objects, concrete, or abstract, hereby termed as elements. If S
is a set and x an element of it, this is expressed as x ∈ S; if x does not belong to S
then x /∈ S. For each use of set theory, all objects that are relevant constitute a set that
is called a universe. A common way to define any set S that consists of some objects
of universe Ω is to assign the number1 to each member of Ω that is also a member
of A and to assign the number 0 to the remaining members of Ω. This assignation
is otherwise known as characteristic function. Given that the characteristic function of
each x ∈ Ω, a set A can also be described as in Eq. 4.3:
A(x) =
1 if x ∈ Ω0 if x /∈ Ω (4.3)
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It is important to note that the range [0, 1] is purely symbolic; any other meaning-
ful expression could have been used such as [false, true]. For example, the charac-
teristic function f of the set of real numbers from 10 to 20 is:
fA(x) =
1 if 10 5 x 5 200 if otherwise
Figure 4.1 illustrates the concept; notice the sharp boundaries that distinguish
between membership and non-membership of the set.
1
f
0
10 20 30
A
Figure 4.1: The characteristic function f of the set of real numbers from 10 to 20
A set is considered finite and/or countable if the number of elements is finite and
the contained elements are countable by any conventional labelling. For example, set
A = {1, 2, 3...n} is finite to |A| = n; with the same logic, the set of natural numbers,N
is not finite but is countable.
Let A and B be sets that form part of a universe X. The symbol ”|” is to be read as
given that; for example {x | x satisfies P}. Briefly, the operations that can be performed
on sets are:
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Union A∪ B = {x | x ∈ Aor x ∈ B} (4.4)
Intersection A∩ B = {x | x ∈ Aand x ∈ B} (4.5)
Complement Ac = {x | x /∈ A} (4.6)
Difference AB = A /∈ Bc (4.7)
Contradiction law A∩Ac = Ø (4.8)
Excluded middle law A∪Ac = X (4.9)
Commutativity A∩ B = B∩A (4.10)
B∪A = A∪ B
Associativity (A∩ B)∩C = A∩ (B∩C) (4.11)
(A∪ B)∪C = A∪ (B∪C
Distributivity A∩ (B∪C) = (A∩ B)∪ (A∩C) (4.12)
A∪ (B∩C) = A∪ (B∪C)
Idempotence A∪A = A (4.13)
A∩A = A
DeMorgan Laws (A∩ B)c = Ac ∪ Bc (4.14)
(A∪ B)c = Ac ∩ Bc
Two sets are considered disjoint if their intersection is empty–in other words, if
they have no elements in common. A partition of a set S is a collection of sets that
are disjoint and their union is S. Figure 4.2 illustrates in practice sets and associated
operations:
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Ω
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Figure 4.2: Crisp sets examples: (a) The shaded region isU∪V . (b) The shaded region
is U ∩ V . (c) The shaded region is U ∩ Vc. (d) U ⊂ V and the shaded region is Vc. (e)
The sets U, V , Z are disjoint. (f) The sets U, V , Z form a partition of setΩ.
4.3.1 Probability axioms
A probabilistic model is a mathematical description of an uncertain situation. It is
composed of two main elements, the sample space Ω and the probability law. The
sample space defines the set of all possible outcomes of an experiment. The probability
law assigns to a subset A (or event A) of possible outcomes a non-negative number
Pr(A) which represents the belief about the likelihood of the elements of A. Thus, the
mathematical expression Pr(A) is read as the “probability of (the event/statement)
A”. The probability axioms are summarised in Table 4.1.
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Non-negativity:
For every event A: Pr(A) = 0
Additivity:
For non-disjoint events A and B: Pr(A)∪ B = Pr(A) + Pr(B) − Pr(A∩ B)
Additivity:
For disjoint events A and B,
the probability of their union satisfies: Pr(A)∪ B = Pr(A) + Pr(B)
For a sequence of disjoint events: Pr(A1 ∪A2 ∪ · · ·An = Pr(A1) + Pr(A2)+ . . .+ Pr(An)
Normalisation:
The probability of the entire
sample spaceΩ is equal to one Pr(Ω) = 1
Complement:
For an event not happening A¯ Pr(A¯) = 1− Pr(A)
Table 4.1: Probability axioms
From the normalisation and additivity axioms, it is also derived that 1 = Pr(Ω) =
Pr(Ω) ∪ Pr(Ø)=Pr(Ω)+Pr(Ø)=1+Pr(Ø)–and thus, the probability of an empty event is
zero Pr(Ø)=0.
The following example is provided as an illustration of the axioms. Let Ω be a
collection of 50 Roman denarii (coins). 15 of them have a high silver content, 20 a
high bronze content, 5 have both silver and bronze, while 10 are mostly made of
bulion. The Venn diagram in Figure 4.3 describes the scenario. Let Pr(A) be the coins
with silver content, and Pr(B) the coins with bronze content.
10
15 205
A Β
Ω
.
Figure 4.3: Venn diagram of Roman denarii
The Karnaugh table (Table 4.2) explains the probabilities.
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A A¯ Total A A¯ Total
B Pr(A∩ B) Pr(A¯∩ B) Pr(B) 5/50 20/50 25/50
B¯ Pr(A∩ B¯) Pr(A¯∩ B¯) Pr(B¯) ⇒ 15/50 10/50 25/50
Total Pr(A) Pr(A¯) 1 20/50 30/50 1
Table 4.2: The probabilities of coins
4.3.2 Conditional probability, independence, and total probability
Conditional probability refers to the probability of an event occurring if some con-
dition has been applied. We write Pr(B | A) to mean Pr(B occurs given that A has
occurred). The conditional probability formula is given in Eq. 4.15.
Pr(B given A) =
Pr(B AND A)
Pr(A)
== Pr(B | A) =
Pr(B∩A)
Pr(A)
(4.15)
Re-arranging Eq. 4.16 gives us the multiplication law:
Pr(B∩A) = Pr(A)Pr(B | A) (4.16)
If events A and B are independent (i.e. A happening has no effect on B whatsoever or
vice verca), Pr(B | A) = Pr(B) and thus Eq. 4.16 reduces to Pr(B∩A) = Pr(B) · Pr(A).
Similarly, Pr(A | B) = Pr(A) and Pr(A∩ B) = Pr(A) · Pr(B).
Looking back at Fig. 4.2, a partition of a set Ω is formed by events A1...Anif these
events are disjoint (Ai ∩Aj = Ø; for i 6= j) and their union sums up toΩ (A1 ∪ ...An =
Ω). As a result, for any conditional event B, the total probability law holds:
Pr(B) =
n∑
j=1
Pr(Aj)Pr(B | Aj) (4.17)
The following example illustrates the law: An Early Anglo-Saxon graveyard con-
sists of 60% males, 30% females, and 10 % children. Burials containing votive deposits
were 45% in male graves, 35% in females and 20% in children. What is the probability
that a randomly selected grave contains a votive deposit?
Let Ω be the cemetery population, with Pr(Male) = 0.6, Pr(Female) = 0.3 and
Pr(Child) = 0.1. Let B be the probability of a votive offering Pr(B | Male) = 0.45,
Pr(B | Female) = 0.35, Pr(B | Child) = 0.20, Using Eq. 4.17:
Pr(B) = Pr(B |Male)Pr(Male) + Pr(B | Female)Pr(Female)
+Pr(B | Child)Pr(Child)
= 0.6 · 0.45+ 0.3 · 0.35+ 0.1 · 0.2 = 0.395
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4.3.3 Bayes’ Theorem
Bayes’ theorem [113] deals with posterior probability, a conditional probability of H
given E, where H actually occurs first. In other words, given that E occurred, what is
the probability that it happened through Hj? Equation 4.18 is the Bayes’ theorem. Let
H1...Hn be disjoint events, forming a partition of sample space Ω and Pr(Hj) = 0 for
all j. Then, for any event E, Pr(E) = 0:
Pr(H | E) =
Pr(Ej ∩H)
Pr(E)
multiplication law (eq. 4.16) =
Pr(Hj)Pr(E | Hj)
Pr(E)
total probability law (eq. 4.17) =
Pr(Hj)Pr(E | Hj)∑n
j=1 Pr(Hj)Pr(E | Hj)
Pr(Hj | E) =
Pr(Hj)Pr(E | Hj)
Pr(H1)P(E | H1) + ...+ Pr(Hn)P(E | Hn)
(4.18)
The concept behind Bayesian reasoning is the use of a prior condition in order
to calculate a posterior–termed as a priori and a posteriori. For example, questions
such as: “What is the probability that a person has illness X given symptoms Y occurred?”
or, from the example in Section 4.3.2 “What is the probability that bones from grave
X belong to a male, given that a votive deposit was found?” illustrate the concept of
Pr(Hypothesis|Evidence). Bayes’ Theorem is used to calculate the probability that
a hypothesis is true based on the available evidence.
To calculate this, the following are required: the probability of getting the evidence
if the hypothesis is true, the probability of getting the evidence if the hypothesis is
false, and how likely it would be that the hypothesis is true if the particular evidence
was not available. The last requirement is the prior condition, this could represent a
subjective belief, or even a state of uncertainty, that, through the feedback of evidence
it is further strengthened or weakened. It should be stressed that evidence does not
affect the actual probability that the hypothesis is true; rather, it alters the state of
knowledge about it.
Taking the Anglo-Saxon graveyard example, calculating Pr(Male|Votive) is:
Pr(M|V) =
Pr(M) · Pr(V |M)
Pr(M) · Pr(V |M) + Pr(F) · Pr(V |F) + Pr(C) · Pr(V |C)
=
0.6 · 0.45
0.6 · 0.45+ 0.3 · 0.35+ 0.1 · 0.2 = 0.683
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Calculating Pr(F|V) andPr(C|V) yields 0.258 and 0.051 respectively. In other words,
the probability distribution of an Anglo-Saxon graveyard was {0.6, 0.3, 0.1} before re-
covering a votive deposit where it changed to {0.683, 0.258, 0.051} for our current dig.
These two distributions are the prior and the posterior, respectively.
4.4 A probabilistic approach to archaeological uncertainty
This thesis proposes that one way to approach archaeological uncertainty is through
subjective (Bayesian) probability. The term probability is used here strictly within its
subjective meaning, representing belief and likelihood. In other words, when creating
an archaeological reconstruction, the expert places her belief on the reconstruction’s
process. Belief increases if the evidence is corroborative, or concrete, and decreases if
it is conflicting, or lacking.
The introduction to Bayes Theorem has shown that simple conditional probability
by itself is not sufficient to handle the impact added by evidence in a model. The
following (archaeologically simple) example illustrates the difference between these
two concepts.
In an archaeological dig, a column base was discovered. Subsequently, pieces
of a column top were also unearthed. A reconstruction must be produced. The ar-
chaeologist has the following knowledge about columns before unearthing anything:
Columns belong to one of two orders, M and N. Either is as likely to be found {0.5,0.5}.
These columns are distinguished usually by their bases (types A and B) with a dis-
tribution (0.95, 0.05) for order M and (0.25,0.75) for order N. Figure 4.4 illustrates the
concept.
Column bases are always followed by pillars (two styles, C, D) and tops (two
styles, E, F). It has been noted that column M has pillar C most of the times (0.8,0.2)
and top F (0.3, 0.7). Column N has pillar D more often (0.1,0.9) and top E (0.6,0.4).
The recovered evidence are a base of type A and a top of type F.
The example is now displayed by means of a Karnaugh table (Table 4.3). This style
of representation is quite important and will be used extensively through the thesis.
If one were to (erroneously) rely only on simple conditional probability, the res-
ults, presented in Table 4.4 arise for the belief in a model fitting the style of column M.
By using the Karnaugh table, it is easy to calculate the belief by multiplying between
the respective rows. For example, for a model in theM style with Base B, Pillar D and
Top F, the belief would be 0.05 ∗ 0.2 ∗ 0.7.
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Figure 4.4: Column example
ColumnM Column N ColumnM Column N
Base A 0.95 0.25 Pillar C 0.8 0.1
Base B 0.05 0.75 Pillar D 0.2 0.9
ColumnM Column N ColumnM Column N
Top E 0.3 0.6 Colour Y 0.1 0.7
Top F 0.7 0.4 Colour Z 0.9 0.3
Table 4.3: The probabilities of two column styles,M and N.
ColumnM Column N
ACE 0.228 BCE 0.012 ACE 0.015 BCE 0.045
ACF 0.532 BCF 0.028 ACF 0.01 BCF 0.03
ADE 0.057 BDE 0.003 ADE 0.135 BDE 0.405
ADF 0.133 BDF 0.007 ADF 0.09 BDF 0.27
Table 4.4: Conditional options
Even if a base of type A, a pillar C and a top F are discovered, the best probability
for a column M interpretation is 0.532. The reliability result for the discovery of a base
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A and a top F is 0.665–by considering both pillar types.
It is easy to observe, that by adding more evidence, this approach leads to a lesser
and lesser belief. The reason is that alternative scenarios where the suggested hypo-
thesis does not hold are not taken under consideration.
The Bayesian approach will be now considered. The question asks for a belief to
be placed on the evidence. Given that a base A and consequently a top F were found,
what is the likelihood that the column belongs to style M? To consider this question,
the prior belief is needed (a non-committing value of 0.5, 0.5), and the conditional
values used before, found in the Karnaugh table. In more detail:
Pr(M | A) =
Pr(M)(Pr(A |M)
Pr(M)Pr(A |M) + Pr(N)Pr(A | N)
=
0.5 · 0.95
0.5 · 0.95+ 0.5 · 0.25
= 0.791
The belief that a column of style M has been discovered, has increased to 0.791
after the discovery of base A. The new belief values for M and N respectively are
{0.791, 0.209}. In order to add the new discovery of top F, a similar approach is fol-
lowed, but the prior belief this time comes from the new values incorporating evid-
ence of base A:
Pr(M | F) =
Pr(M)(Pr(F |M)
Pr(M)Pr(F |M) + Pr(N)Pr(F | N)
=
0.791 · 0.7
0.791 · 0.7+ 0.209 · 0.4
= 0.868
It is also possible to combine multiple evidence together - for example in a scen-
ario where two different parts are found simultaneously. Re-examining the base/top
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scenario:
Pr(M | A, F) = Pr(M).Pr(A |M).Pr(F |M)
= (0.5, 0.5).(0.95, 0.25).(0.7, 0.4)
normalisation =
0.5x0.95x0.7, 0.5x0.25x0.4
0.5x0.95x0.7+ 0.5x0.25x0.4
=
0.3325
0.3825
,
0.05
0.3825
belief in {M, N} = 0.868, 0.132
Pr(M | A, F) = 0.868
Lastly, to demonstrate how belief decreases in the face of contradicting evidence,
let it be supposed that a pillar of type D was found (most commonly associated with
columns of style N):
Pr(M | D) =
Pr(M)(Pr(D |M)
Pr(M)Pr(D |M) + Pr(N)Pr(D | N)
=
0.868 · 0.2
0.868 · 0.2+ 0.132 · 0.9
= 0.59
The confidence in an interpretation of column M has decreased with the contra-
dicting evidence.
Lastly, consider two archaeologists (Mr X and Mr Y) who are judging the inter-
pretation. Each has his own subjective prior belief about the distribution of column
types M and N. Mr X assigns a prior belief of {0.7, 0.3} for {M,N} while Mr. Y as-
signs {0.3, 0.7}. After accumulating the evidence of base A and top F, the calculated
subjective beliefs are {0.939, 0.06} for Mr. X and {0.74, 0.26} for Mr. Y.
It is interesting to note that through the accumulation of evidence, Mr. X’s already
strong belief in the existence of M column types has been strengthened significantly.
He would be very surprised if it turns out to be a column N. Similarly, the low belief
in the existence of M columns shown by Mr. Y has turned to a high confidence, equal
to the a priori belief of his colleague. If further evidence is discovered, the beliefs
of these two people will actually be very similar. The latter example illustrates that
even with different a priori beliefs, supporting evidence will eventually stabilise the
confidence in the interpretation.
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4.5 Conclusion
This Chapter has shown how it is possible, by using a Bayesian approach, to evaluate
the belief in a reconstruction, or parts of it. The Bayesian approach demonstrates how
beliefs can change in an interpretation with the addition of supporting (or contradict-
ing) evidence. The requirement of a prior belief might be an issue–what if the a priori
belief is biased towards one interpretation? While the examples have shown that with
the accumulation of evidence the belief would adjust accordingly, other issues might
also arise. Through the application of Bayes’ Theorem to archaeological examples,
the following issues have been identified:
Prior belief and ignorance
The prior belief requirement fits very well in cases where the expert has adequate
background information on the existence of similar scenarios. What if, however, the
expert is ignorant? Does not know? Classical Bayesian approaches assign an equi-
probability to ignorance. For example, for two cases A and B with no prior know-
ledge, the expert should assign a prior of {0.5, 0.5}. However, semantically, this is not
correct as {0.5, 0.5} can also reflect knowledge that either A or B are likely to occur.
Strict totality of distribution
The laws of Probability (which Bayes’ Theorem inherits) dictate that between two
cases,A and B if one assigns a confidence of 0.95 toA, they should assign a confidence
of 0.05 to B. However, they may be cases where this may be too restrictive or force
the archaeologist to accept assumptions that they would not be comfortable with.
The effect of 0 likelihood
If one assigns a likelihood of 0 to a hypothesis, this hypothesis may never be resurrec-
ted no matter the evidence. In other words, 0 will not represent total ignorance but a
total improbability.
Forced granularity
Consider a scenario which relates a particular Roman roof tile to two different types of
roofs. The archaeologist knows with 100% certainty that the only recorded association
for this tile has been roofs of type A and B but is not willing to give a sub-probability.
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The additivity law forces us to assign 0.5 and 0.5 to each case. There is no way to
assign a confidence in a less granular option.
Closed world
Probability theory (and a large number of theories of ignorance) postulate the exist-
ence of a closed world. The hypotheses tested are exhaustive and inclusive. However,
there may be cases where one would need the option of adding a new hypothesis.
Bayes’ Theorem is an good choice of mathematical tool to be used if one wishes
to quantify subjective belief with well-measured conditions and distributions of evid-
ence. The next Chapter examines non-probabilistic approaches to uncertainty which
tackle the majority of the issues identified above.
Alice laughed. "There’s no use
trying," she said: "one can’t
believe impossible things."
Through the Looking Glass
CHAPTER 5
Quantifying Uncertainty:
Non-Probabilistic Approaches
The previous Chapter discussed Subjective Probability and how it can be used to
quantify archaeological uncertainty. Evaluation indicated a number of issues that
may arise in certain cases. This Chapter explores non-probabilistic methods to un-
certainty. The contributions presented include two applications of quantifying ar-
chaeological uncertainty. These are based on two different non-probabilistic models:
Possibility Theory and the Transferable Belief which has its roots on Evidence Theory.
The mathematical foundations of both are explored followed by their applications to
archaeological scenarios. An evaluation is provided as conclusion.
5.1 Epistemic Possibility Theory
As probability is based on crisp sets (described in Section 4.3) so is Possibility Theory
based on fuzzy sets. Possibility theory is a theory of uncertainty specialising in the
handling of incomplete information [123]. The term Possibility Theory was invented by
L. Zadeh, who in turn, was inspired by a paper by Gaines and Kohout [197]. Possibil-
ity theory does not contradict probability theory; rather, it complements it. The major
difference between the two is that Possibility theory uses a pair of dual-set functions,
known as possibility and necessity, instead of the single function used by probability.
While during its conception, Possibility Theory was created to deal with graded
semantics to natural language statements [123], during the years of its development
87
Quantifying Uncertainty: Possibility & the TBM 88
[198, 199] it has evolved to a representation of partial belief that parallels and comple-
ments probability.
In Section 4 it was discussed how probability has different meanings and uses
depending on the context, even if the mathematical foundations remain consistent.
A similar case occurs with Possibility Theory–it can support various interpretations
[200], such as:
1. Logical: This approach deals with consistency of available information. By giv-
ing a possibility to a proposition, we accept that related information is not con-
tradicted.
2. Feasibility: The ease of achievement; how easy it is to solve a problem given
that certain constrains exist.
3. Plausibility: This reflects the belief or tendency of events to occur. A regular
expression might be It is plausible that ...
Hacking [201] distinguishes between possibility as an objective or subjective (epi-
stemic) notion. In the first case, it reflects properties of the physical world, while on
the second it represents the state of knowledge of an agent. As with probability, this
thesis is related to the subjective notion of possibility. Possibility measure reflects the
idea of plausibility and its dual function, necessity relates to certainty or belief. In
other words, the certainty of an event, reflects a lack of plausibility of its opposite.
This is a major difference to probability theory which is self-dual.
In Probability Theory:
It is probable that "A" = It is not probable that "not A"
In Possibility Theory:
It is possible that "A" 6= It is not possible that "not A"
This section provides a brief overview of fuzzy sets in order to further explain
how Possibility Theory works, and how it differs from fuzzy logic.
5.1.1 Fuzzy set theory
Fuzzy sets were introduced in 1965 in a seminal paper by L. A. Zadeh[122]. Fuzzy
sets, contrary to classical sets, are not required to have sharp boundaries that distin-
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guish members of a set from non-members. A membership in a fuzzy set does not
signify concrete belonging to the set; rather it reflects a matter of degree of belonging.
A fuzzy setA of a universe X is defined by a function that assigns to each object x in X
a membership degree of x in A. As classical sets have the characteristic function, fuzzy
sets display the membership function.
In order to express membership degree, a number is usually used from the unit
interval [0, 1]. During the description of classical sets, it was mentioned that the
interval {0, 1} is arbitrary and does not hold any numerical significance. In the case
of fuzzy sets, however, the interval does have a numerical significance. By allowing
degrees of membership during this interval, fuzzy sets are able to express a gradual
transition, or belonging, from being a member to not being a member of a set. Due
to this ability, one of the first usages of fuzzy sets was to describe linguistic functions
such as very, a lot, a little, a concept which is difficult to describe with classical sets.
Definition: A fuzzy set F is a pair (Ω, µF) where Ω is a set and µF is the mapping
ofΩ to the unit interval [0, 1].
µF : Ω→ [0, 1] (5.1)
degree of membership of ω in F µF(ω) for ω ∈ Ω (5.2)
The following archaeological example serves as an illustration. Consider the ex-
pression “The Roman wall was very high.” How high, is very high? If one accepts that,
for example, above 4 meters is very high, would that imply that 3.95 meters is not
high at all? In the concept of classical (or crisp) sets, one would have to concede to
the latter. Figure 5.1 illustrates four membership functions, all describing the wall. In
order to relate the example with the aforementioned definition, setΩ is considered to
represent the heights of Roman walls. The membership of the function in a fuzzy set,
will express how much the value (or the object) ω is compatible with the concept of
“heights”.
Functions A and B are derived from classical sets. Set A contains a single object,
the number 4. This can be expressed as “High is four meters.” Set B contains numbers
between 3 and 5, which can be expressed as “High is between three and five meters.”
Functions C and D describe fuzzy sets. Set C gradually begins from 2 and gradu-
ally ends at 6. This can mean “High is around four meters.” The difference with the clas-
sic set B is that while both consist of numbers around 4, the boundaries are extremely
sharp at set B thus anything more than 5 meters is not considered high anymore. Set
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1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
A(x)
0
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
B(x)
0
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
C(x)
0
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
D(x)
0
Figure 5.1: Classic and fuzzy sets; Sets A&B demonstrate classic sets while C&D are
fuzzy sets.
D represents an interval-valued fuzzy set. An interval-valued fuzzy set is a set whose
membership function is many-valued and forms an interval in the membership scale
[202, :86]. In other words, the membership functions of an interval-valued fuzzy set,
maps objects to intervals of real numbers.
Basic operations on fuzzy sets are defined by their membership function, as clas-
sical sets by their characteristic function. In brief, for two fuzzy setsA and B specified
by membership functions µA(x) and µB(x):
• Inclusion: A ⊆ B if µA(x) ≤ µB(x) for all x ∈ X
• Complement:Ac = 1− µA(x) Elements that negate the assessment of A.
• Union: (A∪ B(x)) = max[µA(x) µB(x)] Elements that belong to either A or B
• Intersection: (A∩B)(x) = min[µA(x), µB(x)] Elements belonging to both A and
B
Two important properties of fuzzy sets that clearly distinguish them from classical
ones, is the non-adherence to the law of excluded middle (Eq. 4.9) and the law of
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contradiction (Eq. 4.8). Firstly, the intersection of a fuzzy set A with its complement
Ac is not equal to an empty set:
A∩Ac 6= ∅ (5.3)
Secondly, the union of a fuzzy set A with its complement Ac is not equal to the
fundamental set X.
A∪Ac 6= X (5.4)
Graphs in Fig. 5.2 illustrate operations on fuzzy sets:
1.0
µ(x)
0.0
µ (x)
x
A
1.0
µ(x)
0.0
x
D=A    A
U C
µ (x)
A
µ (x)
1.0
µ(x)
0.0
x
E=A UAC
Figure 5.2: Fuzzy set operations
The remaining properties, described in Section 4.3 that hold for crisp sets, also
hold for fuzzy sets.
Concluding, it should be stressed that while some properties of fuzzy sets look
similar to probability expressions, they are built to describe different concepts. Fuzzy
sets are analogous to crisp sets and probability theory is analogous to Possibility The-
ory. It is erroneous to confuse Pr(A) with µA(ω) (the probability of A with a mem-
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bership grade in A). When Pr(A) is considered, the setA is well defined but the value
of the variable x to which Pr is attached is unknown (and perhaps random). On the
other hand, with the membership grade, x is known while the set is ill defined.
Fuzzy sets form the basis for fuzzy logic and Possibility Theory. Before expanding
on the mathematical principles of these two methods, the conceptual differences will
be examined. While both methods are based on fuzzy sets, they handle different
problem areas. Fuzzy logic deals with degrees of truth, while Possibility Theory tackles
degrees of uncertainty and incomplete knowledge. This difference is crucial and an
example is necessary to illustrate it, at least in a conceptual level:
Consider a full glass of water, similar to the example used for classical logic. In
terms of binary logic, the glass is full or empty. Accounting for the quantity of wa-
ter in the glass, it can be said that the glass is half full. The word full is actually a
fuzzy predicate and the degree of truth of the expression the bottle is full represents
the amount of water in the glass. On the other hand, consider an expression of ignor-
ance about whether the glass is full or not. Expressing an ignorance of 0.5 does not
imply that the glass is half empty. Looking back at the discussion of ignorance (Sec-
tion 2.3) degrees of truth can be associated with imprecision while degrees of uncertainty
can be related to belief and the uncertainty aspect of ignorance.
5.1.2 Fuzzy logic
Fuzzy logic [122] can be viewed as a special kind of many-valued logic. The truth
value of a proposition P instead of assuming two values (false, true) or (0, 1) it can
assume any value between [0, 1]. This value indicates the degree of truth of the pro-
position. For instance, let P(y) represent the height of a tall column. The truth values
of P(10) and P(0.5) are certainly 1 and 0 respectively. A truth value of P(4) maybe
something in the range of 0 and 1, such as 0.4. The mathematical representation:
Let A and B be propositions that accept truth (Tr) values to the range of [0, 1]:
Tr(A) = Tr(B) if B = A (5.5)
Tr(A) = 1− Tr(B) if A = B¯ (5.6)
Tr(A∨B) = min[Tr(A), Tr(B)] (5.7)
Tr(A∧B) = max[Tr(A), Tr(B)] (5.8)
As can be seen from Eqs. 5.7and 5.8 fuzzy logic reflects the properties of fuzzy sets
and as a result, the non-conformity to the laws of excluded middle and contradiction.
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There is a natural connection between the degrees of membership in a fuzzy set, and
the degrees of truth in fuzzy propositions. Fuzzy logic can be considered as a gradual
representation of belonging.
5.1.3 Possibility theory
An expression such as X is F where X is a variable and F a fuzzy set (for example,
wall is high) can be used in two different types of situations. Both of them take under
consideration the fuzziness of F. If the value of X is precisely known and what is
estimated is whether this value is in fact compatible with the fuzzy set F, we are
interested in the gradual or elastic nature of the expression X is F. For example, if
we are looking for a person to fit the description of old, we estimate to what extent
the person fits this requirement and can be qualified as such (i.e. Paul, whose age is
known to be 63 can be regarded as old to the degree 0.8 in a context of {70-100}). This
gradual nature of properties is expressed through fuzzy logic.
On the other hand, the expression X is F in other scenarios could also mean all that
is known regarding the value of X, is that X is F. In other words, not knowing precisely
the value of X. When fuzzy sets are used in that context, the degree attached to the
value of X is the level of possibility that it is indeed the value of the variable. As a
result, the fuzzy set F is expressed as a possibility distribution [123]which offers various
shades of plausibility on the values of the variable X. For example, if it is only known
that Paul is old (but not his precise age) where the meaning of old is described by
the membership function of a fuzzy set µtall, then the greater µtallx is, the greater
the possibility that age(Paul) = x (and vice verca). This is the essence of Possibility
Theory.
In [123], Zadeh defines a possibility measure Pos:
Given a [0, 1] possibility distribution pi that describes an incomplete state of know-
ledge:
Pos(A) = sup{pi(x), x makes A true} (5.9)
where A is a Boolean proposition, being either true or false. For two Boolean
propositions, A and B it follows that:
Pos(A∪ B) = max(Pos(A), Pos(B)) (5.10)
and that:
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Pos(A∩ B) ≤ min(Pos(A), Pos(B)) (5.11)
Possibility theory uses two measures to represent an event: Possibility and Neces-
sity. These are represented as Pos(A) and Nec(A). Possibility and Necessity can be
seen as dual set measures. The possibility measure Pos() on a set Ω for an event A is
the degree of possibility that A occurs.
Pos(Ø) = 0 (5.12)
Pos(Ω) = 1 (5.13)
Fundamental axioms in Possibility Theory differ from the probability ones:
Definition: The disjunction of two events A and B is the maximum of their indi-
vidual possibilities.
Disjunction Pos(A∪ B) = max{Pos(A), Pos(B)} (5.14)
Definition: The necessity of an event A is the negation of the possibility of com-
plement of A:
Nec(A) = 1− Pos(A¯) (5.15)
Pos(A) = 1 signifies thatA is fully possible. The relationships between possibility
and necessity are [198]:
Nec(A) > 0 ⇒ Pos(A) = 1 (5.16)
Pos(A) < 1 ⇒ Nec(A) = 0 (5.17)
Pos(A) ≥ Nec(A) (5.18)
Nec(A) +Nec(A¯) ≤ 1
Pos(A) + Pos(A¯) ≥ 1 (5.19)
Eq. 5.18 expresses the fact that something must be possible to some extent before it
can begin to be certain. Eq. 5.19 demonstrates the non-deterministic nature of Possib-
ility Theory. While with probability the sum of an event A and its complement must
Quantifying Uncertainty: Possibility & the TBM 95
add up to 1, in possibility it is not required. This allows scenarios where a particu-
lar piece of evidence A could be fully possible, and at the same time its complement
could be rather possible as well.
Let A and B be two subsets of a sample spaceΩ:
Nec(A∩ B) = min{Nec(A), Nec(B)} (5.20)
Pos(A∪ B) = max{Pos(A), Pos(B)}
Pos(A∩ B) ≤ min{Pos(A), Pos(B)} (5.21)
Nec(A∪ B) ≥ max{Nec(A), Nec(B)} (5.22)
As can bee seen from Eq. 5.20 a fundamental difference of Possibility Theory from
probability is that it is non-compositional. The measures of possibility are decompos-
able in respect to the union, and the calculation of Necessity is compositional with
respect to intersection. For example, if one is completely ignorant about an event A
we have Pos(A) = Pos(A¯) = 1 andNec(A) = Nec(A¯) = 0. Also, Pos(A∩ A¯) = 0} and
Nec(A∪ A¯) = 1}.
In order to analyse the conceptual difference between possibility and necessity a
simple example is presented. Consider the statement P “The possible interpretations of
a discovered pyramid.” Let the universe of discourse Ω contain these interpretations
{Egyptian, Minoan, Roman}. Consequently, consider the following expert opinion
from archaeologist X: “I believe that it is fully possible to be of Egyptian origin. I am not
quite sure about Minoan, and even less about Roman.” Converting this to a possibility
distribution, it could be PosEgyptian, Minoan, Roman = {1, 0.4, 0.2}. In effect, the most
plausible situation compatible with A, namely, the interpretation as an Egyptian pyr-
amid, is the one that is chosen, judging from the maxitivity axiom 5.14. Deriving the
necessity distribution with Eq. 5.15, gives NecEgyptian, Minoan, Roman = {0.6, 0, 0}.
These two dual values reflect the concept that while it could most likely be an
Egyptian pyramid, there could also be other valid interpretations. As a result, the
certainty of our belief in the pyramid being of Egyptian origin, represented by Nec,
is 0.6, which is 1−maxPosEgyptian, Minoan, Roman.
An extreme, but also possible, scenario, would be an archaeologist saying “I believe
equally that the pyramid could be Egyptian or Minoan, but there is no way it can be Roman.”
This represents a complete state of ignorance since the expert is unable to prioritise
between the first two interpretations. The possibility distribution of that statement is:
PosEgyptian, Minoan Roman, = {1, 1, 0}. In that case, the statement is not plausible, and
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NecEgyptian, Minoan, Roman = {0, 0 0}. With the evidence in hand, there is no way to
be certain about either of these interpretations, however possible, or believable, they
may be.
It follows that, the closer Nec is to 1, the more plausible our interpretation is. In
order for the plausibility in an interpretation to increase or decrease, supporting or
contradicting evidence needs to be added.
5.2 A possibilistic approach to archaeological uncertainty
In Section 4.4 it was demonstrated that it is possible to employ Bayesian probabilities
in order to describe archaeological uncertainty. Section 5.2 presents an approach us-
ing Possibility theory. To recollect, Possibility Theory does not contradict probability
theory; rather, it complements it. The major difference between the two is that Pos-
sibility theory uses a pair of dual-set functions, (Possibility and Necessity), instead of
the single function used by probability.
In [203, 204] a possibilistic approach to the Bayes theorem is proposed where the
additivity normalisation part of Bayes’ equation is paralled to the maxitivity axiom
of Possibility Theory. The equation, based on subjective possibilities, takes under
consideration both possibility and necessity measures, and can be described as:
Pos(Hj | E) =
Pos(Hj)Pr(E | Hj)
max{Pos(H1)P(E | H1),Pos(Hn)P(E | Hn)}
(5.23)
There is one restriction; to define the subjective possibilities, one of the possible
scenarios must have Pos = 1. In other words, at least one of the suggested interpreta-
tions must be fully possible. For reasons of clarity, the hypothesis that is fully possible
will be defined as Dominant Hypothesis (DH). Dominance does not indicate correct-
ness or validation, but simply indicates which hypothesis is currently considered as
fully possible. As evidence is added, the dominance characteristic can shift from one
hypothesis to another.
Consider again the example given in 4.4 summarised briefly here:
In an archaeological dig, a column base was discovered followed by pieces of a
column top. The archaeologist has the following knowledge about columns before
unearthing anything: Columns belong to one of two orders, M and N. These columns
are distinguished usually by their bases (types A and B). Column bases are always
followed by pillars and tops. The related evidence distribution can be seen in Table
5.1.
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Until now, the description matches the one for the Bayesian approach. The in-
terpretation again requires a prior. In the Bayesian approach, the archaeologist was
non-deterministic stating that both column types are as likely to be found, with the
sum of that likeliness having to add up to 1. In Possibility Theory, this can be trans-
lated as PosM,N, = {1, 1}. I and NecMN = {0, 0}. This is a unique case where both
hypotheses are dominant as they are considered equally possible to be correct.
After evidence of a Base A is found, we can calculate Pos(M | A) and Pos(N | A) :
Pos(M | A) =
Pos(M)(Pos(A |M)
max(Pos(M)Pos(A |M),Pos(N)Pos(A | N))
=
1 · 0.95
max(1 · 0.95, 1 · 0.25)
=1
Pos(N | A) =
Pos(N)(Pos(A | N)
max(Pos(M)Pos(A |M),Pos(N)Pos(A | N))
=
1 · 0.25
max(1 · 0.25, 1 · 0.95)
=0.26
So, the new possibilities are PosM,N) = {1, 0.26}. Because Nec(A) = 1− Pos(A¯),
the revised NecM = 0.74 resulting to NecM,N) = {0.74, 0}.
The latter result, the outcome of Necessity, is the amount of certainty placed on the
specific interpretation. This is the number of interest in the possibilistic representation
of uncertainty (Table 5.2) for the hypothesis to be consider fully plausible.
As with the Bayesian example, we can add more evidence, in the form of a re-
covered Top F:
ColumnM Column N ColumnM Column N
Base A 0.95 0.25 Pillar C 0.8 0.1
Base B 0.05 0.75 Pillar D 0.2 0.9
ColumnM Column N ColumnM Column N
Top E 0.3 0.6 Colour Y 0.1 0.7
Top F 0.7 0.4 Colour Z 0.9 0.3
Table 5.1: The knowledge base of two column styles,Mand N.
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Prior M N Posterior M N
Pos 1 1 Pos 1 0.26
Nec 0 0 Nec 0.74 0
Table 5.2: Subjective possibility prior and posterior
Pos(M | F) =
Pos(M)(Pos(F |M)
max(Pos(M)Pos(F |M),Pos(N)Pos(F | N))
=
1 · 0.7
max(1 · 0.7, 0.26 · 0.4)
=1
Pos(N | F) =
Pos(N)(Pos(F | N)
max(Pos(M)Pos(F |M),Pos(N)Pos(F | N))
=
0.26 · 0.4
max(1 · 0.7, 0.26 · 0.4)
=0.15
The evidence could have been found at the same time, and it is possible to con-
sider them simultaneously as with a Bayesian scenario:
Pos(M | A, F) = Pos(M).Pos(A |M).Pos(F |M)
= (1, 1).(0.95, 0.25).(0.7, 0.4)
normalisation =
1x0.95x0.7, 1x0.25x0.4
max(1x0.95x0.7, 1x0.25x0.4)
=
0.665
0.665
,
0.1
0.665
Possibility of {M | AF, N|AF} = 1, 0.15
Necessity of {M | AF, N|AF} = 0.85, 0
Lastly, following the Bayesian example, discovery of contradicting evidence does
change the strong belief inM, as when a Pillar D is found:
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Pos(M | D) =
Pos(M)(Pos(D |M)
max(Pos(M)Pos(D |M),Pos(N)Pos(D | N))
=
1 · 0.2
max(1 · 0.2, 0.15 · 0.9)
=1
Pos(N | D) =
Pos(N)(Pos(D | N)
max(Pos(M)Pos(D |M),Pos(D)Pos(D | N))
=
0.15 · 0.9
max(1 · 0.2, 0.15 · 0.9)
=0.675
The last result has decreased the Nec(M|A, F,D = 1− 0.675 = 0.325. There is a
threshold, when evidence amounts against the interpretation of M where the confid-
ence switches to an N interpretation, and N becomes the DH. For example, consider
an extra piece of evidence Y, related to colour.
Pos(M | Y) =
Pos(M)(Pos(Y |M)
max(Pos(M)Pos(Y |M),Pos(N)Pos(Y | N))
=
1 · 0.1
max(1 · 0.1, 0.675 · 0.7)
=0.211
Pos(N | Y) =
Pos(N)(Pos(Y | N
max(Pos(M)Pos(Y |M),Pos(N)Pos(Y | N))
)
=
0.675 · 0.7
max(1 · 0.1, 0.675 · 0.7)
=1
The updated Possibility value indicates that an N interpretation is now fully pos-
sible (and somewhat certain since Nec = 1− 0.211 = 0.788 ) given the new evidence.
As a result, a common evidence pool can be used for both Bayesian and Possibil-
istic calculations if required.
5.3 The Transferable Belief Model
The Transferable Belief Model (TBM) is a non-probabilistic model of belief represent-
ation proposed and extended by Phillippe Smets [187, 120, 205]. It is an interpretation
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of the DST model, the main difference being that all connections to a probabilistic
model are explicitly rejected. The DST model itself will not be expanded here, the
reader is referred to extensive descriptions and comparisons in [206, 207, 208]. Where
the TBM deviates from the DST or probabilistic assumptions, this will be made clear
in the discussion.
5.3.1 Introduction to the TBM
The TBM works in two levels:
1. The Credal Level (CL) (from credus meaning belief in Latin)
2. The Pignistic Level (PL) (from pignus, meaning bet, in Latin)
The Credal Level always precedes the Pignistic Level. The CL is where beliefs are en-
tertained and assigned. This is where beliefs are quantified by using belief functions.
If any new information arrives, or new beliefs need to be included, it will occur in the
CL.
Once all beliefs are gathered, revised, and combined, and if it is necessary (it is not
required), then the PL assists in making decisions about those beliefs. Beliefs in the PL
induce a probabilistic measure; in other words, the beliefs (from CL) are transformed
to probabilities in the PL.
In subjective probabilities, as it has been shown, the CL does not exist, and it is
embedded within the decision-making process. The transformation to probabilities
does not mean that the results will always be the same as in the Bayesian approach.
TBM, apart from its disassociation from the probabilistic model in the construction
of belief functions, also differs from DST, possibilistic and probabilistic approaches in
other ways, the most important being:
1. It features a dynamic transfer of belief
2. It is not restricted to a closed world assumption.
3. It has two levels (CL/PL) and features the pignistic transformations (otherwise
known as Bets)
4. It contains unnormalised belief functions.
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The universe of discourse Ω is usually postulated (i.e. in the majority of subjective
Probability or Possibility interpretations) as a closed set of hypotheses on which be-
liefs are entertained. Any proposition outside this domain, is considered improbable
(or impossible, depending on what you use). The TBM suggests that this an idealistic
viewpoint and that the cognitive process is rarely that simple or so complete that it
can include all possible propositions [209]. Three sets of propositions are presented:
• Known as Possible (KP)
• Known as Impossible (KI)
• Unknown (UP)
In a classical Bayesian approach, the UP is definitely empty and one must accept a
closed world assumption–that the truth is inside the KP. The TBM works with all
those three sets and, according to accummulating evidence, may move a hypothesis
from KP to KI via dynamic transfer, for example:
• There is evidence about a KP proposition A which makes it impossible: Condi-
tioning redistributes it to KI.
• There is new evidence about an UP, perhaps a forgotten or unthought-of hypo-
thesis. The UP is transferred to KP.
Each piece of evidence induces a finite (maximum of 1) amount of belief (called mass of
belief ) that must be allocated among different propositions. The mass can be assigned
to a proposition or a subset of propositions. For example, supposed a murder scene
has three suspects: {Tom, Tim,Sally}. Evidence arises that the perpetrator is male;
the belief mass of this evidence goes to hypothesis A ={Tom, Tim}. While with a
subjective probability approach we would have to equally split the belief between
the two, the TBM does not require this. It represents that the evidence is not clear
enough to distinguish between Tom and Tim.
The TBM, like other models for belief quantification (be those possibilistic or prob-
abilistic in nature), has two components of operation [210]. The first component, is
the static one, which is where beliefs are allocated. In the TBM this is where the bbms
are assigned. The second one is the dynamic component–where beliefs are updated.
In the TBM this is where bbms are transferred or updated among the propositions
(perhaps due to new evidence, or to conditioning). It is also where beliefs that are
induced by different distinct pieces of evidence are combined. It should be noted
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that both of those components still happen at the CL. One last difference between the
TBM and other models of belief representation is the order of these updating rules.
For example, in DST the order below is being followed:
1. The static component (bpms) is assigned
2. Evidence is combined (by using Dempster’s rule of combination)
3. Any updating process occurs (by using Dempster’s rule of conditioning)
In the TBM:
1. The static component (bbms) is assigned
2. Any updating process (i.e the mass transfer, or a discounting)
3. Evidence is combined by using (unnormalised) Dempster’s rule of combination
5.3.2 Belief, combination, discounting and conditioning
The major element of the TBM is the basic belief assignment (referred to as bba or m).1
For A ⊆ Ω, m(A) is the part of belief that gives support to A. The total belief has
a maximum of 1. [Ev] is the particular evidence, of fact, that gives rise to the mass:
mΩ[Ev](A) ∈ [0, 1]
∑
A⊆Ω
m[Ev](A) = 1
Recall from Section 4.3 and Section 5.1.3 that the Probabilities and Possibilities of
empty events are 0 (Pr(∅)=0;Poss(∅) = 0). The same holds for DST, wherembpm(∅) =
0. In the TBM this restriction does not hold. A mass given to ∅ is belief in the UP;
an unknown proposition, the concept of the open world. Perhaps, as in the murder
example, evidence arises which give support to Sally or someone else other than Tim
or Tom.
1DST users may recognise this notation as basic probability assignment from the DST. Because of
the strict absence of probability in the CL, P. Smets does not use the term probability and promotes the
term belief instead.
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The degree of belief bel(A) is defined as:bel : 2Ω → [0, 1] for all A ⊆ Ω.2Ω reflects
all subsets of the worldΩ. Thus the belief function bel is:
belΩ[Ev](A) =
∑
Ø 6=B⊆A
m(B) (5.24)
Eq. 5.24 represents the justified specific support [120] given to A. It is called justified
because the belief in A gets only support from the bbms to subsets of A. It is called
specific because it will always excludem(∅), the mass of the ∅ subset.
The degree of plausibility pl(A) is defined as: pl : 2Ω → [0, 1] for all A ⊆ Ω. Thus
the plausibility function pl is:
plΩ[Ev](A) =
∑
B⊆Ω,B∩A 6=
m(B) = bel(Ω) − bel(A¯) (5.25)
Eq. 5.25 represents the potential specific support given to A. What this means, is that
some of the bbms contained in pl(A) may be transferred to other subsets of A if new
evidence becomes available.
Lastly, the commonality function, q, [211] can be defined as: pl : 2Ω → [0, 1] for all
A ⊆ Ω . Thus:
qΩ[Ev](A) =
∑
B⊆Ω,A⊆B
m(B) (5.26)
The plausibility function pl is another way of representing information contained
in the belief (bel) function. It is not required, but, along with the commonality func-
tion, q, they can be mathematically useful when representing and combining beliefs.
In order to combine evidence, consider mΩ[Ev1] and mΩ[Ev2], two distinct bbas
that lend support to subsets ofΩ. To calculatemΩ[Ev1,Ev2] = mΩ[Ev1]∩mΩ[Ev2]:
mΩ[Ev1]∩mΩ[Ev2](A) =
∑
B,C⊆Ω,B∩C=A
mΩ[Ev1](B)∩mΩ[Ev2](C)∀A ⊆ Ω (5.27)
qΩ[Ev1]∩mΩ[Ev2](A) = qΩ[Ev1](A)∩ qΩ[Ev2](A)∀A ⊆ Ω (5.28)
What Eq. 5.27 instructs is the following: Take two pieces of evidence (Ev1,Ev2)
giving support (through their masses) to different subsets of A. Multiply each subset
of Ev1 with each and every one of Ev2. Where subsets discuss, contain a common
hypothesis (symptoms, diseases, murder victims, archaeological interpretations) it is
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considered a non-empty intersection. Those that do not intersect their multiplication
will be considered as belonging to m(∅). In the end, add the common intersections
together. The commonality combination gives the same result, by using the common-
ality function.
Conditioning is a special case of combination, where evidence arises that com-
pletely excludes proposition(s) from the list of KP and thus they are to be transferred
to KI. Consider an existing mass m and new information in the form of m[Ev] saying
that only B ∈ Ω. Thus:
m[Ev1](B) =
∑
C⊆ A¯,m(B∪C) if B ⊆ A
= 0 otherwise (5.29)
The Conditioning equation postulates that one should transfer all mass pertaining
to a now-defunct hypothesis to any subsets that used to contain this hypothesis.
Another property of the TBM is its ability to represent total ignorance through
the vacuous belief function. The vacuous function is such as: mΩ = 1 and bel(A) =
0,A 6= Ω and so bel(Ω) = 1. This is suitable for representing a state of total ignorance
about which hypothesis may possibly be true when no information is available. The
usefulness is demonstrated in Section 5.4.1 which deals with the Generalised Bayesian
Theorem (GBT) .
Lastly, the Pignistic Transform can be calculated as follows:
BetPΩ(A) =
∑
A:ω∈A⊆Ω
mΩ(A)
|A|(1−mΩ(∅) (5.30)
Eq. 5.30 transforms beliefs held at the CL to a pignistic decision (PL) as a probab-
ility function.
In order to illustrate the capabilities of the TBM and explain the terminology, an
example will now be presented. A good majority of TBM examples [209, 103, 212] use
a fictional murder mystery where the TBM assists an investigator to assemble witness
evidence and find out who the murderer is. In this example, the TBM will assist You,
a fictional archaeologist, in an archaeological reconstruction.
5.3.3 Archaeological example
A small-scale excavation has just started on a Roman building. The re-
mains of a room have been found. Your task is to discover what the room
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was used for, or at least get a good estimate of that. You take the position
of the room into account and, combined with the years of experience, you
suggest that it must be one of:
Ω = {Bath,Dining,Bedroom,Kitchen,Storage}.
You found the following evidence:
• Evid. 1 (biofacts analysis): “A good quantity of edible seeds has been found. It could
be a place where food was stored or consumed.”
– m1({Dining,Kitchen,Storage}) = 0.7 m(Ω) = 0.3
• Evid. 2 (room shape): “Compared to similar buildings, the shape of the room is similar
to either a Bath, a Bedroom or a Kitchen.”
– m2({Bath,Bedroom,Kitchen}) = 0.7 m(Ω) = 0.3
• Evid. 3 (pottery found): “A few pieces of broken jars that held wine. I think these
belong to a Kitchen or a Storage area.”
– m3({Kitchen,Storage}) = 0.6 m(Ω) = 0.4
Combining Evidence
To combine Evidence 1 with Evidence 2:
Ev1 m1
Din,Kit,Stor Ω
Ev2 m2 0.7 0.3
Bath, Bed,
0.7
{Kit} {Bath,Bed,Kit}
Kit 0.49 0.21
Ω 0.3
{Din,Kit,Stor} {Ω}
0.21 0.09
Table 5.3: TBM Combination of Ev1 and Ev2
Using Eq. 5.27:
mEv1Ev2{Kitchen} = 0.49 mEv1Ev2{Din,Kit,Stor} = 0.21
mEv1Ev2{Ω} = 0.09 mEv1Ev2{Bath,Bed,Kit} = 0.21
It should be noted that the combinations are associative and the order with which
they are combined does not matter. To combine Evidence 12 with Evidence 3:
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Ev12 m12
Kit Din,Kit,Stor Bath,Bed,Kit Ω
Ev3 m3 0.49 0.21 0.21 0.09
Kit,
0.6
{Kit} {Kit,St} {Kit} {Kit,St}
Stor 0.294 0.126 0.126 0.054
Ω 0.4
{Kit} {Din,Kit,Stor} {Bath,Bed,Kit} {Ω}
0.196 0.084 0.084 0.036
Table 5.4: TBM Combination of Ev12 and Ev3
Again using Eq. 5.27, this time for Ev12 and Ev3:
mEv123{Kit} = 0.294+ 0.196+ 0.126 = 0.616
mEv123{Kit,Stor) = 0.126+ 0.054 = 0.18
mEv123{Din,Kit,Stor} = 0.084
mEv123{Bath,Bed,Kit} = 0.084
mEv123{Ω} = 0.036
To calculate bel and pl for i.e. Kitchen and Storage:
belEv123{Kit} = 0.616
belEv123{Stor} = 0
belEv123{Kit,Stor} = 0.18+ 0.616 = 0.796
plEv123{Kit} = 0.18+ 0.616+ 0.084+ 0.094+ 0.036 = 1
plEv123{Stor} = 0.18+ 0.084+ 0.0361 = 0.3
plEv123{Kit,Stor} = 0.18+ 0.616+ 0.084+ 0.094+ 0.036 = 1
If one wanted to take a decision now, by using the Pignistic Transform (Eq. 5.30)
it would give:
BetPEv123{Kit} = (
0.616
1 +
0.18
2 +
0.084
3 +
0.084
3 +
0.0.036
5 ) · 1 = 0.7692
Open World
Some other newly discovered evidence, Ev 4, suggests that:
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• Evid. 4 (lots of glass pieces): “Most likely from wine /oil holders but it could also be
perfumed oils. Or something else completely.”
m4Storage,Kitchen = 0.8; m4Bath,Bedroom = 0.1; m4{∅} = 0.1
Note that the above evidence brings the possibility of a previously unconsidered
room type. It is still not known what it could be, but this information must be taken
under consideration:
Ev4m4
Kit, Stor Bath, Bed ∅
Ev123 m123 0.8 0.1 0.1
Kit, Stor 0.18
Kit,Stor ∅ ∅
0.1444 0.018 0.018
Kit 0.616
Kit ∅ ∅
0.4928 0.0616 0.0616
Kit, Stor,
0.084
Kit,Stor ∅ ∅
Din 0.0672 0.0084 0.0084
Bath, Bed
0.084
Kit Bath,Bed ∅
Kit 0.0672 0.0084 0.0084
Ω 0.036
Kit,Stor Bath,Bed ∅
0.0288 0.0036 0.0036
Table 5.5: TBM Combination of Ev123 and Ev4
Using Eq. 5.27:
mEv1234{Bath,Bed} = 0.012 mEv1234{Kit,Stor} = 0.24
mEv1234{Kit} = 0.56 mEv1234{Ø} = 0.188
The mass allocated at ∅ not only represents any possible Unknown Propositions
but also encapsulates any conflict arising from disagreeing evidence. One can deduct
that two highly contrasting pieces of evidence, after being merged, will have a high
amount of conflict mass and a low amount of mass to their respective supports.
Discounting Evidence
What happens if a piece of evidence is deemed untrustworthy, or for some reason, the
expert does not wish it to have a big impact on the total evidence pool? This is solved
by applying discounting.
• Ev. 5 “This marble tile seems to strongly match similar tiles found in Roman baths or
bedrooms.”
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m5{Bath,Bed} = 0.8 m5(Ω) = 0.2
However, another expert suggests to You that this tile seems to have arrived from
another location. He proposes that its reliability is quite low; he gives it at most 20%.
This value, 0.2, is known as the discounting factor, or the reliability coefficient. Before
Ev5 is to be combined with the rest of the evidence, it will be discounted by the factor.
Discounting involves transferring a portion of this mass to theΩmass, so that:
mα(A) = αm(A)
mα(Ω) = 1− a+ am(Ω)
Thus m5disc{Bath,Bed} = 0.8 ∗ 0.2(reliability) = 0.16 and thus m5disc{Ω} = 1−
0.2+ 0.2 ∗ 0.2 = 0.84. After discounting, the combination can occur:
Ev1234m1234
Bath, Bed Kit,Stor Kit ∅
Ev5 m5disc 0.012 0.24 0.56 0.188
Bath,Bed 0.16
Bath,Bed ∅ ∅ ∅
0.00192 0.0384 0.896 0.03008
Ω 0.84
Bath,Bed Kit,Stor Kit ∅
0.01008 0.2016 0.4704 0.15792
Table 5.6: TBM Combination of Ev1234 and Ev5disc
Using Eq. 5.27:
mEv12345disc{Bath,Bed} = 0.012 mEv12345disc{Kit,Stor} = 0.2016
mEv1234disc{Kit} = 0.4704 mEv12345disc{∅} = 0.316
Transferring Belief
Moving to the last piece of evidence, You deduct that it is extremely strong against
the hypothesis of the room being a Storage room.
• Ev. 6 (features analysis): “The room had a fair amount of constant sunshine, most
likely large windows–a storage room would have been dark.”
Thus, it has to be excluded fromΩ and moved to the list of all IP. To transfer the mass
of evidence beloning to Storage, a conditioning should be done:
m6strong{Storage] = 0 m6strong{Ω) = 1
This results to:
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Ev1234m1234
Bath, Bed Kit,Stor Kit ∅
Ev6 m6strong 0.012 0.2016 0.4704 0.316
Stor 0
∅ Stor ∅ ∅
0 0 0 0
Ω 1
Bath,Bed Kit Kit ∅
0.012 0.2016 0.4704 0.316
Table 5.7: TBM Combination of Ev12345disc and Ev6strong
mEv12345disc6str{Bath,Bed} = 0.012 mEv1234disc6str{Kit} = 0.672
mEv12345disc6str{∅} = 0.316
These masses concluding the evidence combination for the room and describe
Your credal state on Ω. Through the TBM–still at the Credal Level–your belief indic-
ates that the room was most likely a Kitchen. There is still the possibility that it is
something else (∅). That, or the evidence needs to be re-evaluated and perhaps some
of it discounted if is appropriate. If You wish to make a decision between the current
options (Bed/Bath/Kitchen), the TBM will need to operate on the pignistic level in
order to normalise for the conflict. It will also need to operate on the PL in order to
separate the subset mass (i.e on Bath, Bed) equally between the two.
Making a Decision
Using the Pignistic Transform (Eq. 5.30) gives:
BetPEv123{Kit} =
0.672
1 · 11−0.316 = 0.982
BetPEv123{Bed} =
0.012
2 · 11−0.316 = 0.009
BetPEv123{Bath} =
0.012
2 · 11−0.316 = 0.009
5.4 The TBM approach to archaeological uncertainty
5.4.1 Generalised Bayesian Theorem
As has been demonstrated in Section 4.3.2, Bayes’ rule allows for knowledge update
and provides posterior probabilities, based on some prior belief and accummulated
information. In the TBM, Bayes’ rule has been extended and generalized, resulting
into the Generalised Bayesian Theorem. Instead of a probability distribution, one
builds a belief function over the hypothesis H given observed evidence e based on
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the knowledge of the belief function over E given each hi ⊆ H and a vacuous a priori
belief over H. The use of a vacuous prior solves a number of issues that arise, most
particularly where no information actually exists on prior values. By using a vacuous
prior, one chooses to accept ignorance about any prior values forΩ.
After observing evidence e, the GBT requires the plausibilities for e under all pos-
sible hypotheses (ie all hi ⊆ H): plE[hi](e) for all hi ⊆ H. In concept, this is similar to
the possibilistic and probabilistic scenario where Poss/Prob(E|H) was the likelihood
of the evidence given the hypothesis. For simplicity, the notation followed by [213] is
used, and l(e|hi) representes the plausibility, or likelihood, of E|H. For the GBT, Smets
has proved [187, 214]:
Given all likelhoods l(e|hi) for all hi ⊆ H, then for e ⊆ E and for A ⊆ H:
mH[e]{A} =
∏
hi⊆A
l(e|hi)
∏
hi⊆A
(1− l(e|hi)) (5.31)
belH[e]{A} =
∏
hi⊆A
(1− l(e|hi)) −
∏
hi⊆A
(1− l(e|hi)) (5.32)
plH[e]{A} = 1−
∏
hi⊆A
(1− l(e|hi)) (5.33)
qH[e]{A} =
∏
hi⊆A
l(e|hi) (5.34)
If, in any case, prior beliefs do exist for all hi ⊆ H, represented by mev0{H}, then
a combination of beliefs would be needed, using the conjuctive rule of combination
(Eq.5.27)
A demonstration follows, using the same knowledge base as for the Probabilistic
and Possibilistic examples.
GBT archaeological example
As with the previous examples, in an archaeological dig, a column base was dis-
covered followed by pieces of a column top. The archaeologist has the following
knowledge about columns before unearthing anything: Columns belong to one of two
orders, M and N. These columns are distinguished usually by their bases (types A
and B). Column bases are always followed by pillars and tops. The related evidence
distribution can be seen in Table 5.1. The evidence distribution translates to the plaus-
ibility functions for the GBT. The archaeologist has no information (or perhaps does
not wish to place belief) on prior distributions of the columns M, N; thus a vacuous
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belief will be used. Using Eqs. 5.31-5.34 the table can be extended for the GBT in such
a way that, for example:
plHM,N{A} = 1− (1− 0.95)(1− 0.25)
mHM{A} = 0.95 · (1− 0.25)(1− 0)
qHM,N{A} = 0.95 · 0.25
The results can be seen in Table 5.8.
Bases {M} {N} {M,N} {∅} Pillars {M} {N} {M,N} {∅}
plhi {A} 0.95 0.25 0.9625 0 plhi {C} 0.8 0.1 0.82 0
mhi {A} 0.7125 0.0125 0.2375 0.0375 mhi {C} 0.72 0.02 0.0144 0.2456
qhi {A} 0.95 0.25 0.2375 1 qhi {C} 0.8 0.1 0.08 1
plhi {B} 0.05 0.75 0.7625 0 plhi {D} 0.2 0.9 0.92 0
mhi {B} 0.0125 0.7125 0.0375 0.2375 mhi {D} 0.2 0.72 0.18 0.08
qhi {B} 0.05 0.75 0.0375 1 qhi {D} 0.02 0.9 0.18 1
Tops {M} {N} {M,N} {∅} Colours {M} {N} {M,N} {∅}
plhi {E} 0.3 0.6 0.72 0 plhi {Y} 0.1 0.7 0.73 0
mhi {E} 0.12 0.42 0.18 0.28 mhi {Y} 0.03 0.63 0.07 0.27
qhi {E} 0.3 0.6 0.18 1 qhi {Y} 0.1 0.7 0.07 1
plhi {F} 0.7 0.4 0.82 0 plhi {Z} 0.9 0.3 0.93 0
mhi {F} 0.42 0.12 0.28 0.18 mhi {Z} 0.63 0.03 0.27 0.07
qhi {F} 0.7 0.4 0.28 1 qhi {Z} 0.9 0.3 0.27 1
Table 5.8: The knowledge base of two column styles,M and N for the GBT.
Notice the values of 0 and 1 at the plausibility and commonality rows respectively,
under the column of conflict. This represents the vacuous belief function over the
hypotheses. Consider that, as with the previous examples the following combinations
of evidence: ACFZ, ACFY, ADFY. By using Eqs. 5.345.285.27 with a vacuous prior,
results in Table 5.9.
{M} {N} {M,N} {∅}
qH[ACFZ]{} 0.4788 0.003 0.0014 1
mH[ACFZ]{} 0.477 0.0015 0.0014 0.519
qH[ACFY]{} 0.0535 0.007 0.0003 1
mH[ACFY]{} 0.0528 0.0066 0.0003 0.94
qH[ADFY]{} 0.0133 0.063 0.0008 1
mH[ADFY]{} 0.0124 0.062 0.0008 0.92
Table 5.9: Combination of evidence with the GBT using a vacuous prior.
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Recollect that evidence ACFZ is in favour of Column M, while ACFY and ADFY
tend to be contradicting, with ADFY being the most contradicting. This is also rep-
resented in the mass of the conflict; ACFZ has much less conflict than the other two
thus indicating that the evidence is corroborative rather than contradicting.
This is a very interesting feature of the GBT/TBM as, at any point in time, it is
possible to gauge how much conflict, or perhaps support for another interpretation,
exists in the evidence itself. Neither the possibilistic, nor the probabilistic approach
offer this feature. For completeness, Table 5.10 shows an updated evidence combina-
tion with a {0.5, 0.5} prior.
{M} {N} {M,N} {∅}
qH[ACFZ]{} 0.2394 0.0015 0.0003 1
mH[ACFZ]{} 0.2390 0.0011 0.0003 0.76
qH[ACFY]{} 0.0266 0.003 0.0003 1
mH[ACFY]{} 0.0265 0.0035 0.00009 0.97
qH[ADFY]{} 0.0066 0.00315 0.0002 1
mH[ADFY]{} 0.0064 0.00313 0.0002 0.96
Table 5.10: Combination of evidence with the GBT using a prior of {0.5, 0.5} .
As with the previous example (room excavation), in order to reach a decision
about which of the hypotheses is the most plausible one, the GBT needs to operate
on the Pignistic Level. Table 5.11 shows the pignistic calculations for the vacuous and
the {0.5, 0.5} prior respectively. Notice that the results of the latter are the same as the
ones that can be calculated with a Subjective Probability approach.
Vacuous {M} {N}
BetP(H|ACFZ) 0.9953 0.0047
BetP(H|ACFY) 0.8861 0.1139
BetP(H|ADFY) 0.171 0.829
{0.5, 0.5}
BetP(H|ACFZ) 0.9945 0.0055
BetP(H|ACFY) 0.885 0.115
BetP(H|ADFY) 0.1725 0.8275
Table 5.11: Pignistic transformation with the GBT with a vacuous and a non-vacuous
prior
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5.5 Conclusion
This Chapter has explored non-probabilistic approaches to uncertainty by explaining
Possibility Theory and the Transferable Belief Model. It also presented the application
[92] of these two models to archaeological examples. Chapter 4, which discussed
the application of subjective probability, highlighted a few shortcomings. There are
benefits to using a non-probabilistic model as some of those shortcomings can be
tackled. These are now explained in more detail.
Prior belief and ignorance
Both Possibility Theory and the TBM offer ways to express total ignorance about prior
beliefs. This removes a serious constraint that subjective probability faces.
Strict totality of distribution
Possibility Theory does not inherit the additive axiom of probability. Thus, among
two statemens, A and B, if A is quite possible, B could be quite possible as well. One
does not negate the other. Balance is achieved through the dual function of necessity.
The effect of 0 likelihood
In the TBM, the assignment of a mass function of 0 to a proposition does not nullify
the proposition. It simply states that for the particular evidence, there is no weight
to be assigned to that hypothesis, and whatever mass exists will either go to other
hypotheses or the world. As a result, 0 means no evidence at all for, rather than it is
totally improbable that.
Forced granularity
The TBM allows for assigning masses to a group of hypotheses without granulating
the evidence further (at least at the Credal Level). This is very useful in cases where
evidence could support two hypotheses but the expert is not willing to specify to
what extent it supports one rather than the other.
Closed world
Both subjective probability and possibility work with the concept of a closed world.
The TBM allows for having an open world scenario, where it includes the possibilty
of hypotheses that have not been consider or are still unknown. A good analogy to
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this is in a medical scenario where mass is assigned to still unknown or undiscovered
diseases.
Discounting
Through the feature for discounting of evidence, the TBM allows for representation of
evidence weight. This is very important as it could be extremely useful in scenarios
such as those encountered through the archaeological questionnaire, in Chapter 3.
Claiming one type of evidence as unreliable in interpreting a hypothesis, will not
transfer the ratio equally to other hypotheses. Rather it gets included in the mass
of the world of possible hypotheses encapsulating the fact that this evidence is not
strong enough.
Conflict
The capability of the TBM to measure the conflict between evidence at the Credal
Level is considered to be quite useful. There may be situations where the expert
needs be aware of it in order to potentially examine the source of it or to visualise it.
Closing, it should be stressed that there is no right or wrong choice between the
three models. It all depends on the requirements of the uncertainty representation.
If someone uses an evidence table that conforms to a subjective probability model, it
will work for both the possibility and GBT approaches. However, an approach that
relies heavily on the Credal Level of the TBM would not be reducible to the subjective
probability model unless the information is normalised (through the Pignistic Trans-
formation).
The following Chapter explores how the different models behave when using a
shared evidence table. Additionally it examines and disputes an uncertainty model-
ling approach based on fuzzy logic. Lastly, it demonstrates and discusses uncertainty
visualisation examples using the three mathematical models.
To what a degree, the same past,
can leave different marks–and
especially admit of different
interpretations?
André Gide
CHAPTER 6
Modelling Uncertainty
6.1 Introduction
The previous two Chapters examined three different ways of uncertainty quantific-
ation and presented their application to archaeological scenarios. This Chapter de-
scribes innovative contributions to the modelling and visualisation of uncertainty in
archaeological reconstructions and is composed of three parts.
The first part critically examines and disputes a previous approach on modelling
and representation of uncertainty in archaeological reconstructions involving fuzzy
logic [101, 215] and briefly discussed in Section 2.2 [92].
The second part of this Chapter brings together the three mathematical models
under an experiment that explores the correlation of their results given a common
evidence pool. The experiment also asks questions such as the assignment of values
to a hypothesis.
The third part demonstrates a case study visualisation [91, 90]of an existing Romano-
British building with had extremely limited available evidence. Different archae-
ological uncertainty visualisations, using information visualisation schemes and the
three uncertainty quantification models, are presented and discussed.
6.2 Previous modelling approaches
In work introduced by Niccolucci and Hermon in 2004 [101, 215], the authors pro-
pose a numeric definition of the reliability of an archaeological reconstruction based
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on fuzzy logic. The first part of their work discounts the use of a probabilistic ap-
proach, while the second one proposes a solution based on fuzzy logic. This section
of the thesis demonstrates that a probability solution is actually capable of repres-
enting uncertainty, and that a fuzzy logic approach is not suitable for this type of
uncertainty modelling. Firstly, the probability section is analysed.
6.2.1 Discounting of probability
The authors define the reliability index of a model M belonging to a universe Uas a
function r : U→ {0, 1}. For every modelMU a reliability rM = r(M) is attached. The
range between {0, 1} is the model’s reliability range where 0 indicates total unreliabil-
ity and 1 absolute reliability. The models are distributed in a vector space X. Within
universe U, an aggregation operation A is defined between i.e. two operandsM1 and
M2 in a vector space position X1 and X2. This results to a new modelM3 in a position
X3. In other words, A((M1,X1), (M2X2)) = (M3,X3).
The virtual position X3 however, does not affect directly the reliability of a model;
on the contrary, the reliability is influenced by relative position of details on each
model. This is represented as A(M1, M2 ,q) = M3 where q takes into account the
mutual position ofM1 andM2
Thus, the process of producing an archaeological model is a sequence of models,
each obtained from the previous one, as follows Mk+1 = A(Mk,mk,qk) where mk
represents the details added in the last step and qk the position ofMk andmk.
The authors suggest that the probability of the reliability of a model Mk+1 can be
calculated as
Pr(Mk+1) = P(Mk)P(Mk+1 |Mk) (6.1)
where both the added details with the previous model as well as their position
with regards to it are taken under consideration. By iterating Eq. 6.1 the probabil-
ity/reliability of the model is:
Pr(Mk+1) = p0p1p2...pn (6.2)
In other words, Pr(Mk+1) == Pr(Mk+1)∩ Pr(M)
By following this approach, a building with three parts and 0.9 reliability in each
would have approximately 0.65 total reliability. As a result, the authors forego the use
of probability for such archaeological scenarios and propose a fuzzy logic approach.
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Section 4.4 also acknowledged that conditional probability by itself is indeed not
sufficient to handle the impact added by evidence in a model. However, an effi-
cient way to model this would have been by using a Bayesian approach, as has been
demonstrated in the same Section. Thus, contrary to the suggestion of [101, 215],
probabilistic models are capable of representing archaeological uncertainty. Limita-
tions exist, as highlighted in Section 4.5, but subjective probability can be used, and
has been used extensively by a number of other disciplines, to quantify uncertainty.
6.2.2 Fuzzy logic and reliability
The authors also propose a fuzzy logic approach to estimating the overall reliability
of an archaeological model. By using the fuzzy logic mathematical foundation intro-
duced in Section 5.1.2, a fuzzy truth-value scheme is proposed for treating the models.
More analytically:
A fuzzy truth function f aggregating two model parts, A and B is defined as:
f(A∪ B) = min(f(A), f(B)) (6.3)
Three reliability indices are proposed: r(a) which stands for absolute reliability, r(r)
which represents relative reliability and r(r) which represents positional reliability.
The first one takes under consideration the actual reliability of the object itself, the
second examines the reliability of the object with the previously chosen details, while
the third one represents the reliability of the object’s position. In order to calculate a
model step reliability:
r(Mk+1) = min(r(Mk), r(a)(mk), r(r)(mk), r(p)(mk))
The above equation derives the minimum of the reliabilities (relative, absolute
and positional) and assigns it as an overall reliability of a specific part. Consider a
column’s base, with {0.8, 0.6, 0.9} for the relative, absolute and positional reliabilities.
Even though the position as well as the context with respect to the other objects are
fairly reliable, the absolute reliability is less, perhaps because of fragmented informa-
tion. This leads to an overall value of 0.6 for the reliability of this specific part.
Calculating the overall reliability of a model, M consists of either applying re-
cursively the previous formula, or being computed step by step for each model part
added. As a result, the overall reliability of a model would equal the worst one of its
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Figure 6.1: Fuzzy logic approach example
parts. A simple example is presented to illustrate the authors’ approach, by using a
column as a case study:
Consider the reconstruction of a column, M, of which only the base and parts of
the head have been found. Figure 6.1 illustrates the first step of the reconstruction.
Part A is the recovered part, with a reliability of 1 (r0 = 1), which results to the first
step, M0. As there is no evidence for the pillar, it has to be reconstructed. Thus, a
pillar is added, with an unknown height h1, identified as Part B. The new model,
composed of parts A and B isM1.
In order to compute the reliability of M1, the different reliabilities are computed
for part B. The compatibility with the previous shape and the positional reliability
are assigned the number of 1. The absolute reliability, however, depends on the un-
known height of B. The authors, then, assign a fuzzy membership function ranging
from min. height of B < B < max. height of B. This is illustrated with a fuzzy
membership function such as in Figure 6.2.
The next step would be to add the column top, illustrated in Figure 6.3 as part
C. Let us consider that the fragment found gives an absolute reliability that the top
existed, to an extent of 0.9. Then, the following could also be considered:
• The height of the column top, with a range:
min. height of C < C < max. height of C
This is once more, represented by a membership function, as in Figure 6.2.
• The decorations on the column bust with:
r(decnone) = 0.2, r(dectwirl) = 0.8
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Figure 6.2: Membership function for height of Part B
For the current interpretation, the latter decoration option is chosen, with a re-
liability of 0.8.
Figure 6.3: Fuzzy logic approach example with full parts.
By examining the reliabilities of the individual parts, it is deduced that: r(A) =
1, r(B) = 1, r(C) = 0.8. Thus, the overall reliability for the current interpretation is:
r(total) = min(r(A), r(B), r(C))
= 0.8
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6.2.3 Limitations of the Fuzzy Logic approach
The fuzzy logic approach to reliability faces a number of limitations. These are ana-
lysed below:
Degrees of truth is not uncertainty
As introduced in Sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, fuzzy logic examines the degrees of truth in
a proposition, such as “John is tall”. This requires that all relative information about
tallness to be available, for example, the gradual range in between where a man of
John’s age could be considered tall or short. In the case of a column’s possible height,
it is not enough to assign a fuzzy distribution of heights and arbitrarily decide all the
values that satisfy 1. The simple reason for this is that the exact height of the column
is not known beforehand, in order to gradually attach it to a range of interpretations.
A high degree of truth assigned to a reliability interpretation, does not make this
statement a reality. Rather, one must think of what information is possessed by the
expert/agent about this reality, and how these possibly incomplete facts could be
described.
In other words, in such scenarios, it is not feasible to describe the degrees of truth
of a proposition. Instead, what can be described is the degree of belief that this pro-
position actually holds–how well the hypothesis conforms with the facts and evid-
ence available. If, and only if, those facts ever become complete, then the degrees of
belief can result to degrees of truth.
A possible way with which such fuzzyfied values could be used would be through
an information fusion model which would combine subjective beliefs with vague
(fuzzy) statements. For example, consider the following expression:
I am quite sure that the wall was tall.
The first part of the statement (I am quite sure that...) carries the belief information
for the sub-statement the wall was tall. The word tall incorporates a vague value of
tallness. In the case of archaeological uncertainty, the first part, which carries the
belief in the reconstruction must be there.
Information fusion systems, where different kinds of things can be measured and
fused together, would be the next evolutionary step in the representation of uncer-
tainty. A further discussion is provided in Section 8.2.
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Reliability depends on the order of addition
Consider the previous example with the column’s reconstruction using the fuzzy lo-
gic approach. The relative and positional reliabilities rely on the position and the
contextual belonging when compared with neighbouring parts. This would mean
that the order of addition of new parts in a reconstruction can influence the relative
and positional reliability–a fact also acknowledged by the authors themselves. As a
result, the reliability of the model as a whole will depend on the order with which
parts are added. This is a serious drawback, also encountered in Certainty Factors
[181], another approach to quantifying uncertainty. The order with which evidence
is added through probability, possibility and the Transferable Belief Model, does not
have any effect–the results are the same.
Assignment of reliability values
The reliability values assigned to each part are not sufficiently justified. There is no
explanation how the values should be chosen, or if some parts are more significant
than others.
Pessimistic assignment
Regardless of how many parts are added, the overall reliability of the reconstruction
will always equal the minimum reliability of a single part. There is no possible way
to discount the influence that a part might have.
6.3 Comparison of Subjective Probabilities, Possibilities,
and Beliefs
This section is dedicated to a comparison between subjective probabilities, beliefs,
and possibilities. An experiment conducted that explores correlations between Pos-
sibility, GBT and Subjective Probability, is presented.
6.3.1 Experiment design and procedure
The experiment investigates how Possibility theory and Subjective probabilities be-
have under different priors, given a common evidence pool. As case study, the ex-
ample regarding columns M and N has been used. The evidence pool used can be
found in Table 5.1. The initial prior value for {M,N}was {0.01, 0.99}; for each case
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the prior was increased by {+0.01,−0.01} respectively, until the 99thcase which had a
prior of {0.99, 0.01}. Three evidence scenarios were tested:
1. Evidence fully supports interpretation M; recovered evidence is ACFZ
2. Evidence partially supports interpretation M; recovered evidence is ACFY
3. Evidence does not support either (is contradictory); recovered evidence is ADFY
The following questions are asked:
• How do the results between GBT and Bayesian calculations compare?
• How do the results between Possibility and Bayesian calculations compare?
• Is there any correlation between them? Is it significant or non-significant?
• What happens under different prior values?
• Under Possibility Theory, does it matter which hypothesis is chosen as the DH
for prior values? (i.e. the requirement that at least one interpretation must be
fully possible).
• What happens to results under: (A) supporting or (B) contradicting evidence
scenarios?
The posterior Subjective (Bayesian) probability was calculated for each prior, and then
under each evidence scenario, thus resulting to 99 values per scenario. The calculation
of possibilities gives rise to a question: Since the major requirement of Possibility
Theory demands that at least one of the interpretations has a Possibility of 1, how
does this affect the results? In other words, consider a Possibility prior of {1, 0.9}.
Perhaps the expert assigning the prior is undecided and assigns Poss = 1 arbitrarily.
If instead, he/she had assigned {0.9, 1} what effect would it have to the results?
To extensively explore this, two sets of priors under the three evidence types
(ACFZ/ACFY/ADFY) were constructed. The first set always assumes that inter-
pretation M is Dominant, while the second set assumes that interpretation N is. For
example, if under a Bayesian scenario the prior is {0.1, 0.9}for {M,N}, the two Possib-
ilistic cases examined are {1, 0.9} and {0.1, 1} respectively.
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6.3.2 Subjective Probabilities and Beliefs
The GBT, presented in section 5.4.1, was modelled in such a way that if priors would
exist for the singleton of each hypothesis, it collapses to the theorem of Bayes. This
was tested using the same evidence pool and priors as the Subjective Probabilities
and Possibilities. At all cases the results were exactly the same as with the Subjective
Probability approach. Figure 6.4 illustrates the results of both under ACFZ. To derive
those results, Eq. 4.18 and Eqs. 5.31-5.34 were used for Subjective Probability and
GBT, respectively. A correlation analysis was also performed (Table 6.1), indicating
perfect significance (τACFZ = 1.000, p < 0.01 ).
Figure 6.4: Subjective Probabilities and GBT beliefs under ACFZ using Eqs. 4.18,
5.31-5.34
Modelling Uncertainty 124
Correlation Tests by Evidence Group
Probability GBT/TBM
Probability
ACFZ
Pearson 1.000 1.000
Covariance .003 .000
Kendall’s Tau 1.000 1.000 ∗ ∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
Spearman’s rho 1.000 1.000 ∗ ∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 6.1: Correlation tests for Subjective Probabilities and TBM/GBT
6.3.3 Analysis
Figure 6.5 illustrates the prior and posterior subjective probabilities under the differ-
ent evidence. Due to the strong supporting evidence of ACFZ the confidence in an
M interpretation grows sharply, even when the prior is against it. Scenario ACFY
also highlights the evidence supporting M, especially after a prior of 0.2. As can be
seen, it rises less sharply than ACFZ due to the fact that not all evidence supports
that interpretation. Lastly, ADFY is very interesting as it shows the indecision of the
particular evidence; two of those support M while the other two favour N. and a
bit more strongly at that. As a result, depending on the prior, the posterior is quite
different. In scenarios such as the latter, one has to accumulate more evidence.
Calculating Possibilities
Figure 6.6 represents the confidence in M under both subjective probabilities and pos-
sibilities while considering evidence ACFZ. It can be seen that for a prior of 0.38 and
more the values of all three confidences converge strongly. If the prior was less, there
are a number of interesting observations. The results were derived by using Eqs. 4.18
and 5.23 for the Subjective Probabilities, and Possibilities, respectively.
Firstly, at low prior levels, the evidence of ACFZ surprises the observer because
it is not expected to occur (as the low prior represents that expectancy). Note that
if hypothesis M is dominant, even though its certainty would be low (N < 0.38)
once the supporting evidence occurs, the post-confidence immediately rises due to
the maxitivity axiom. On the other side, when N is dominant, the rise is much less
sharp, closely following that of the Subjective Probability.
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Figure 6.5: Subjective Probabilities under different evidence using Eq. 4.18
The next Figure (6.7) shows the confidence in M under evidence ACFY. IfM is the
DH, the post-evidence confidence inM rises quite sharply compared to the Subjective
probabilities. On the other hand, ifN is the DH, the Possibility follows the Subjective
Probability at smaller prior values.
It can be noted that a sharp spike occurs at priors around 0.2 This is due to
threshold being reached–the confidence actually has changed to anM interpretation,
even though we have started with N as dominant(and with a large necessity, close to
0.8). This happens because the evidence suggests that M should now be the the DH
as it is fully possible and begins to be certain.
Figure 6.8 illustrates the conflicting evidence ADFY. As with the Subjective Prob-
ability results for the conflicting evidence, the post-evidence priors are largely de-
pendent on the pre-evidence priors. Again, a sharp spike can be seen around the
prior value of 0.8 when M is the DH. This happens because the DH again shifts, but
Modelling Uncertainty 126
Figure 6.6: Subjective Possibilities and Probabilities under ACFZ using Eqs. 4.18 and
5.23.
that time back to the original DH which isM.
Consider the first prior of this scenario, it is {1, 0.99}; if we apply Eq. 5.23 the
post-evidence value would be {0.213, 1}. This means that support for M under the
low prior is very weak to give any certainty to this interpretation. Consecutively,
the spike represents the incompleteness of the evidence; if the prior is {1, 0.22} the
posterior is {0.96, 1}. If it is {1, 0.21} it becomes {1, 0.99}. As demonstrated in Section
5.2, this represents indecision, both are quite possible and almost nothing is certain.
If the Subjective Probabilities are examined around the peak, it is worth noticing that
they also lie around 0.5.
The graphs represents the confidence in interpretation M, not just the single pos-
sibility value of M. To elaborate, when M is the DH, the graph will show its Necessity
value. When a shift happens, like from {0.96, 1} to {1, 0.99} it means that M has to be
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Figure 6.7: Subjective Possibilities and Probabilities under ACFY using Eqs. 4.18 and
5.23
represented by its Necessity again which at the current case is around 0.01.
The occurrence of spike events such as this cannot be predicted. When they hap-
pen, the results do deviate sharply from probabilistic and even possibilistic counter-
parts. Fortunately, a simple measure has been implemented that stabilises the events,
further analysed in Section 6.3.4. The following section examines the correlation of
the probabilistic and possibilistic values which is fundamental to establishing a rela-
tionship between the two.
6.3.4 Correlation between Subjective Probabilities and Possibilities
The data was statistically analysed to determine whether Subjective Probabilities and
Possibilities are correlated. The data was tested for normality and the results indic-
ate that data does not conform to a normal distribution and is thus non-parametric.
As a result, while certain parametric tests can be used (such as Pearson’s correlation
coefficient) in order to calculate significance, non-parametric tests were used.
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Figure 6.8: Subjective Possibilities and Probabilities under ADFY using Eqs. 4.18 and
5.23
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S) was used to test for normal distribution adher-
ence. Table 6.2 shows the K-S results. A significant K-S value (K− S < 0.5) v indicates
a deviation from normality. As can be seen from the table, all of the results are signi-
ficant.
Since the data is at the interval value, this satisfies the Pearson coefficient require-
ment for its use. However, for significance testing Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s tau
are used as they are fitted for non-parametric data. The test is for bivariate correlation
examining whether there is a relationship between Subjective Probabilistic and Sub-
jective Possibilistic values and thus bi-directional two-tail tests are performed. Table
6.3 shows the results of the Correlation tests.
The results show that there is a significant relationship between the Subjective
Probabilities and Subjective Possibilities, τACFZ = 0.000, p < 0.01 , τACFY = 0.846, p <
0.01 and τADFY = 0.706, p < 0.01, Even when considering the conflicting evidence
scenario, the correlation still holds. It is interesting to note that on the ACFY/ADFY
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Tests of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig
Probabilities
ACFZ .331 99 .000 .434 99 .000
ACFY .180 99 .000 .809 99 .000
ADFY .146 99 .000 .865 99 .000
Possibilities - Poss(M) = 1
ACFZ .061 99 .200∗ .955 99 .002
ACFY .061 99 .200∗ .955 99 .002
ADFY .126 99 .000 .926 99 .000
Possibilities - Poss(N) = 1
ACFZ .360 99 .000 .345 99 .000
ACFY .164 99 .000 .847 99 .000
ADFY .061 99 .200∗ .955 99 .002
*this is a lower bound of the true significance
Table 6.2: K-S Test for Subjective Possibilities and Probabilities
scenarios, the possibilistic data most closely correlated with the probabilistic is the
one that inhibited the threshold effect (Figures 6.7 and 6.8).
6.3.5 The case for the Ψ-measure
The previous section has demonstrated that there is a significant correlation between
possibility and subjective probability values. However, the analysis of the possibility
values, indicated that a series of spikes during threshold occasions can occur. Thus, it
is unrealistic to use such an approach where a small shift in a prior could result into a
significant difference in belief. As a result, an alternative way to represent possibilistic
values had to be proposed. It is suggested that a Ψ-measure is used to represent the
Possibility and Necessity of an interpretation during visual or verbal representations.
The Ψ-measure was introduced in [130]. Raufaste and daSilva Neves ran a series
of experiments on medical practitioners to investigate if human judgements of uncer-
tainty conform better to Possibility Theory than to Probability Theory. They proposed
a new measurement apparatus, the Ψ-scale which allowed them to compare possib-
ilistic vs. probabilistic values for conjunction and disjunction. The Ψ-measure can be
derived in a few simple steps.
If a possibilistic confidence judgement from i.e. an expert archaeologist is re-
trieved, it has to conform to Possibility Theory rules. To its most basic level, that
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Correlation Tests by Evidence Group
Probability Possibility Possibility
Probability Poss(M) = 1 Poss(N) = 1
ACFZ
Pearson 1.000 .562 .988
Covariance .003 .000 .004
Kendall’s Tau 1.000 1.000 ∗ ∗ 1.000 ∗ ∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
Spearman’s rho 1.000 1.000 ∗ ∗ 1.000 ∗ ∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
ACFY
Pearson 1.000 .879 .745
Covariance .047 .007 .034
Kendall’s Tau 1.000 1.000 ∗ ∗ .846 ∗ ∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
Spearman’s rho 1.000 1.000 ∗ ∗ .847 ∗ ∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
ADFY
Pearson 1.000 .615 .926
Covariance .059 .032 .014
Kendall’s Tau 1.000 .706 ∗ ∗ 1.000 ∗ ∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
Spearman’s rho 1.000 .690 ∗ ∗ 1.000 ∗ ∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 6.3: Correlation tests for Subjective Probabilities and Possibilities
means that something has to be fully possible before it has to be certain. This is also
why when the Bayesian possibilistic approach (Eq. 5.23) is calculated, only Possibil-
ity values are requested since the Necessity ones are retrieved by Equations 5.16 and
5.17.
If experts are given a choice between necessity and possibility they would produce
a confidence judgement using only one of the two. The suggestion by D. Dubois
[130] is to use a scale combining both possibility and necessity measures. This scale
would have a range from totally impossible to totally certain. This scale, the Ψ-scale,
averages the results into a Ψ-measure. The Ψ-measure is:
Ψ(hypothesis) = 1/2[Poss(h) +N(h)] (6.4)
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The values for Possibility and Necessity can be retrieved from a calculated Ψ-
measure thus:
If Ψ(h) ≤ 1/2 then Poss(h) = 2Ψ(h) Nec(h) = 0 (6.5)
If Ψ(h) ≥ 1/2 then Poss(h) = 1 Nec(h) = 2Ψ(h) − 1 (6.6)
Total ignorance is represented when Ψ = 1/2 which is the point where Poss=1
and Nec=0.
In order to establish a prior to be used for the subjective possibilities, only the
Possibility values for the different interpretations are required. The calculations do
take care of the Necessity values accordingly, and what the expert needs to express is
his/her belief in that interpretation.
As already mentioned, spikes can occur under certain priors which reflect the
points when the belief shifts from one interpretation to another. Ψ-measures, how-
ever, also take the necessity value under consideration and it was deemed that they
could balance out those spikes. In order to test this, Ψ-measures were calculated for
all three evidence scenarios under Poss(M) = 1 as well as Poss(N) = 1 in exactly
similar conditions as the previous experiment.
6.3.6 Correlation between Ψ-measures and Probabilities
The following Figures display the Ψ-measures with the relative subjective probabilit-
ies. The results were derived by using Eqs. 4.18, 5.23 and 6.4. As it can be observed,
under ADFZ, the graph looks similar to that observed for possibilities/subjective pos-
sibilities (Figure 6.9). The next two graphs (6.10 and 6.11) also exhibit similar shape to
the related possibilistic ones - with one major difference. There are no spikes near the
threshold values, since the Ψ-measures consider both possibility and necessity at the
same time. The correlation results signify this even further, summarised in Table 6.4.
The correlation results indicate that there is a significant relationship between the
Ψ-measures and subjective probabilities. Especially for the cases of ACFY (Poss(N) =
1) and ADFY (Poss(M) = 1) which showed the spikes before (r = 0.745 and r =
0.615respectively), the correlation is even higher (r = 0.990 and r = 0.993). Similarly,
the significance levels are much stronger for these two scenarios when compared to
the case using the subjective possibilities.
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Figure 6.9: Ψ-measures and Probabilities under ACFZ using Eqs. 4.18, 5.23 and 6.4.
As a result, when using a common evidence pool, the TBM behaves exactly like
the Subjective Probablity model which also allows it to inherit the similarities and
differences observed with the Possibilistic ψ-value.
This section has highlighted a strong correlation between subjective probabilities
and possibilities and also introduced the notion of the Ψ-measure as a representation
of archaeological uncertainty. An experiment was conducted to test the behaviour
of possibilistic and probabilistic values under different priors and evidence combin-
ations. It was discovered that at certain values where the dominant attribute shifts
from one hypothesis to the other, sharp spikes occur that can influence the results.
The Ψ-measure provides a solution to this issue, by combining possibility and neces-
sity into a single value. It has also been demonstrated that under Ψ-measures spikes
do not occur and the relationship with probabilistic values is even more significant.
Sometimes, in both possibilistic cases–when using single values of Possibility/Ne-
cessity and when using Ψ-measures, the post-evidence results appear over- or under-
confident when compared to probabilistic ones. This is due to the maxitivity axiom
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Figure 6.10: Ψ-measures and Probabilities under ADFY using Eqs. 4.18, 5.23 and 6.4.
and the dual measures that characterise Possibility Theory. If the DH at prior is sup-
ported by evidence, the posterior result will be even more confident–and vice versa.
Since a significant relationship has been established between probabilistic and pos-
sibilistic values it does not matter which hypothesis is chosen as the DH–as long as
the expert believes it is fully possible.
Figure 6.11: Ψ-measures and Probabilities under ACFY using Eqs. 4.18, 5.23 and 6.4.
Correlation Tests by Evidence Group
Probability Ψ-measure Ψ-measure
Probability Poss(M) = 1 Poss(N) = 1
ACFZ
Pearson 1.000 .562 .988
Covariance .003 .000 .002
Kendall’s Tau 1.000 1.000 ∗ ∗ 1.000 ∗ ∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
Spearman’s rho 1.000 1.000 ∗ ∗ 1.000 ∗ ∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
ACFY
Pearson 1.000 .879 .990
Covariance .047 .004 .048
Kendall’s Tau 1.000 1.000 ∗ ∗ 1.000 ∗ ∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
Spearman’s rho 1.000 1.000 ∗ ∗ 1.000 ∗ ∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
ADFY
Pearson 1.000 .993 .926
Covariance .059 .059 .007
Kendall’s Tau 1.000 1.000 ∗ ∗ 1.000 ∗ ∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
Spearman’s rho 1.000 1.000 ∗ ∗ 1.000 ∗ ∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 6.4: Correlation tests for Subjective Probabilities and Ψ-measures
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6.4 Visualisations
A Romano-British building excavated in Fishbourne, East Sussex, was chosen as the
case study. Building III, is a rectangular structure located just outside the grounds of
Fishbourne Roman Palace. Fishbourne Roman Palace is one of the few palaces of that
period in Britain which makes it a very significant and important monument.
Building III itself, was unearthed during excavations undertaken by the Sussex
Archaeological Society between 1995—1999. The excavation report, published in 2005
[216], highlights both its simple structural form and the absence of substantial evid-
ence which made the building’s interpretation all the more difficult. Little more was
discovered than the building’s stone wall foundations.
Building III (Figure 6.12) represented an ideal candidate to use as a case study for
archaeological uncertainty. Despite its simple form and close proximity to a prestigi-
ous palace, the evidence (or better the lack of) gave rise to two viable interpretations
and possible reconstructions.
Figure 6.12: Plan of Building III (after 6.12)
A simple model of the military interpretation of the building was created in 3D
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Studio Max.1 The model was then extensively adapted in order to separate it into
different structural parts such as roofs, and walls but also recovered foundations from
hypothesised information. Finally, the model was exported in X3D format in order to
be used by the visualisation system.
6.4.1 The visualisation system
The visualisation system prototype is based on an application (VSAC/VSAM) de-
veloped as part of a research thesis by Ben Jackson [217]. VSAC (Visual Simulation
Attribute Connector) is an author-friendly, run-time configurable X3D interaction sys-
tem; it utilises its own X3D/VRML prototype node, VSAM (Visual Simulation Attrib-
ute Messenger).
VSAM provides all input and output events for all data types supported by VRM-
L/X3D browsers (Octaga, Cortona, Xj3D among others). All VSAM fields are optional
at design time; the fields can be configured dynamically at runtime if required. When
used in conjunction with VSAC, the VSAM nodes are self-describing supporting the
automated construction of the functional properties of graphical assets during mod-
el/scene authoring.
The benefits of using VSAC/VSAM include abstraction from specific simulation
scenarios which enables reuse of models and simulation assets. The VSAC/VSAM
components and services provide socket-based remote control of the graphical rep-
resentations, and can be used in single user mode or extended to support multi-user
collaboration. The VSAC/VSAM interfaces can control all VRML/X3D attribute val-
ues including script functions; this means that the remote controls can add or replace
the existing scene content as well as affecting simpler attribute values such as colour
or shader values. The services support dynamic construction of control interfaces
for scene components and can automate the process of adding controls for changing
scene content. VSAM nodes can support all input and output events types included in
the X3D specification. VSAM fields are optional at design time and can be configured
at runtime if required.
For the purposes of the case study, the use of VSAC/VSAM allowed for changing
objects, textures and objects’ attributes in real-time without the need to manipulate
the model. Figure 6.13 illustrates the prototype design.
The system is divided in two interacting components: control (A) and visualisa-
1The author would like to gratefully acknowledge assistance from Masters student, George Fassal,
who created the first version of the model.
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Figure 6.13: Diagram of the system
tion (B). The control component allows the user to select different parts of the model
through a user interface (1) and assign uncertainty values (2). The visualisation and
communication services are supported by VSAC. Once all the values have been as-
signed, the user can choose the visualisation scheme to apply (3).
Two different scheme types have been tested on the case study. The first type al-
lows for graphical variable changes on the model, such as hue, transparency, opacity,
etc. The second type tested the ability to use X3D shaders [218], which support real-
time advanced adjustment of textures, opacity, colour, position and direction of the
object.
The capability to use X3D shader nodes allows for embedding GLSL/HLSL shaders
in the scene, and as a result swap between different visualisation schemes. The use of
shaders opens up possibilities of visualisations such as a combination of texture maps
with varying colour overlays.
Finally, the visualisation component displays the model and supports user navig-
ation and interaction with the scene. The system provides bidirectional information
transfer between the control component and the scene.
As a result, objects in the scene are identified through the prototype and can be
manipulated in real-time. Figure 6.14 shows the building; the visualisation window
is to the left and the controller to the right.
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Figure 6.14: System screenshot
6.4.2 Visualising uncertainty in Building III
As introduced in 2.5, colour visualisation schemes are of importance when visually
interpreting uncertainty levels, especially ordinal perceptually-ordered pseudocolour
sequences. Pseudocolouring is a technique for representing varying values using a
sequence of colours.
In archaeology it is mostly used in Geographical Information Systems (GIS) rep-
resentation, as discussed in Chapter 2. Ordinal perception means that colour grading
follows an order (black to white, hue/saturation increase, etc.); the crucial require-
ment is the change towards opponent colour space. If a data value Y lies between X
and Z, in an ordinal pseudocolour sequence the colours should have the same order-
ing scheme to allow for the visual perception of the ordering of values.
For the purposes of Building III, once the uncertainty is quantified, the results
were fed to an uncertainty visualisation scheme. Figure 6.15 shows a pilot run of two
columns using a combination of Green-Red and Opaque-Transparent schemes.
Extensive discussions with three expert archaeologists who have worked on Romano-
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Figure 6.15: Pilot run with column
British structures were held. One of the archaeologists was the lead of the Building III
excavations. Discussions were structured and answers were open-ended [89]. During
these discussions the archaeologist was asked to list the available evidence in relation
to each part of the building (if any), and report how confident he was concerning his
subjective associations between the evidence and the suggested hypothesis.
The outcome of these discussions formed a simple knowledge table employed
when performing the Bayesian, Possibility, and Belief calculations. Table 6.5 repres-
ents the resulting calculations for certain parts of the building and the possibilistic as
well as probabilistic uncertainties associated with each part. The hypothesis visual-
ised is the Military one. The higher a result turned to be, the higher the belief resulting
in a Military interpretation, derived from the specific part.
The results were derived when two different priors were considered, one favour-
ing neither hypothesis, Prior A{Religious,Military}{0.5, 0.5}and one favouring the
Religious scenario Prior B{Religious,Military}{0.75, 0.25}.
Modelling Uncertainty 141
Prob Poss Prob Poss
NS walls 0.636 0.71 0.37 0.43
EW walls 0.76 0.84 0.51 0.8
Roofs 0.30 0.21 0.12 0.11
Stairs 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25
Trusses 0.72 0.81 0.47 0.66
Prior A{0.5, 0.5} B{0.75, 0.25}
Table 6.5: Subjective probabilities and possibilities for Building 3 Military hypothesis
Examination of the results in Table 6.5 shows that the probabilistic and possib-
ilistic uncertainties do not deviate more than ±0.09 except in two cases: EW walls
(0.75 prior) and Trusses (0.75 prior). In both cases, the evidence highly supports the
Military hypothesis. This may suggest that in the face of extremely positive evidence,
the possibilistic calculations might get overconfident (or under confident in negative)
results while the probabilistic ones will not deviate that much. The following section
examines the visualization of the results.
The following figures demonstrate the visualisation of the uncertainty values in-
cluded in 6.5 as input in our system. Figure 6.16 shows the specific parts of Building
III using a transparency visualisation under Prior A. The left figure represents the
probabilistic and the right the possibilistic values. More transparency indicates more
uncertainty. The difference between the probabilistic and possibilistic values for the
roofs is apparent, since the possibilistic figure shows less confidence in the roof re-
construction.
Figure 6.16: Subjective Probabilities and Possibilities with a {0.5, 0.5}prior and a trans-
parency visualization
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Figure 6.17 shows the specific parts of Building 3 for which uncertainty values
were calculated using a transparency visualization under Prior B. While the uncer-
tainty values do not vary considerably, the overconfidence of the possibilistic results
for the east-west walls can be clearly observed.
Figure 6.17: Subjective Probabilities and Possibilities with a {0.75, 0.25}prior and a
transparency visualization.
Figure 6.18 shows the specific parts of Building III for which uncertainty values
were calculated using a transparency and a Red-Yellow-Green visualization under
Prior B where red also represents uncertainty and green certainty. The colour visu-
alization uses a 10-value scale for equal intervals between Red and Green. This time,
the difference between the cautious confidence of the probabilistic inference and the
over/under confidence of the possibilistic one becomes more apparent, as the east-
west wall and trusses appear more yellow, while in the possibilistic version they tend
to be greener.
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Figure 6.18: Subjective Probabilities and Possibilities with a {0.5, 0.5}prior and a trans-
parency/colour visualization
Following, the concept of conflict, represented through the TBM, was examined.
A Red-Green visualisation was used to represent conflict; red indicates more conflict
among contributing evidence, while green indicates less. The uncertainty is represen-
ted with transparency; the more transparent, the more uncertain. The result is shown
in Figure 6.19.
Figure 6.19: The concept of conflict in Building III
The conflict between the evidence among different parts is not very contrasting
and it is difficult to show the impact that it has. In other words, because the evidence
for the walls, trusses, roofs does not contradict much, the effect for both is towards
the Green (low conflict) scale. If there were a highly conflicting part, it would appear
like in Figure 6.20.
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Figure 6.20: Simulated conflict in Building III
The ability to visualise the conflict amongst different evidence that makes up the
certainty of an interpretation, is very useful. In the other two models, and in the
TBM’s pignistic level, the conflict is normalised in the result. However, there may
be cases where evidence might be highly conflicting and is in need of re-examination.
The option to visualise it instead of examining the numerical values would be desired.
Because, as mentioned, Building III does not have highly conflicting evidence, the
element of conflict was visualised by using the column example. This is the same
example, first introduced in Section 4.4 on page 81, that has been used to illustrate the
differences between the three mathematical models and to test for results’ similarities
in the simulation experiments.
6.4.3 Visualising conflict and uncertainty
Table 6.6 presents the Bet and Conflict calculations for column M and N under evid-
ence combinations ACFZ, ACFY and ADFY. A number of different visualisations are
now examined, including pseudocolouring, transparency, side-by-side, texturing and
glyphs.
Bet(M) Bet(N) ∅
ACFZ 0.99 0.01 0.51
ACFY 0.88 0.12 0.94
ADFY 0.17 0.83 0.91
Table 6.6: Bet and Conflict results for columns M and N
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Pseudocolouring
Figure 6.21 shows a visualisation of ACFZ where conflict is represented through a
Red-Yellow-Green pseudocolour scheme (Green is less conflict). Belief in evidence
is represented with transparency; more transparency is less belief/more uncertainty.
The same scheme is followed in the visualisation of ACFY.
The conflicting evidence is extremely apparent in the ACFY interpretation at Fig-
ure 6.21; this suggests that the current interpretation is given with highly contradict-
ing information. Similarly, the high opacity of Column M indicates that the evidence
lends strong belief to that interpretation, rather than the low opacity of Column N.
Textures
In very complex scenes, or at cases of high uncertainty, the use of transparency can
potentially be a serious issue. It might lead to confusion between distinguishing dif-
ferent areas of the model or at ignoring them because of low opacity. Precious inform-
ation may be lost or obscured by other models.
As a result, visualisations that use texture as well as colour schemes are also ex-
amined. The next visualisations use a chequerboard scheme to represent conflict and
a Red-Yellow-Green to represent uncertainty.
The higher the opacity of the chequerboard, the more conflict exists between the
evidence (Figure 6.22). Notice the very high intensity of the checkerboard in the
second set of images (ACFY); this distortion indicates a high level of conflict. Also
notice the orange tint at the ACFY visualisation in the same Figure. When compared
to the ACFZ, the certainty in the former is slightly stronger.
One of the useful aspects of the chequerboard is its parametrisation. One could
opt to change the number of repeated rows x columns, the dimension of the squares,
the shape (square, rectangle, circle), and the colours (i.e. black - white, black - trans-
parent). Figure 6.23 illustrates a chequerboard with longer, less frequent, rectangles.
Such a representation, especially in the visualisation of ACFY might be preferred in
order to minimise the chequerboard’s area of influence.
The next visualisation utilises a noise texture to represent conflict. The more con-
flict that exists between evidence, the higher the noise effect on the object. Simil-
arly to the previous approaches, uncertainty is represented with a Red-Yellow-Green
scheme. Figure 6.24 illustrates the outcome. In cases where the existing texture is
also highly granulated, a noise representation of conflict would not be efficient. In
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the particular case, the difference between the two levels (mid and high) of conflict
are apparent. However, the high level of conflict distorts the ACFY so much that it
is difficult to recognise that the level of uncertainty in column N is slightly less than
ACFZ. As a result, a noise representation can be useful in cases where the conflict is
considered of more importance than the evidence certainty; perhaps when identify-
ing where high conflict exists, in order to reduce it.
Glyphs
There may be cases where the expert does not wish to affect the whole model, yet at
the same time requires the uncertainty/conflict information to be available. In such
scenarios, the use of glyphs is recommended instead of graphical variables. Figures
6.25, 6.26 and 6.27 visualise column M under evidence ACFZ, ACFY and ADFY re-
spectively. Two glyphs are used, an inverted triangle to represent Uncertainty, and
∅ for conflict. Two different variations are given for the glyph scheme. The first,
represented by the figures on the left hand side, fills the glyphs with a colour from
a Red-Yellow-Green interval pseudocolour scheme. The closer the colour is to Red,
the less the certainty and the higher the conflict. On the figures located at the right
hand side, the glyphs are superimposed on a vertical axis illustrating the pseudocol-
our scheme. This way, the corresponding position of conflict can be compared to the
extent of the spectrum and at the same time to the position of the evidence strength.
Figure 6.25 indicates a very high confidence in this interpretation; recollect that
evidence ACFZ is highly supportive of column M. At the same time, it is not sin-
gularly supportive, as there is still conflict among its evidence represented by the
yellowish hue of the conflict symbol. Moving on to Figure 6.26, notice that the cer-
tainty is quite less; recollect that evidence ACFY mostly lends support to column M.
Similarly, the conflict is quite high here, indicated by both the filled red colour and
the position at the pseudocolour bar. Lastly, ADFY is a highly conflicting set of evid-
ence, half of it marginally supports column M and half of it strongly supports column
N. This is also reflected in the visualisation in Figure 6.27 where the red triangle rep-
resents a high level of uncertainty in this interpretation, followed by an even higher
amount of evidence conflict.
(a) Column M (b) Column N
(c) Column M (d) Column N
Figure 6.21: Conflict and Evidence visualisation of ACFZ (top) and ACFY (bottom);
colour is conflict, transparency is uncertainty.
(a) Column M (b) Column N
(c) Column M (d) Column N
Figure 6.22: Conflict and Evidence visualisation of ACFZ (top) and ACFY (bottom);
colour is uncertainty, intensity of chequerboard is conflict.
(a) Column M (b) Column N
(c) Column M (d) Column N
Figure 6.23: Conflict and Evidence visualisation of ACFZ (top) and ACFY (bottom);
colour is uncertainty, intensity of chequerboard is conflict.
(a) Column M (b) Column N
(c) Column M (d) Column N
Figure 6.24: Conflict and Evidence visualisation of ACFZ (top) and ACFY (bottom);
colour is uncertainty, intensity of noise is conflict.
(a) Uncertainty
and conflict as
coloured glyphs
(b) Uncertainty and conflict posi-
tioned on a range glyph
Figure 6.25: Conflict and Evidence visualisation of ACFZ for Column M; inverted
triangle is uncertainty, ∅ is the conflict symbol.
(a) Uncertainty
and conflict as
coloured glyphs
(b) Uncertainty and conflict posi-
tioned on a range glyph
Figure 6.26: Conflict and Evidence visualisation of ACFY for Column M; inverted
triangle is uncertainty, ∅ is the conflict symbol.
(a) Uncertainty
and conflict as
coloured glyphs
(b) Uncertainty and conflict positioned
on a range glyph
Figure 6.27: Conflict and Evidence visualisation of ADFY for Column M; inverted
triangle is uncertainty, ∅ is the conflict symbol.
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6.4.4 Visualisation synopsis
A number of points can be drawn from the visualisations of Building III and columns
M and N. The simulations presented at Section 6.3 discovered an overconfidence and
underconfidence that characterises the Ψ-measure / Possibility theory. Nonetheless,
statistical comparison between the results indicated that they are significantly similar.
This over/under confidence was also made manifest in the visualisation of Build-
ing III when compared with the conservatism of the Bayesian measurement. As a
result, choosing a quantification model not only makes a difference in the ways the
expert can express uncertainty but also will have a direct effect in the visualisation of
the reconstruction.
Secondly, the use of a TBM/GBT approach allows the expert to represent con-
flict, alongside with the belief in the reconstruction. The visualisations used the
same quantified results to represent conflict and uncertainty through pseudocolour-
ing, transparency, chequerboard and noise texturing and glyphs. A combination of
pseudocolouring and transparency might be useful in simple scenarios without a
multitude of model. High levels of transparency amongst different models might
confuse a viewer.
The majority of transparency and pseudocolouring combinations used at Build-
ing III, represented one variable: uncertainty. However, it was felt that for the dual
variable representation, of belief and conflict, the importance of either might be lost
if represented only via transparency. As a result, different texturing approaches were
also implemented, using the column examples that feature low and high values of
conflict. The chequerboard texture offers a number of customisation options that
make it suitable for a variety of surfaces. On the other hand, the noise texture can
be too intense, overlaying uncertainty information, and also confusing when overlay-
ing already granulated textures.
Lastly, the use of glyphs would be a good choice when one wishes for both a
realistic-looking model as well as accompanying visual information on uncertainty.
The glyphs’ positioning at the examples were always next to the columns, but there
other ways that they can be generated for example:
• Through proximity: once the viewer comes close to the particular model, the
glyphs appear
• Through interaction: By touching/clicking on the specific model/part of the
reconstruction
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• Through animation: Fades in and out of view at specified intervals.
The choice of a visualisation scheme is also very important. If an investment is made
to a transparency-heavy scheme and the model is complex, then it may be confusing
to the viewer. Similarly, an influx of noise-based textures might also increase confu-
sion. It depends on the particular model and the amount of uncertainty information
that one wishes to visualise. Hopefully in the future it will be extremely easy to swap
between different information visualisation schemes in order to effortlessly choose
the one most appropriate for the particular model. This is also explored in Section 8.2
of this thesis.
6.5 Conclusion
In the first part of this Chapter, previous approaches to archaeological uncertainty
were critically examined. It was suggested that approaches based on fuzzy logic are
not appropriate for representing uncertainty based on belief. For such cases, Possib-
ility or Plausibility/Belief models should be used. If expression of vacuous descrip-
tions is required then the belief models can be combined with fuzzyfied expressions
in an information fusion system. Additionally, the Bayes Theorem as demonstrated in
relation to archaeological uncertainty in Section 4.4 suggests that, contrary to existing
literature, a subjective probability approach is capable of dealing with uncertainty.
Following, an experiment conducted to compare the results between Subjective
Probability, Beliefs, and Possibility Theory was discussed. Results indicate that due to
the max/min axiom of Possibility theory, confidence judgements may appear higher
or lower than Subjective Probability especially when conflicting evidence is involved.
The differences were found to be insignificant, while a significant relationship was
demonstrated between results given by Possibility and Subjective Probability.
As a result, sharp spikes in judgement which were accrued to the duality nature of
Possibility Theory were successfully eliminated by using the Ψ-scale. Statistical tests
between Ψ-scale and Subjective Probability results suggest a significant relationship
between the two, while any deviations observed are even less significant.
Finally, the visualisation implementations were discussed. Building III was visu-
alised in order to illustrate the different approaches to archaeological uncertainty. The
visualisation was based on a system (VSAC/VSAM) which utilises X3D models and
allows for the real-time altering of objects’ properties. The ways to quantify uncer-
tainty are modular and can be adapted to other systems as well.
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Limitations with Building III in regards to the visualisation of conflict led to the
use of the column example. The conflict and uncertainty was visualised with different
visualisation schemes including pseudocolour, texture and glyphs.
The visualisations highlighted some important issues. It goes without saying that
the choice of a quantification model should not be taken lightly. Even if the results are
statistically similar with limited deviations (as shown in Section 6.3), the visualisation
is affected. In other words it can lead to perceptual differences in visualisations, as
illustrated by the Possibilistic and Probabilistic representations.
Although the visualisations are not strikingly different, the overconfidence/un-
derconfidence of the Possibilistic model compared to the conservatism of the Bayesian
do have an effect in their respective visualisations. This was highlighted further when
using colour schemes instead of transparency.
The pseudocolour, texture and glyphs visualisations of uncertainty and conflict
showcased different ways of visualising conflict and uncertainty. Glyphs were less
invasive to the 3D model itself while texture such as noise might be considered too
distracting.
Closing, one of the major difficulties a system like this faces is the discovery of rel-
evant evidence to use as information supporting an interpretation. The visualisation
system presented here is a prototype and uses a simple knowledge-base table, how-
ever it is envisioned that in the future distributed, shared, knowledge-bases would be
more useful and less redundant.
As discussed in Chapter 1, a large part of the archaeological inferential process is
making analogies with similar discoveries. This was also evident with the absolute
and contextual comparison categories identified by the archaeologists in Chapter 3.
Additionally, there may be cases where the user would prefer to display uncertainty,
or conflict, above a certain level, or for only specific types of evidence. These charac-
teristics add another element for which search would be useful.
The ability to search and discover relevant associated data is explored in the next
Chapter. Chapter 7 presents research results on the design and development of a
search engine with a focus on discovering ancient coinage.
His ambition is to be the spider
in the World Wide Web.
Anonymous
CHAPTER 7
Searching for Information
7.1 Introduction
One of the conclusions made in the previous Chapter was that it is extremely difficult
to discover associated information in order to back up an interpretation. Knowledge
base researchers in other disciplines, such as medicine [219], have been aware of this
for a long time. Usually, knowledge in such a system is accumulated by getting in-
formation directly from experts as well as aggregating information from published
research results.
This Chapter analyses contributions and research results achieved through a search
engine tool developed to aggregate and collect information on ancient coinage. The
information was used by a European project which had as its major aim the identific-
ation of illegal electronic trade of antiquities.
The first section provides an introduction to the project and literature review on
electronic illegal trade and web image and text crawling. Section 7.3 describes the
methodology used for the design of the search engine, and the open source software
on which it relies. Section 7.4 extensively analyses the implementation aspects and the
extensions developed for adapting the search engine. Section 7.5 presents test results
of the working engine, while Section 7.6 outlines conclusions, identifies shortcomings
and explores the link between semantic search engines and uncertainty.
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7.2 Searching for ancient coins
Electronic illegal trade and selling of antiquities and art works is a very important
issue for authorities to handle. The COINS project was designed to provide a sub-
stantial contribution to the fight against illegal trade of ancient coins. Such trade
appears to be a major part of the illegal antiques market. It was an EU funded project
which involved technological, heritage and law enforcement partners.
COINS is not a single piece of software; it provides a set of tools that can assist
the user with their search for ancient coins. Three interconnected areas are available:
a search engine that crawls the web and retrieves candidate images, an image recog-
nition application for matching candidate coins with stolen ones, and a management
tool for archiving, indexing modifying and querying a coin image archive. These
tools are able to work independently as well as collaboratively.
Figure 7.1 illustrates the design of the interconnected tools available through COINS.
Section A, which involves the COINS spider (search engine) is the focus of this Chapter.
The spider has the role of retrieving and saving appropriate content on its database.
The content includes the HTML file, images, and any other metadata created on-the-
fly in index time. The mapping tool (section B) provides the interaction between
the spider and the management tool firstly by translating the retrieved metadata in a
semantically meaningful way and secondly by giving the ability to add richer inform-
ation to the content. Lastly, the Management tool (section C) allows for navigational
and semantic search of retrieved data.
The following contributions [93] are made through the design and development
of a number of novel plugins attached to the COINS spider:
• Extension to a Free and Open-Source Software (FOSS) search engine allowing it
to crawl for images as well as text. It is able to retrieve and store both HTML
pages and candidate coin images.
• Further extension to the FOSS search engine by taking under consideration a
number of parameters related to the search of ancient coins.
• Implementation of a connector between the FOSS search engine and CBIR soft-
ware, by extending the FOSS engine to also retain image data.
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Figure 7.1: Diagram of COINS tools and data flow.
7.2.1 Electronic illegal trade
With the increasing use of the Internet, online trade in stolen goods has reached a
large scale. Research by CheckMend, an online stolen property checking service in-
dicates that roughly £5 billion worth of stolen goods are on sale at any time in the
UK. Its checking service identifies two items per minute as stolen; a total of 10% of
all the second hand items checked with a projected value of cˇ100 million [220]. High
profile cases of online illegal trade have surfaced in the news and retailers in the US
are putting pressure on online marketplaces to safeguard the origin of the items being
sold [221].
In the area of antiquities, illegal trade is also very prominent and the market is
tentatively estimated as being worth around $2 billion a year; reliable data is hard
to find [222]. Once more, high profile unmaskings of illicit trade have taken place,
with notable example the £25million case [223] of 10,000 unprovenanced antiquities
recovered by the Italian carabinieri. Illegal electronic sale of antiquities has not been
actively documented in terms of volume but its existence is undoubted. In 2006 PAS
(Portable Antiquities Scheme), the UK government funded scheme that records ar-
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chaeological objects found by the public formed an alliance in 2006 with the online
auction house, eBay, in order to curb unreported antiquities trade. In June 2008, the
Swiss authorities made a deal with eBay to crack down on the illicit sale of cultural
property over the internet. Facilities such as CheckMend are very useful in cases
where a serial number of an item exists or at least some sort of uniquely identifying
property.
On the contrary, identifying antiquities is considerably more difficult and the ma-
jority of successful discoveries until now have occurred because people chanced to
look more closely at the items being sold. More appropriate to the case is trace.com,
the global database of lost, stolen and seized items, which includes antiquities among
others and is regularly updated by the public and law enforcement agencies. How-
ever, trace.com does not actively search for content on the Internet but rather relies
on the vigilance and feedback of its users. In the case of ancient coins, research by
Elkins [224] suggests that about 260,000 and 280,000 coins are sold each year on the
eBay-U.S. website, not counting bulk lots.
7.2.2 Web image searching
Section 7.2.1 has illustrated that online trading of illegal antiquities is an active and
ongoing problem. The COINS project is following an image-finding oriented ap-
proach. This means that it actively searches the web for coin images. Searching for
images is still in its infancy stages. Quality of an engine’s image results directly de-
pends on the quality of the textual information associated with the images (e.g. file-
name, nearby text, alt tags within etc.). Advanced search abilities can display images
according to colour properties (grayscale/colour) or size.
In a few cases (Google, Exalead) the engines apply face recognition technology
in order to identify likely images containing faces. Content-Based Image Retrieval
(CBIR) search engines are few and mostly in research stages. Examples include Web-
Seek and IBM’s QBIC. These engines consider the characteristic of the image itself–its
shape and colours. Without the ability to examine image content, searches must solely
rely on textual metadata.
Queries on a CBIR system, except from the images’ characteristics, can be by ex-
ample (an image is provided by the user as a search criteria), or by semantic retrieval
(finding images of a specific subject). Research by Google [225] attempts to blend
computer vision techniques with user feedback and preferences. Images are returned
by their visual similarities by using local features descriptors. Results are encour-
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aging, showing a large decrease in the number of out-of-context images returned.
This also follows work done for the National Centre for Missing and Exploited Chil-
dren (NCMEC). In this scenario, Google assists NCMEC in tracking child exploitation
and search for patterns in images of abuse on the web [225]
7.3 Methodology
When designing the search engine, a number of factors influenced the methodology
subsequently followed. These factors are better explained through two categories:
the behaviour of the search engine, and the target group of users.
7.3.1 Search engine behaviour
• Whole web crawling: In order to compare candidate coin images with a list of
known stolen ones, good candidate sites must first be found. It is a tremendous
task to crawl the whole web and requires a huge amount of hardware and man-
hours.
• Open source approach: One of the COINS project initiatives is its open source
approach. This extends also to the search engine.
• Image indexing and caching: The search tool should be able to index and save
images as well as text.
• Resource constraints: effort should be placed to limit the image candidates even
when indexing the web; the less false candidates, the better.
• Metadata retention: any information related to a specific image should be kept
as potential information to be used by the management tool
• Multilingual properties: Not all pages are written in English. The search engine
should take under consideration the existence of multilingual websites.
• Index updates: How often should an index be updated? How feasible is it to
remove or updated outdated content?
• Image information: How is it possible to archive data information on candidate
images so as to be used in an image query?
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7.3.2 Users
The COINS system is expected to be used by two different user types: numismatics
experts, and law enforcement. As a result, the search engine should be able to cater
both for the coin specialist and the hobbyist. The users should be able to query the
crawler by keywords, retrieve results from specific sites, or input a candidate image
and receive similar results.
7.3.3 Requirements analysis
The factors relating to the users and the search engine behaviour were analysed care-
fully before any implementation:
Whole web crawling: It was clear from the initiation of the development that
deep (extensive) web crawling in the count of millions of pages would be infeas-
ible. Initial research was focused in identifying good candidate web sites containing
ancient coinage. After consultation with the heritage experts of the project the web
crawling has been tested with coin websites including auction sites. As a result, the
crawler begins with a set of starting URLs and fetches relevant pages back. Of course,
more starting URLs can be added in the process.
Open source approach: In an effort to be as open about the code as possible, an
open source search engine implementation was used. The image searching capabil-
ities would be an extension of the engine. Four open search engines were evaluated
for the purposes of the project; their summaries can be found in Table 7.1.
Web glimpse Htdig Swish-e Nutch
Key feature suffix arrays simplicity metadata rankings
Licence nonprofit use GPL GPL/LGPL apache
Active no no yes yes
Crawling local FS intranet Intranet all
Caching no no no yes
Link rank no no no yes
Table 7.1: Comparision of open source search engines
Evaluation results indicated Nutch[226] as the best candidate for the particular
project. It is a complete open source search engine, implemented in Java and can
be fully customised by programming plugins for it. Nutch is based on Lucene, an-
other open source project for indexing and searching documents. Research shows
that Nutch achieves high performance [227] often as good as commercial search en-
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gines [228]. Its use as a search engine is quite wide spread. Notable examples include
Krugle, Creative Commons and the Internet Archive. The technical details of Nutch
are analysed further in the implementation section.
Image indexing and caching: By default, Nutch is not an image indexer. It works
as any text-based search engine. Work such as the one by Zhang [229] introduce an
image plugin able to read JPG file formats. However it has been tested on a local
filesystem scenario and not by crawling web sites. The solution was to design an
image indexing and caching extension to the parser component. The plugin inherits
all the properties of the text-based Nutch parser and extends it for the inclusion of
images. As a result, this also aids us in the case of web page updates.
Resource constraints: An obvious solution to handling resource constraints is to
limit the amount of pages the crawler is allowed to index. However, this approach
may erroneously exclude positives. Additionally, it would be important to exclude
automatic non-candidates such as banners and logos. The crawler is not aware of
what it indexes; it does not know the content of a picture. Taking these under consid-
eration, an approach was used where candidate URLs are fully indexed, but images
with size less than a certain threshold (128x128 pixels–customisable) are automatic-
ally ignored and not cached. This manages to exclude not only banners and logos but
also thumbnail pictures that are too small for image comparison. Lastly, the capability
was added to exclude certain types of images (such as GIF) if not wanted.
Metadata retention: By default, Nutch stores the whole textual content of a web
page to its database. However, as the text is being retrieved, additional fields can
be specified in the database that can dramatically improve the relationship with the
management tool. Profiles of sites can be specified during the indexing and thus
include coin properties such as dimensions/mint type/etc.
Multilingual properties: To extensively test for multilingual capabilities non -
English URLs were included to be cached.
Index updates: Updates to the index can be done as often or as infrequently
wished. Different candidate URLs can be re-indexed in varying time intervals. For
example, site A can be queried for updates every 5 days while site B every one month.
Initial experimentation has shown that a 25-day limit is good enough, since the ma-
jority of auction sites keep their listings data for at least one month.
Image information: As mentioned before, Nutch is not capable by default to un-
derstand raw image data. For this reason, a number of open source CBIR systems
were evaluated, in order to examine which was better suited to the project. The
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systems were GIFT, FIRE, img:seek, and LIRE. In the end, LIRE [230] was selected
because it supports a wide number of image indexing information, is updated fre-
quently, and shares many common characteristics with Nutch, especially the Lucene
indexer.
Figure 7.2 illustrates the desired functioalities of the system through a use-case
diagram.
Figure 7.2: Use-case diagram for desired user actions
7.4 Implementation
Before discussing the development of the search engine, it is necessary to analyse
further its basic components - Lucene, Nutch and LIRE, and how they relate to each
other.
7.4.1 Lucene
Lucene [231] is a high-performance, full-featured text search engine library written
entirely in Java. It is able to index and score documents according to their content.
There are four fundamental concepts to understanding Lucene: index, document, field,
and term. An index is a collection of documents–these may be webpages, text files,
etc. A document is a collection of fields-fields may be information such as author, date,
document content, etc. Fields contain terms, these are the values of the fields and may
be numbers, signifying a date, an author’s name, or an image title. Two terms with
the same value, but belonging to different fields are considered differently.
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Additionally, an index stores statistics about terms in order to make term-based
search more efficient. Lucene is characterised by inverted indexing–this means it can
list, for a term, the documents that contain it. Fields may be stored, in which case their
text is stored in the index literally, in a non-inverted manner. Fields that are inverted
are called indexed. A field may be both stored and indexed. The text of a field may
be tokenized into terms to be indexed, or the text of a field may be used literally as a
term to be indexed. Most fields are tokenized, but sometimes it is useful for certain
identifier fields to be indexed literally.
Lastly, Lucene indexes may be composed of sub-indexes, or segments. Each seg-
ment is a fully independent index, which could be searched separately. Indexes
evolve by creating new segments for newly added documents and merging existing
segments.
7.4.2 Nutch
Nutch is an extension of Lucene, for indexing the web. It adds a crawler, a link data-
base, and the ability to parse HTML pages, among others. It also provides support for
scaling-up and clustering by using Hadoop, an implementation of Google’s map/re-
duce computing paradigm, and a Distributed File System (DFS). Nutch is roughly
composed of three parts (Figure 7.3, after [226] ): fetcher, parser and indexer. The
fetcher is responsible for retrieving web pages from the web as well as updating any
renewed content. The parser navigates through the fetched HTML (or other types)
content and identifies tags and content available for indexing. Lastly, the indexer,
with all the capabilities of Lucene, assembles indexable parts into the Nutch data-
base.
7.4.3 LIRE
The LIRE (Lucene Image REtrieval) library provides a simple way to retrieve images
and photos based on their color and texture characteristics. It creates an index, based
on Lucene, but the relevant fields and terms relate to image features for CBIR. The list
of features that can be retrieved are presented below:
1. Color histograms in RGB / HSV color space.
2. MPEG-7 descriptors, such as scalable color, color layout and edge histogram
3. The Tamura texture which includes coarseness, contrast and directionality
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Figure 7.3: The flow of data through Nutch
4. Color and edge directivity descriptor, CEDD,
5. Fuzzy color and texture histogram, FCTH
6. Auto color correlation feature
Each image is saved in a Lucene index as a separate document. Prior to indexing,
the desired features that will be saved must be selected. This is implemented by
DocumentBuilders; for example, the fast Document builder, retrieves only the color
layout information. Other builders also include: Extensive (all mpeg-7 descriptors),
Auto color correlation, Full (all features). Once an image is indexed, the user is able
to query the index with another image. The search functions also relate to the existing
index–one cannot search for a Tamura feature if it has not been indexed. Figure 7.4
illustrates the concept.
Figure 7.4: The flow of indexing/searching provided by LIRE
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7.4.4 Integration and Implementation
The integration of Nutch and LIRE into a search engine involved extending, modi-
fying and creating a number of plugins for the project. Figure 7.5 shows the state of
Nutch and LIRE before the extensions; note that there is no interaction between the
two. Nutch is capable of indexing, crawling, and searching just for text and links. On
the other hand, LIRE retrieves CBIR information from a repository of images (local
or online). Figure 7.6 shows the re-design of the system; the plugin additions are
represented with orange arrows.
Figure 7.5: Nutch and LIRE basic functionalities before the extensions
Extensions were designed, developed and integrated into Nutch in order to:
1. Save images according to criteria (dimensions/input-output format)
2. Optionally filter out sites by keyword
3. Validate images (discard faulty/invalid links)
4. Cater for duplicates (ignore same images)
5. Be able to use LIRE for:
a) Open source image information indexing.
b) Indexing image data such as colour/edge histogram, colour layout etc
Figure 7.7 presents the overall workflow of the search engine in the crawling and
indexing phase, with the included modifications.
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Figure 7.6: Nutch and LIRE interactions after the extensions
Figure 7.7: Crawling and indexing text and images from the web
Parsing and retrieval extension
The default HTML parser of Nutch was extended in order to recognise HTML <img>
tags. This allowed to get information on the image file, such as its link and dimen-
sions. Testing indicated that the majority of images being discarded were GIFs.
Specifically, testing with approximately 1.4 million URLs returned 6,942,640 link
checks for images. Out of those, 88% were GIF checks and 12% were JPG. About 97%
of the checks were checks for duplicate images, and only 3% of the images were con-
sidered as save-able. An estimated 99% of the images eventually saved were JPEG.
Finally, 82% of the time is spent processing GIF images, of which at the best, less than
1% are coins. As a result, the user is provided with the option to exclude parsing and
caching of GIF images if so desired.
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The flow diagram in Figure 7.8 illustrates how the HTML document is traversed
and outgoing image links, belonging to a src attribute, are saved. In case that GIF
filtering is on, all GIF image links will be omitted.
Indexing extension
After the fetching cycle finishes, the indexing commences, where data from the web
sites is actually indexed in the Nutch local database. During this phase Nutch re-
trieves the crawled web page, indexes its information, and ranks the keywords with
its ranking system. The default Nutch indexing filter was extended in order to be
capable to index any images within a web page. Additionally, a number of features
have been included that make the archiving of images more efficient.
1. Size check: If an image is below a certain threshold provided by the user, it is
not archived (e.g. 128x128 pixels).
2. Validity check: If for any reason, the image file is erroneous it is not archived.
3. Image indexing check: If for any reason, the image fails the image indexing
check (of LIRE), it is not archived
4. Duplication check: If the image already exists, with the same URL and path, it
is not double saved.
5. Unique ID check: For each image to be saved in the database, a unique MD5
hash key is composed by the URL of the image and used as a file name.
6. Image output: The user is able to specify what output the images will be saved
as. The default is PNG, but the user is able to choose from well known formats
such as JPG/TIFF if so wished.
7. Coin candidate: This includes the capabiilty to identify while indexing an im-
age as probably belonging to a coins-related page. The user is able to provide
keywords or site-specific tags, and if located within the text, the particular page
is tagged as a probable coins candidate. This gives greater flexibility in the
search results.
The above were implemented in a new indexing filter plugin, its flow diagram is
presented in Figure 7.9.
Figure 7.8: Parsing and archiving image links in an HTML page
Figure 7.9: Filtering and indexing suitable images from an HTML page.
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Image Indexing extension
The Nutch image plugin has been further extended in order to encapsulate LIRE in
the search engine architecture. The image CBIR indexer examines the incoming file,
and saves the image characteristics in a LIRE/Lucene index, according to the features
chosen (as described in 7.4.3 ). Each image is a Lucene document with a unique ID
as the one in the Nutch index, formed by the MD5 hash. In this way, a direct link
between the two indexes is established and subsequently allows for querying both or
one of them at a time. The image indexer checks for:
• File validity: can the requested features be retrieved from the image? if not, it is
not archived.
• Index existence: if an index is not available, it is created.
• Filter check: checks which feature filter is requested and in case of errors it uses
the default MPEG-7 filter.
• Optimisation: Optimises and cleans the index for faster retrieval.
Figure 7.10 illustrates the flow.
7.4.5 Searching
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the search tool, two methods were de-
ployed for searching the indexed content. The first one is a web-based application
while the second is a Java-based standalone application.
Web-based search
The first searching method uses a web-interface and behaves as any well-known
search engine. The search runs as a Java servlet on an Apache Tomcat server. The
user can search by keywords and results displayed include the images related to the
specific page. Other options include: viewing only images/viewing images from cer-
tain web sites/viewing content classified as potential coin candidates. Figure 7.11
illustrates the concept.
Image search application
The second search implementation demonstrates a CBIR search on the indexed im-
ages by calling on the LIRE API. The user is asked to input the index directory (of
Figure 7.10: Indexing an image’s CBIR information.
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(a) A simple search that displays images. (b) A search that displays images, relevant
links, and summary description.
Figure 7.11: Example text searches
(a) Configuring the search application (b) Results with a low threshold and 30
maximum returned.
Figure 7.12: Example image searches.
the image features) and the location of the archived images. Then, the user is able to
upload an image to use as a comparison. It also incorporates the ability to select a
search method according to the features saved, the maximum results returned, and a
threshold value for likeness. The threshold value is a number from 0 to 1 that indic-
ates how similar a picture is to another; the closer the number is to 1 the more likely
they look similar. By having a higher threshold value only the most likely of results
will be shown. Figure 7.12 shows the user interface in action with a random coin im-
age from an auction site chosen as input. The default MPEG 7 descriptor has been
chosen, and the results appear as most likely first. The feedback log at the bottom of
the interface shows the likeliness of each image, its filename, and its location.
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Configuration file
All the configurations and the options mentioned as part of the implementation are
integrated as part of an XML configuration file. This is used by default by Nutch
in order to configure aspects of the crawling/indexing process, plugin information,
etc. It also serves as a configuration basis for customised plugins such as the one
implemented. Through this way, the user is able to make any chances simply by
interacting with the XML file. For example, to choose a differeent image indexer one
can just change a number in the configuration file as shown in the code snippet.
<property>
<name>imgindexer . current . indexer</name>
<value>1</value>
< d e s c r i p t i o n >
These are the a v a i l a b l e indexers
provided by LIRE . Values :
1 : Defaul t
2 : Extensive
3 : Fas t
4 : F u l l
5 : CEDD
6 : Tamura
7 : AutoColorCorrelat ion
8 : Fas t AutoColorCorrelat ion
9 : Colour Histogram
</ d e s c r i p t i o n >
</property>
7.5 Experiments
This section analyses the experiments done when testing the search engine. Because it
is composed of different parts, such as the crawler, the indexer, the image indexer, and
the searcher, a number of different tests was also used. The tests check for perform-
ance of the algorithms as well as the validity of the results returned. All benchmarks
were composed on a single PowerMac G5 with 1GB of ram and a 2 Mbit ADSL line.
A list of 43 coins-related URLs including eBay was fed to the engine and search was
restricted on those sites. The following Section illustrates how a site was chosen for
inclusion.
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Site name Local search Worldwide search
Italy 1686 6495
US 3383 7680
UK 935 6358
France 1388 4227
Table 7.2: Comparison of localised eBay sites
Keyword:
Denarius
Category: Coins Category: Other %
UK 144 3 2.1
US 308 4 1.3
Italy 427 3 0.7
France 17 0 0
Table 7.3: Comparing results across eBay categories (A)
7.5.1 Focus: eBay
As mentioned in the introduction, a large proportion of illegal online trade occurs on
the eBay site. As a result, one of the sites the spider uses is eBay. A study was made
of four eBay sites, namely the French, UK, Italy and US in order to estimate:
• Which of the three sees the most traffic.
• Number of relevant coin results in the ancient coins category
• Number of relevant coin results in other categories.
Table 7.2 shows the number of results retrieved for all items in the Ancient Coins
category, both for a local and a worldwide search. The US site gives the maximum
number of results.
Another point to consider was whether coins were found in other categories than
the Ancient Coins one and whether these categories should be included in the crawl.
Tables 7.3 and7.4 show the results of a simple keyword case; in Table 7.3 queries were
done in the local language. Results are included from Ancient coins and the other
categories. It was found that a very low number of coins appeared in other categories
than Ancient Coins, mostly in the Antiquities one.
It would seem that eBay users try to be as accurate as possible when assigning
categories for their listings. These observations also include items that may belong in
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Keyword:
Roman
Coin
Category: Coins Category: Other %
UK 413 70 16.9
US 1026 74 7.2
Italy 114 5 4.4
France 91 3 3.3
Table 7.4: Comparing results across eBay categories (B)
both categories and would be thus retrieved from a crawl in just the Ancient Coins
one. As a result the cost of crawling other categories for this case study was con-
sidered unnecessary.
Lastly, the spider adheres to the good practices of web robots and fully respects
robots.txt permissions before crawling a web page.
7.5.2 Crawling and indexing
Table 7.5 shows the time taken for crawling and indexing respectively. While the
crawling appears to take a large amount of time, this is due to the threaded crawling
requests to the sites. They are low in number, for politeness so as not to overbear
any site. An additional matter is the bandwitdh, and the use of a single machine;
since Nutch supports cluster architecture, the same tests on a cluster would take less
time. In both cases, the indexing and saving of the images takes about 21-23% of the
time–and again this could be decreased by using a cluster architecture.
N URLs fetched t
fetching
t index-
ing
imgs
Cache size Total
imgs
10,000 12,195 13 hrs 3 hrs 1 gb 11,161
100,000 146,804 6 days 30 hrs 17 gb 166,501
Table 7.5: Crawling and indexing benchmarks
7.5.3 Image characteristics
In 7.5.2 one of the two tests resulted in 166,501 images. Further tests were conducted
on those results in order to identify the types of images returned and examine any po-
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tential waste of time/bandwidth. While the end result was 166,501 images, the actual
examination for links were 6,942,640. From these examinations, 87% (6,083,730 ) were
checks for GIF files, 12% for JPG and the rest for other types e.g. PNG. These millions
of checks (which is actually a first check for duplicates) allowed 195,295 of images to
pass through second checks (i.e. size/validity). The end result after size/validity is
the original 166,501 where 99% are jpg and 0.7% are GIF. Upon examining the GIF for
relevant coin content, 8% (81) were coins.
Following these results, an option to exclude GIF files if desired, was implemen-
ted. This extension has been described in Section 7.4.4.
7.5.4 Image features indexing
Tests were also conducted in the indexing phase in order to retrieve the indexing
times of the image features. Table 7.6 illustrates the indexing time taken by a simple
colour histograpp and the full index which combines all features. The difference is
that the full is about 32 times slower, considering that the simple takes 104 ms/image
and the other 3400ms/image.
Type of Index N. of images Time/Image
Colour histogram 30,000 104 ms
Full index 1,340 3.4 sec
Table 7.6: Image features indexing
7.5.5 Searching
The searching capabilities were tested in a local filesystem, by two different means:
through the web application, and the image application index. Both perform quite
fast, the former giving an average of 3 sec/search and the second 1.1 sec/search with
the lowest threshold (maximum numbers of results returned).
7.6 Conclusion
This Chapter described extensions to an open source search engine developed as part
of the COINS project. The extensions integrate and extend a number of open source
applications such as NUTCH and LIRE. As a result, it provides an engine capable
of querying coins web sites, retrieving candidate images, indexing both HTML in-
formation and image features and searching both by keyword and image data. The
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flexibility of the systemy was achieved by providing two means of search capabilit-
ies, a web-based application and a Java stand-alone system. The transfer from a Java
application to another, preferred medium, would involve only the writing of the fron-
tend, as the behaviour remains the same. Further work can include testing scenarios
with remote/concurrent users and the deployment on a cluster system.
Due to the modularity of the new plugins developed for this project and also of the
underlying applications, this engine can feasibly and easily be extended to other types
of searches. The indexed results can also be further enriched with additional metadata
in order to be semantically queried. In fact, one of the main aims of COINS was
to add capabilities for semantic search and classification to the cached index of text
and images. The search engine is tightly integrated with an ontology-based semantic
database capable of storing and querying information. The semantic database uses
the CIDOC-CRM standard [232]. CIDOC is an ontology mapping for cultural heritage
data; a portion of it is devoted specifically to archaeological data.
Crisp semantic descriptions are in development for Nutch in different search areas
(Mathematics [233], e-learning [234]). At the same time, ontological descriptions for
archaeological scientific publications, one of the main sources of archaeological know-
ledge repository, have also been explored [235] Additionally, projects such as 3D-
COFORM [94], which extend work done with the COINS Semantic database, provide
ways to semantically describe excavation data. As with the development of mathem-
atics, from crisp to elastic, fuzzy sets, researchers in semantic descriptions are now
exploring the concept of vagueness and uncertainty.
A seminal paper by Lukasiewicz and Straccia [236] detailed significant research in
the area of semantic ontologies towards representing and reasoning with uncertainty
and vagueness. They describe a set of possibilistic and probabilistic expressive de-
scriptive logics that can aim to extend classical ontology languages. During the same
period, the World Wide Web consortium initiated an incubator group to examine un-
certainty reasoning for the web [237] which examined fuzzy reasoning, probability
theory and evidence theory. One of its aims was to identify case studies where uncer-
tainty reasoning would aid in extracting useful information.
Let us return to Sally, the archaeology graduate, who unearthed an unidentifiable
shard of pottery (Chapter 3.3). She uploads a picture of it to a semantic database of
archaeological information, together with as much description as possible, however
vague, i.e. brown colour, about 30 gr. in weight, rough texture. The search engine, ex-
tended as to understand uncertain descriptive logics such as this, crawls through the
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database and returns relevant results that can immediately aid in identification. At
the same time, the archaeologist can update said database with her own discoveries
and identifications.
Writing non-crisp semantic extensions for Nutch, or other, search engines is fully
feasible and it is envisioned that this will be an active research area in the next years.
Furthermore, non-crisp semantic descriptions could enhance the CIDOC-CRM stand-
ard.
As with archaeological uncertainty, semantic search featuring vague and uncer-
tain logics, instead of crisp descriptions, is a long way from being widely used. How-
ever, the author cannot help but notice that in the future these two areas will be very
much related in order to construct and query archaeological knowledge bases with
correct ontologies and adequate descriptive languages that include uncertainty and
vague knowledge. Figure 7.13 illustrates the concept diagram of a proposed system
for archaeological 3D reconstructions, which acknowledges uncertainty and evidence
and can be powered by a semantically searchable Knowledge Base.
Figure 7.13: Global system diagram
The Knowledge Base will include (fuzzy) semantically-described archaeological
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evidence. It will be updateable by experts and evidence can have assigned confidence
levels. Any 3D models created, must acknowledge evidence relevant to their creation.
This repository is envisioned to be cloud-based and distributed. In the visualisation
system segment, the expert wanting to create an archaeological reconstruction has to
query the knowledge base for available model parts. Alternatively, she can also query
the KB for ambiguous/unidentified evidence or models. Uncertainty visualisation
schemes can be changed locally to provide for a variety of visualisations.
The next Chapter, the conclusion to this thesis, provides an overall discussion
of the thesis’s problem questions and contributions and expands on future research
work needed.
The End Is the Beginning Is the
End.
The Smashing Pumpkins
CHAPTER 8
Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis explored, described, quantified and visualised uncertainty in a cultural
informatics context, with a focus on archaeological reconstructions. For quite some
time now, archaeologists and heritage experts have been rightly criticising the often
too-realistic appearance of three-dimensional reconstructions. They have been high-
lighting one of the unique features of archaeology: the information we have on our
past will always be incomplete. This incompleteness should be reflected in digitised
reconstructions of the past.
This criticism composed the major motivation behind the thesis. The research
started by examining archaeology itself, archaeological theory and archaeological in-
ference, and followed with an insight into computer visualisation and how these two
areas have formed a useful but often tumultuous relationship through the years.
An extensive literature review on uncertainty concluded that the quantification
and visualisation of archaeological uncertainty itself was at the very first, concep-
tual, stages when compared to other disciplines. By examining the uncertainty back-
ground of disciplines such as GIS, medicine, and law, the thesis postulated that ar-
chaeological visualisation, in order to be taken seriously, should move towards ar-
chaeological knowledge visualisation. Three steps were identified for the initial ex-
ploration of archaeological uncertainty: identification, quantification and modelling.
A questionnaire, targeting expert archaeologists, was designed, modelled and dis-
tributed in order to gauge perception about uncertainty as well as different types of
evidence. On the matter of quantification, three established mathematical models of
uncertainty quantification, Probability Theory, Possibility Theory, and the Transfer-
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able Belief Model, were presented, explained, innovatively applied to archaeological
scenarios and then evaluated. Following, a previous modelling approach to uncer-
tainty using fuzzy logic was critically examined. A series of simulations were de-
signed and run in order to examine differences between results of the mathematical
models. The visualisation of Building III aimed to explore the differences and cap-
abilities between the various models. Additional visualisations of using information
visualisation schemes evaluated the uses of texture, glyphs and graphical variables as
representations of uncertainty and conflict. Lastly, the design and development of a
extensions to a search engine led to the suggestion that perhaps all this knowledge, as
well as the awareness of its limitations, can be all tied together with vague semantic
descriptors. The thesis contributions are now presented in more detail.
8.1 Thesis contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are:
• The innovative design, development and distribution of a questionnaire which
examines archaeological uncertainty in interpretation during excavations.
• One of the questionnaire’s conclusions was that archaeologists across different
disciplines are equally concerned about uncertainty in interpretations and re-
constructions.
• Another conclusion was that archaeologists may indicate preference among dif-
ferent categories of evidence. This can influence the choice of a quantification
algorithm as well as visualisations.
• Three mathematical uncertainty quantification models were explained, applied
and evaluated for the first time, for the purposes of archaeological belief repres-
entation and reasoning visualisation.
• The behaviour of Possibility, TBM and Subjective Probability were examined
through simulations. Statistical tests indicated that the results converge signi-
ficantly. However, the unpredictable over/under confidence of Possibility was
highlighted and the application of the Ψ-scale was proposed.
• Examination of previous approaches to modelling uncertainty on fuzzy logic
were critically examined and disputed.
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• Suggestions that a probabilistic approach is not capable of representing archae-
ological uncertainty were refuted and was proved that it can be done through a
Bayesian approach.
• Visualisation of Possibilistic and Probabilistic beliefs in an actual case study
highlighted that even though the results of the two are significantly similar,
during the visualisation differences are apparent. As a result, the importance of
choosing a mathematical model appropriate for the circumstances is even more
crucial under the light of differences in visualisation.
• Innovative visualisation of belief and conflict elements on 3D archaeological
reconstructions by using an actual archaeological site as a case study as well
as simulated models. Application and evaluation of a variety of information
visualisation schemes.
• The design and development of extension to a search engine for searching for
archaeological data. Results from this research can be extended towards a se-
mantic search engine capable of handling uncertainty. Finally, it is suggested
that semantic annotation of uncertainty and representations of it (i.e the mod-
els) would be a positive step in the direction of typologies and standards.
8.2 Future work
Representing uncertainty in archaeological reconstructions is currently a novel and
niche research area. This thesis has aimed to contribute in examining some founda-
tional aspects. There is vast amount of further work to be done towards this area, the
following sections analyse possible directions for such work. Figure 8.1 recaps the
predicted stages of uncertainty research.
8.2.1 A typology for archaeological uncertainty in 3D reconstructions
Archaeologists face two tasks when evaluating evidence towards an interpretation.
The first one is to understand how accurate the evidence is; measurement quality,
granularity, possible errors etc. The second one is to assign their own level of confid-
ence, importance to that evidence. Depending on the type of evidence, or what it is
being used for, it may be deemed more, or less important.
One of the contributions of this thesis has been applying mathematical models of
uncertainty representation to archaeological scenarios. In order to develop the repres-
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Figure 8.1: Stages of uncertainty research
entation further and use features such as information fusion, a typology framework
for the different types of uncertainties faced by archaeologists should be established.
A first step would be to evaluate similar efforts done for analysts in intelligence gath-
ering [238]. The particular research by Thomson uses classifications by Pang [110]
and Gershon [108] to suggest a typology for intelligence gathering. Zuk [140], based
on Thomson’s suggestions extends the typology to a more general typology for reas-
oning.
Much work has been done in the cultural heritage sector in CIDOC-CRM [239].
CIDOC-CRM can be used as a bridge between other typologies and one that ex-
presses uncertainty in reasoning and data when archaeological 3D reconstructions
are involved. Concise identification of typologies will hopefully, subsequently lead
to the establishment of standards.
8.2.2 Advanced quantification: Archaeological information fusion
Longley [111] provides a conceptual view of uncertainty, where the actual, real world
has its complexity distorted and reduced through its representation in a GIS. Figure
8.2 presents an adaptation of this model for archaeological uncertainty.
In order to move forward towards the fusion of different kinds of uncertainty in-
formation (as identified through the typologies), the actual creation and propagation
of uncertainty should also be acknowledged. For example, what kind of simplifica-
tions and assumptions are being made during a reconstruction? What information
is willingly (or unwillingly) lost? Stages U1-U5 provide building blocks for further
consideration.
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Figure 8.2: Uncertainty propagation
A good reason to acknowledge what kind of uncertainty is involved and where
in the system it is most apparent, is that it can affect the choice of quantification and
modelling. Taking another example from the GIS universe, IDRISI GIS allows for
representation using the Dempster-Shafer, fuzzy as well as subjective probability. Es-
pecially if one chooses to use an information combination (fusion) system, perhaps
involving fusing fuzzy and probabilistic information through belief functions [240];
the way the uncertainty moves through such a system would be crucial in modelling
it.
8.2.3 Advanced modelling and visualisation approaches
A cumbersome issue in wanting to represent uncertainty is that the need for altern-
ative models escalates. It is perfectly reasonable, if an evaluation or comparison is
made between two or more hypothesis, that the expert would want to view both. Of
course, with the current available tools it is not quite feasible due to cost and time
constraints. This was also encountered during the visualisation of Building III, con-
straints prevented from creating the alternative model of a religious representation.
This also raises another issue: redundancy. So many models are created, somehow
visualised and then abandoned. To continue this way with archaeological knowledge
visualisation in mind would surely lead to many, many, more redundant models and
limited collaboration or use between the experts creating them.
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Two crucial areas for further work are the research of alternative ways of creating
and sharing models of archaeological data, and exploration of visualisations. Two
directions are proposed for the former:
Expert, community-monitored, open-standard model repositories
A Wikipedia for archaeological model components. This concept is inspired by the
way computer games populate the game worlds by using building blocks of items,
structures, trees, etc. As a result, many professional websites exist which provide
such models. The models themselves are often rated by their users in terms of the
model’s quality and realistic representation.
Such a heritage repository would consist of 3D models or other data that can be
used for archaeological representations, along with required information about their
creation. For example, consider a texture map for a Roman plaster wall. The creator
would have to explain how it was created, based on what sources and evidence. Also,
other experts would be able to rate, make alterations and suggestions to the texture
or model themselves–this is where the Wikipedia analogy comes in. The involvement
of experts is very crucial as the crowdsourcing validation of the models would lend
them a higher credibility.
If this repository and its data are also semantically described through CIDOC (and
they should be, for completeness), a search engine capable of understanding semantic
logic can provide a connecting point between a 3D modelling software and the repos-
itory itself.
An approach such as this would greatly reduce redundancy, associate an origin
record to each modelised part which in turn would connect with actual archaeological
knowledge through articles etc. Furthermore, it would provide a consistency that is
currently lacking in archaeological visualisations.
Procedurally generated content
A diametrically different approach would be to invest in describing archaeological
models procedurally. Procedural generation of 3D object means that the objects are
created from a set of rules which describe not only their structure but relationship
between their neighbours. For example, a procedurally-generated door will have suf-
ficient knowledge for its dimensions but also where it can be placed, how many doors
may be allowed in a building, its style (interior door, exterior door), its proximity to
windows, etc. In essence it is a semantic description of the object. Such modelling
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a t t r randomly = 0
a t t r winW = 2 // fixed , no u n c e r t a i n t y
a t t r winH =
60%: 1 . 5 // from " arch . source "
20%: 1 . 6 // from " arch . source 2 "
e l s e : 1 . 7
has been used for quite a long time in computer games, especially for procedurally
rendering huge cityscapes where individual modelling would be tedious, costly and
extremely time consuming.
Such an approach was recently suggested by Haegler [241], who applies proced-
ural modelling concepts to representing alternative archaeological reconstructions of
buildings. Procedural models, because of their semantic capabilities, would feature
an awareness of relationships between objects. For example, the family of columns
belonging to an ancient Greek timeline would be Corinthian, Doric and Ionic. A
procedurally generated city, set in the ancient Greek timeline, when needing some
columns, it would be from the relevant family. Havemann also acknowledges the
existence of uncertainty, and takes a purely crisp-set, probabilistic approach to its
representation. The code snippet below (after [241]) represents a window’s uncertain
height as a probability distribution.
Although this is a step in the right direction, it is a very simplistic representation.
In order to better represent the uncertainty involved in such a visualisation the pro-
cedural language and rules used must be extended to cater for vague meanings, belief
functions, and external association to sources, rather than in a comment. Inspiration
can be received from medical rule-based systems which also use procedural rules but
also cater for vague, fuzzy information.
The very recent acquisition (late 2011) of City Engine, a graphics engine for pro-
cedural generation of buildings, by ESRI means only one thing: GIS is going to be
immensely enhanced with procedural rules for generating structures, vegetation and
more. It is only a matter of time before the uncertainty plugins are also applicable to
procedural modelling.
Further exploration of visualisations
This thesis applied a number of visualisation approaches to archaeological uncer-
tainty. Further work is needed in a number of areas. Firstly, the issue of swapping
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between different visualisation schemes has to become as easy as changing, for ex-
ample, a chart style in Microsoft Excel. The resources and amount of time required
to create a 3D model is already quite high and it only escalates with the uncertainty
quantification and visualisation. Plus, the issue of redundancy also occurs here; cur-
rently there is no way to transfer visualisation styles between models.
New approaches to 3D modelling such as those previously discussed, can lead to
a parallel systematisation of visualisation approaches. Another future area of interest
is the user experience and perception of such visualisations.
8.2.4 Knowledge bases
Chapter 7 briefly examined the difficulties of discovering expert information and ex-
panded on the aspect of searching for said information in associated repositories.
There is a second aspect, which is the elicitation of expert knowledge: in other words,
how to make archaeologists, doctors, lawyers express their knowledge in a consistent
manner. With regards to archaeological uncertainty, this is another area where further
work is definitely needed. Firstly, to create a knowledge base about an archaeological
domain, experts in that domain would need to be enrolled to share their knowledge.
Secondly, an ontologically concise way is needed in order to express that knowledge.
It should be semantically understandable by the system, and this would also put a
great limitation on the experts. Thirdly, the elicitation of knowledge must take under
consideration factors such as the conjunction fallacy and overconfidence/undercon-
fidence that are often expressed by humans. Again, a first step of examination could
be research in elicitation of expert medical knowledge which has a strong, 40-year,
background.
8.3 Closing Remarks
The main objective of this research has been to highlight the concept of uncertainty in
archaeological reconstructions, research means to quantify it, discover ways to model
and visualise it and explore future ways to search information for it. It is extremely
encouraging that through the time this thesis was being completed, new research
has surfaced that deals with archaeological uncertainty and knowledge representa-
tion. The STAR and STELLAR projects [242], which make archaeological data (par-
ticularly grey literature and excavation reports) semantically accessible and search-
able, through ontologically mapping them to CIDOC-CRM. Research by Moussa and
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Fritsch [243], attempts to link 3D models with bibliographic repositories containing
relevant evidential information. Verhagen et al [244] devote a book to archaeological
site prediction involving the visualisation of its uncertainty, through using models
such as Dempster-Shafer and Bayesian analysis.
Those research projects reinforce a number of points also made in this thesis and
justify the original research position: That archaeological visualisation has the poten-
tial to be transformed to archaeological knowledge visualisation. This thesis suggests
that the direction to get there would be through a re-examination of how 3D models
are created. In order for the model to carry a representative significance, it should
have a semantic awareness of what it is, what it can be associated with, and what in-
formation is available that gives it this representation. Semantic annotation of inform-
ation and lack of information, vagueness, uncertainty, will be crucial for the further
development of archaeological knowledge representation.
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Participant No______________ 
 
 1
Introduction to the questionnaire 
The following questions are related to the reconstruction and interpretation of 
buildings and structures in general; please keep this in mind when giving 
your answers.  The following questions are applied to cases where you have 
collected all available data from a site.   
Please state your opinion as in the following example: 
1. I often consider two or more valid interpretations. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
The circled answer indicates that you seldom encounter the above scenario. 
Answer the questions independently in the order that they appear.   
Do not skip questions or return to a previous question to change your 
answer. 
Participant No______________ 
 
 2
The following questions explore the notion of uncertainty through 
archaeological interpretation 
ARCHAEOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY 
1.  Archaeology is fraught with uncertainty: You can never be too sure about 
anything. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
2. There is only one true interpretation of a site. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
3. Other alternatives to my interpretation could be equally viable. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
4. I often consider two or more valid interpretations.  
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
5. I often consider two or more valid interpretations and present one.  
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
6. I always end up with one interpretation and no alternatives. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
7. I feel sure about my interpretation given the available evidence. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
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The following questions relate to the interpretation of features and structural 
evidence; these indicate any non-portable remnant of human activity 
whether a structure, ditch, post-hole, etc.  
FEATURES 
1. While archaeology is uncertain, structural evidence gives me security.  
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
2. When faced with structural evidence I usually make up my mind very 
quickly as to how the building looked.  
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
3. I try to understand the function of the building (i.e. what it was used 
for) and make my reconstruction around it. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
4. First I interpret the structural evidence and then I deduce the 
building’s function. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
5. Most times I am more sure about the ground floors than an existence 
of a second storey. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
6. Interpreting basic structural shapes (e.g. walls) is easy even when you 
have just the foundations 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
7. I am comfortable with placing exits in a building when the structural 
evidence suggests it. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
 Continues overleaf… 
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8. I am comfortable with placing exits in a building in the absence of 
structural evidence. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
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The following questions relate to the interpretation of: 
 artefacts: objects made or modified by human culture 
 biofacts; objects found at an archaeological site and carrying 
archaeological significance, but not altered by human hands (e.g. 
wood, bone, etc).  
ARTEFACTS 
1. Scarcity of artefacts in a site greatly hinders my interpretation of the 
site 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
2. Interpreting the function of a room mostly depends on what artefacts I 
have found. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
3. Artefacts mostly help in the details of a structure (e.g. roof style, room 
decorations) 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
4. I can interpret the look of a room without any artefacts. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
BIOFACTS 
5. Scarcity of biofacts in a site greatly hinders my interpretation 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
6. Interpreting the function of a room mostly depends on what biofacts I 
have found. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
 
 
Continues overleaf… 
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7. I can interpret the look of a room without any biofacts. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
Participant No______________ 
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The following questions relate to Comparative data. This means comparison 
with other cases and the environment. Comparative data includes: 
 Absolute comparisons: compare with similar buildings 
 Contextual comparisons:  examines the context of the building (e.g. its 
surrounding) as well as the building itself with similar contexts 
 Topography: The study of the surrounding environment; formulations 
of the ground, earth features, etc. 
COMPARATIVE DATA 
1. I often base my interpretation on the surrounding topography of the 
area 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
2. I rely on similar structures to establish a layout of the site. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
3. Documented structures (e.g. in archaeological publications) 
contemporary to the one I work on greatly influence my interpretation. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
4. I often change my interpretation of the structural features when faced 
with contradictory contextual comparisons. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
5. The surrounding environment greatly influences the structure and 
layout of a building. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
6. I often place exits on a building according to the surrounding 
landscape. 
Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
7. I will change my interpretation of the structural features if textual 
evidence suggests it. 
Continues overleaf… 
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Never Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
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The following questions relate to peer review and explore the depth of 
discussing results and interpretations with one’s peers. 
PEER REVIEW 
1. I find it useful to discuss my interpretations with my peers 
Never     Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
2. I rely upon peer interpretations and comments 
Never     Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
3. I sometimes find that my peers’ opinions change my interpretation  
Never     Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
4. Peer discussion results in better interpretations and results 
Never     Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
5. How often do you discuss interpretations with your peers? 
Never     Almost 
never 
Seldom     Sometimes     Often   Very 
often 
Always 
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Consider the following types of evidence. Please circle the following 
combinations in terms of which you think give stronger evidence for your 
reconstructions.  The grading is from 1 to 9; 1 being the weakest and 9 the 
strongest, as in the following example: 
Artefacts & Peer input        weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
This would indicate that the above combination tends to be quite strong. 
EVIDENCE COMBINATIONS 
Features & Artefacts weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Features & Biofacts weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Features & topography weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Features & absolute comparisons weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Features & contextual comparison weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Features & textual evidence weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Features & peer input weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
  
Artefacts & biofacts weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Artefacts & topography weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Artefacts & absolute comparisons weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Artefacts & contextual comparison weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Artefacts & textual evidence weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Artefacts & peer input weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
  
Biofacts & topography weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Biofacts & absolute comparisons weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Continues overleaf… 
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Biofacts & contextual comparison weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Biofacts & textual evidence weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Biofacts & peer input weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
  
Topography & absolute comparisons weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Topography & contextual comparison weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Topography & textual evidence weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
Topography & peer input weak     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9     strong 
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Consider the following types of evidence usually available in an excavation 
and how important they usually are in your interpretations of a site. 
 Please read the complete list first.   
You are asked to rank the evidence in order of importance, from 1 to 8; 1 
being the lowest (least important) and 8 the highest (most important). Use a 
number only once. 
EVIDENCE TYPE RANKS 
Evidence type Score 
Features  
Artefacts  
Biofacts  
Topography  
Contextual comparisons  
Absolute comparisons  
Textual evidence  
Peer input/outside support  
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OPEN QUESTIONS 
Through this questionnaire you have been asked to think about different 
categories of evidence that turn up in an excavation. The categories were:  
 Features 
 Artefacts 
 Biofacts 
 Topography 
 Contextual comparisons 
 Absolute comparisons 
 Textual evidence 
 Peer input/outside support 
You will now be asked a few questions regarding the questionnaire and its 
contents. Please feel free to add your comments. 
OPEN QUESTIONS  
Please circle the correct answer. 
Do you consider the categories of evidence list to be complete?  Yes No 
If you have answered NO, please use the following space to express a more 
complete opinion and include any other possible categories: 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
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Was the questionnaire difficult to fill in?  Yes  No 
 
Did it take a lot of time to fill in?   Yes  No 
 
Did you find the questionnaire tiring?           Yes  No 
 
Did you find the questionnaire offensive?  Yes  No 
 
If you have answered yes to any of the above question you may use the 
following space to express a more complete opinion.   
 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________ 
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Finally, you may use the space to express any additional comments about 
the questionnaire. 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
Please Use Overleaf If Necessary 
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Please fill in the following information: 
 
Name:    _____________________________________________ 
 
E-mail:           _____________________________________________ 
 
Age Group: less than 25  
    26-33  
    34-41  
    42-49  
    50-57  
    58-65     
                more than 65 
 
Gender:  Male / Female 
 
Date and Time:  ____________________ _____________________ 
 
Years of excavation expertise:  
less than 10  11-20   21-30   31-40   more than 40 
 
 
Major area of excavation expertise: 
 
 _____________________________________________ 
 
Current Status:  Technical Research Fellow  Academic 
    Other (please specify):___________________________ 
 
To what extend do you use a    Not at all             Very much 
computer in your daily activities?    1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU!  
 
